Opinion
01-CV-1137
June 17, 2002
Margaret L. Wachtmeister, Plattsburgh, NY, Plaintiff pro se.
Samuel Hoar, JR., Esq., Dinse, Knapp M.C. Andrew, P.C., Burlington, VT, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff started her employment as a public health nurse with the Clinton County Department of Public Health ("Department") in 1994. An occurrence with one of plaintiff's patients in October 1997, alerted the Department to certain irregularities in the manner plaintiff was carrying out her employment duties. This prompted the Department's Director of Patient Services, defendant Joanne Swiesz, to institute a critical appraisal of how plaintiff was carrying out her duty assignments. The appraisal consisted of a formal audit of a sample of the charts maintained for plaintiff's patients, and it revealed disparities and mistakes in every one of the charts chosen for assessment. The Department immediately implemented a "plan of correction" for plaintiff which included her required participation in scheduled group discussions with her supervisors and taking a series of competency tests. Plaintiff failed six of the eleven tests she took and the exams were discontinued when she was suspected of cheating.
§ 75 of the New York State Civil Service Law sets for the procedure for the removal and other disciplinary action against civil service personnel. In January 1998, plaintiff was charged under this statute with fifty-five specifications of misconduct in the following six charges:
Charge 1), 9 specifications that she failed to execute medical regimens prescribed by a physician,
Charge 2), 22 specifications that she failed to consistently maintain a an accurate patient record for her clients,
Charge 3), 4 specifications that she failed to properly supervise home health aids,
Charge 4), 17 specifications that she failed to provide appropriate follow-up care for her patients,
Charge 5), 2 specifications that she failed to meet the standards of practice for a registered nurse, and
Charge 6), 1 specification that she failed to demonstrate good judgment and moral behavior from the allegation that she had cheated on one of the competency examinations.
At the conclusion of a full and protracted hearing on these charges, wherein plaintiff had participated with the assistance of counsel, and had the opportunity to testify and cross examine witnesses, the Hearing Officer found every specification in Charges1 through 5 were proven and that plaintiff was incompetent and/or committed misconduct within the meaning of § 75 of the Civil Service Law. Charge 6 was found to be unproven. Approximately one month later, defendant John V. Andrus, the Department's Director of Public Health, adopted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, and penalized plaintiff with dismissal from employment as of July 13, 1998.
Plaintiff then brought a proceeding pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 78 ("Article 78 proceeding") against defendants Swiesz and Andrus seeking abrogation of the § 75 hearing decision, reinstatement to her position as a public health nurse and back pay. The proceeding was filed in the New York State Supreme Court, Clinton County, and transferred to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
In her Article 78 proceeding, plaintiff claimed that defendants did not provide all of the documents she requested and needed to prepare her response to the charges made against her, nor was she given sufficient time prior to the hearing to complete her response, that the Hearing Officer made various errors regarding the admission of evidence at her hearing, that the penalty she received was very unfair and not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff requests the court for immediate reinstatement to her position as a Public Health Nurse, and for back pay from July 13, 1998, to the date of her reinstatement.
The Appellate Division found plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive, upheld plaintiff's discharge, and dismissed the Article 78 proceeding. Wachtmeister v. Andrus, 279 A.D.2d 822, 719 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Third Dept. 2001). An appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals was dismissed sua sponte on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was directly involved. 96 N.Y.2d 853, 729 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2001).
On July 13, 2001, plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking reinstatement to her former position, back pay and compensatory damages. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending that plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, the applicable statute of limitations and immunity, and that the complaint has failed to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff had entered opposition to this motion.
