Opinion
No. 352703
02-25-2021
WEST MICHIGAN ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, Respondent-Appellant.
Lennon, Miller, O'Connor & Bartosiewicz, Kalamazoo (by Andrew J. Vorbrich and Christopher D. Morris ) for the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church. Toby Koenig and Jason C. Grinnell, Assistant City Attorneys, for the city of Grand Rapids.
Lennon, Miller, O'Connor & Bartosiewicz, Kalamazoo (by Andrew J. Vorbrich and Christopher D. Morris ) for the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.
Toby Koenig and Jason C. Grinnell, Assistant City Attorneys, for the city of Grand Rapids.
Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Markey and Tukel, JJ.
Tukel, J. Since 1893, the General Property Tax Act has generally excluded a "parsonage" from being subject to the property tax. In this case, respondent, the city of Grand Rapids, argues that a home owned by petitioner and lived in by Reverend Doctor Margie Crawford, an ordained minister who does not have a designated congregation but who occupies an administrative role overseeing multiple congregations for petitioner, does not meet the statutory definition of "parsonage." The Michigan Tax Tribunal (the MTT) disagreed, upholding the exemption. Respondent thus appeals as of right the MTT's order which denied respondent's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and which granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) to petitioner, the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.
In essence, the dispute boils down to which of two possible interpretations of the term "parsonage" is correct: does that term require that (1) property be owned by a religious society and occupied by an ordained minister who serves a particular congregation; or (2) does property owned by a religious society and occupied by an ordained minister who does not serve a particular congregation, but who otherwise works as a minister on behalf of the religious society also qualify. Respondent argues for the first option, while petitioner argues that the second, more expansive, possibility applies. We agree with petitioner that given the undisputed facts of this case and the legal definition of parsonage, the house qualifies for the tax exemption. We therefore find no legal error in the MTT's grant of summary disposition to petitioner, and we affirm its order.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS
The basic facts of this case are straightforward and agreed to by the parties. Rev. Dr. Crawford is an ordained minister who works for petitioner in an administrative capacity in the church hierarchy. Rev. Dr. Crawford does not serve any specific congregation but instead occupies an administrative role as the District Superintendent overseeing petitioner's Midwest District, which encompasses 91 individual churches. In her role as District Superintendent, Rev. Dr. Crawford "oversee[s] the total ministry of the clergy and of the churches in the communities of the District." As part of this function, Rev. Dr. Crawford gives at least one guest sermon per year at each of the churches in her district; she also provides pastoral care "to anyone with a physical or mental ailment within [her] District" and could be "called upon to serve as Chaplain, if needed." Rev. Dr. Crawford lives in a residential house owned by petitioner and located in Grand Rapids (the residence). Petitioner applied for tax exemption for the residence for tax year 2019, but respondent denied petitioner's application and assessed the residence as having a taxable value of $98,200. Petitioner then made the same request for tax exemption "before the appropriate local Board of Review," but the Board of Review also denied petitioner's request. Petitioner then appealed that decision to the MTT.
Respondent eventually moved for summary disposition and argued that the residence did not qualify as a "parsonage" under MCL 211.7s because Rev. Dr. Crawford does not minister to a specific congregation. Petitioner responded that Rev. Dr. Crawford was not required to minister to a specific congregation for the residence to qualify as a parsonage. The MTT agreed with petitioner and granted it summary disposition, concluding that the residence qualifies as a parsonage. This appeal followed.
MCL 211.7s provides:
Houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand, the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and any parsonage owned by a religious society of this state and occupied as a parsonage are exempt from taxation under this act. Houses of public worship includes buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Unless there is fraud, this Court's review of MTT "decisions is limited to determining whether the MTT erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong legal principle." VanderWerp v. Plainfield Charter Twp. , 278 Mich. App. 624, 627, 752 N.W.2d 479 (2008). If this Court's "review requires the interpretation and application of a statute, that review is de novo." Power v. Dep't of Treasury , 301 Mich. App. 226, 230, 835 N.W.2d 622 (2013). "Though this Court will generally ‘defer to the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute that it is delegated to administer,’ that deference will not extend to cases in which the tribunal makes a legal error. Thus, agency interpretations are entitled to ‘respectful consideration’ but cannot control in the face of contradictory statutory text." SBC Health Midwest, Inc. v. Kentwood , 500 Mich. 65, 71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (2017) (citations omitted).