DISCUSSION
A dismissal under 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a judgment on the merits, a determination that the facts in the complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Teltronics Services, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 3108, 69 L.Ed.2d 971 (1971). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the court "must accept as true all the allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). Dismissal of a claim is not proper unless it is obvious that the plaintiff is unable to prove no set of facts supporting his claim which will enable him to prevail. Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984). A complaint may be dismissed, however, when the facts pleaded and the reasonable inferences therefrom are legally insufficient to support the relief sought. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ex rel Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1988). "The function of a motion to dismiss is merely to assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill, Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 744 [ 748 F.2d 774], 749 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 363 [ 616 F.2d 636], 369 (2d Cir. 1980)). When determining the sufficiency of plaintiff's claim, for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes, consideration is limited to the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint, to documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated by reference, to matters of which judicial notice may be taken, or to documents either in plaintiff's possession or of which plaintiff had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit. Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42,47 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960, 112 S.Ct. 1561, 118 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992). As the judgment of a state court is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned," Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2), a court may take judicial notice of it and consider it in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion. Conopco, Inc. v. Roll International, 231 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000). Dismissal under 12(b)(6) is appropriate when a defendant raises a claim preclusion as an affirmative defense and it is clear from the face of the complaint, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice, that the plaintiff's claims are barred as a matter of law. Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1994).
[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given the judgment under the law of the State in which judgment was rendered." Migra v.Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d, (1984), 28 U.S.C § 1738. Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in the action." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, under New York law, res judicata, will not apply where the initial forum was not empowered to award the full measure of the relief sought in the subsequent litigation. Giakoumelous v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56,61 (2d Cir. 1996). "[A] New York plaintiff is not barred from seeking damages, in federal court, on civil rights claims by reason of a prior judgment in an Article 78 proceeding requesting injunctive or affirmative relief. The reason is that damages are not available in these circumstances in an Article 78 proceeding and therefore that action cannot give the damages relief demanded in a civil rights suit such as this one." Davis v. Halpern, 813 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1987); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 870 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1995). Since plaintiff could not have litigated her claim for actual damages in the Article 78 proceeding, she should not be precluded by res judicata from seeking relief in a § 1983 federal action.
Plaintiff is precluded from raising her claims, however, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Under this doctrine, "once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issues in a [later] suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first action." Allen, 449 U.S. at 94, 101 S.Ct. at 414; Burgos, 14 F.3d at 789. Collateral estoppel is applied in a later court if: (1) there has been a final determination on the merits on the issues sought to be precluded; (2) the party against whom the issue preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision invoked as dispositive in the later controversy; and (3) the issue sought to be precluded by the earlier suit is the same issue involved in the later action. Davis, 813 F.2d at 39.
In her § 1983 action, plaintiff challenges her discharge on the grounds that it was not supported by substantial evidence, that she had not been provided with adequate process, and her hearing had not been fair and impartial. In her Article 78 proceeding, plaintiff litigated these issues concerning the hearing which resulted in her dismissal, the evidentiary rulings of the hearing officer, the substantive bases for the decision of the hearing officer, and the rationality and legality of the decision.
Article 78 provides a summary proceeding which can be used to review administrative decisions. If the record before the Article 78 court demonstrates a lack of appropriate procedure, the Article 78 court has the authority to order the agency to conduct a proper hearing, regardless of the type of substantive claim involved. In the Matter of Pasta Chef, Inc. v. State Liquor Authority, 54 A.D.2d 1112, 389 N.Y.S.2d (4th Dept. 1976), aff'd., 44 N.Y.2d 766, 406 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1978). An Article 78 proceeding, therefore, constitutes a constitutionally adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes. Hellenic American Neighborhood Action Committee v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1996). No reason exists to depart from the presumption that a judicial trial represents the epitome of full process. Campo v. New York City Employees Retirement System, 843 F.2d 96, 100-101, 103 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Appellate Division found that the record demonstrated that there was "overwhelming evidence of plaintiff's misconduct," and that "[i]n light of such proof, we cannot say that the penalty of termination was not so disproportionate to the offenses committed as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Wachtmeister, 279 A.D.2d at 823, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 346. Plaintiff's other contentions were examined by the Article 78 court and found to be lacking in merit. Id. The appellate court's review of the Article 75 hearing is a determination on the merits, Genova v. Town of Southampton, 458 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dept. 1983), and is properly accorded estoppel effect under New York law. Genova v. Town of Southampton, 776 F.2d 1560, 1561 (2d Cir. 1985). The preclusive effect of the prior litigation is not disturbed by the fact that these issues were not previously phrased in constitutional terms. Id.
Accordingly, defendants motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is GRANTED and the complaint is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.