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint and is reviewed de novo. Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200, 205-206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Patrick v. Turkelson , 322 Mich. App. 595, 605, 913 N.W.2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary disposition "is appropriate ... if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., L.L.P. , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "Only the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered may be considered." 1300 Lafayette East Coop., Inc. v. Savoy , 284 Mich. App. 522, 525, 773 N.W.2d 57 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, "[s]ummary disposition is properly granted to the opposing party [under MCR 2.116(I)(2) ] if it appears to the court that that party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment." Sharper Image Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 216 Mich. App. 698, 701, 550 N.W.2d 596 (1996). "Additionally, statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to review de novo." Mich. Milk Producers Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 242 Mich. App. 486, 491, 618 N.W.2d 917 (2000).
III. ANALYSIS
The MTT correctly applied the general definition of "parsonage"—that is, the home of a parson—as well as the remainder of the statutory language of the exemption. Contrary to respondent's argument, the statute has no requirement that in order for a residence to constitute a "parsonage," its resident must be a pastor who ministers to a particular congregation. The statute does require, though, that the residence be used as a parsonage. Therefore, so long as the resident is a minister who is not retired or otherwise unconnected to church functions, such a home is used as a parsonage and therefore qualifies for the exemption.
Throughout this opinion, we use the terms "church" and "religious society" interchangeably, because although the statutory term is "religious society," the particular society at issue here is a church. Our holding, of course, applies to any religious society of any faith, regardless of the nomenclature it uses to describe itself. The same goes for our use of the terms "minister" or "pastor"; although many religious societies or faiths use different words—and the statute applies equally to each of them—"minister" is the term used by the religious society involved in this case.
A. LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE
As an initial matter, petitioner argues that because the Legislature has not overruled or modified St. Joseph's Church v. Detroit , 189 Mich. 408, 155 N.W. 588 (1915), the rule set down in that case is settled and we cannot modify it by virtue of a doctrine known as "legislative acquiescence." That argument is not viable, however, because "it has been the rule in Michigan since at least Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. , 460 Mich. 243, 261, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999), that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is not recognized in this state." Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm. , 477 Mich. 197, 209 n. 8, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007). Indeed, "the legislative acquiescence doctrine is a highly disfavored doctrine of statutory construction; sound principles of statutory construction require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature's intent from its words, not from its silence." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence has no force in this state, and we instead rely on normal principles of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of "parsonage" as used in MCL 211.7s. B. THE PARSONAGE EXCEPTION
Although petitioner is incorrect about the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, it is correct that we are nevertheless bound by St. Joseph's . See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Lansing , 499 Mich. 177, 191-192, 880 N.W.2d 765 (2016), discussed later in this opinion.
The parties agree that petitioner is a religious society and that it owns the residence. They further agree that Rev. Dr. Crawford is an ordained minister; that she lives in the residence; and that, in her role as District Superintendent, she does not minister to a particular congregation. The purely legal issue before us is whether an ordained pastor must minister to a particular congregation for his or her residence to qualify as a parsonage. As such, this case presents a question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of a "parsonage" within the meaning of MCL 211.7s, which we review de novo.
1. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
This Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have described the rules of statutory construction as follows:
"The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute's language. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." [ PNC Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 285 Mich. App. 504, 506, 778 N.W.2d 282 (2009), quoting Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare Sys. , 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001).]
"Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used." In re Smith Estate , 252 Mich. App. 120, 124, 651 N.W.2d 153 (2002) ; MCL 8.3a. Nevertheless, "technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." MCL 8.3a. As our Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions in interpreting statutes, "[i]f the language is plain and unambiguous, then judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted." Johnson v. Pastoriza , 491 Mich. 417, 436, 818 N.W.2d 279 (2012). See also McCormick v. Carrier , 487 Mich. 180, 195, 795 N.W.2d 517 (2010) ; Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 526, 697 N.W.2d 895 (2005). Finally, "[t]he provisions of any law or statute which is re-enacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments." MCL 8.3u.
In addition, "[a] property tax exemption is in derogation of the principle that all property shall bear a proportionate share of the tax burden and, consequently, a tax exemption will be strictly construed." Retirement Homes of Detroit Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Sylvan Twp. , 416 Mich. 340, 348, 330 N.W.2d 682 (1982). The rule that tax exemptions are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxing authority is applied "[i]n general." Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing Twp. , 423 Mich. 661, 664, 378 N.W.2d 737 (1985). "However, this rule does not mean that we should give a strained construction which is adverse to the Legislature's intent." Id. at 665, 378 N.W.2d 737, cited by TruGreen Ltd. Partnership v. Dep't of Treasury, 332 Mich. App. 73, 110, 955 N.W.2d 529 (2020) ( SWARTZLE , J., dissenting). Indeed, "because the canon requiring strict construction of tax exemptions does not help reveal the semantic content of a statute, it is a canon of last resort." TOMRA of North America, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 505 Mich. 333, 343, 952 N.W.2d 384 (2020). Furthermore, as regards both of the cited rules of the construction of tax law, deference to the MTT and narrow construction of tax exemptions, it is important to bear in mind that they each are just those—rules of construction. As we have noted, when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. 2. STATUTORY HISTORY
The tax exemption in MCL 211.7s originally was enacted by 1893 PA 206 and was most recently amended by 1980 PA 142. The language of the statute relevant to this case has remained essentially unchanged since its original enactment in 1893. Today, MCL 211.7s provides:
As originally enacted, the statute exempted the following from all taxation under the act:
All houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand, the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and also any parsonage owned by any religious society of this State and occupied as such. [1893 PA 206, § 7.]
Houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand, the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and any parsonage owned by a religious society of this state and occupied as a parsonage are exempt from taxation under this act. Houses of public worship includes buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society.
Thus, as an initial matter, the relevant statutory language—"any parsonage owned by a religious society of this state and occupied as a parsonage"—is unchanged from the original act, except that the more archaic language of "and occupied as such" has been updated to "occupied as a parsonage," along with some minor punctuation changes and the change from "owned by any religious society of this State" to "owned by a religious society." (Emphasis added.) 3. THE CASELAW
To the extent we consider the common understanding of a word or phrase at the time it was adopted by the Legislature, which we discuss later in this opinion, it is the original 1893 enactment which is controlling because, despite more than 30 reenactments, the language of the parsonage exemption has remained substantively unchanged throughout those years. See MCL 8.3u ("The provisions of any law or statute which is re-enacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments."). For purposes of this case, the relevant statutory language from the 1893 act was "any parsonage owned by any religious society of this State and occupied as such." As noted, none of the more than 30 acts addressing the parsonage exception altered that language in any material way.
Indeed, 1901 PA 44 made no changes; 1909 PA 309 merely deleted the comma after "houses of public worship"; 1911 PA 174 and 1919 PA 331 made no changes from the previous versions; and 1925 PA 55 reinserted the comma after "houses of public worship" and ceased capitalizing the word "State." Those changes did not affect the substance of the act.
A whole series of amendments then made no change whatsoever to the previous versions of the exemption. See 1927 PA 118; 1931 PA 42; 1933 PA 243; 1939 PA 232; 1941 PA 125; 1942 (2d Ex. Sess.) PA 8; 1943 PA 131; 1945 PA 76; 1946 (Ex. Sess.) PA 24; 1949 PA 24; 1949 PA 55; 1951 PA 169; 1952 PA 54; 1955 PA 46; 1958 PA 190; 1960 PA 155; 1961 PA 238; 1963 PA 148; 1966 PA 320; 1968 PA 342; 1971 PA 109; 1971 PA 189; 1974 PA 358; and 1976 PA 135. The 1931 and 1963 acts changed the catchlines of the exemption but made no other changes. Because "[t]he catch line heading of any section of the statutes that follows the act section number shall in no way be deemed to be a part of the section or the statute, or be used to construe the section more broadly or narrowly than the text of the section would indicate, but shall be deemed to be inserted for purposes of convenience to persons using publications of the statutes," MCL 8.4b, those two changes did not alter the exemption in any substantive way.
In 1976, the Legislature added a second sentence to the exemption, which defined the term "houses of public worship" as including "buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used exclusively for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society," but left intact the existing relevant statutory language "any parsonage owned by any religious society of this state and occupied as such." 1976 PA 432. In 1978, the Legislature changed the beginning of the statute from "All houses of public worship" to "Houses of public worship," 1978 PA 54, which worked no change in meaning. The Legislature also made a minor change regarding parsonages, changing the phrase "and also any parsonage owned by any religious society" to "and any parsonage owned by a religious society." Id. (emphasis added). "A" and "any" have the same meaning as used in the amendment, so 1978 PA 54 was simply a reenactment of the previous version. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman , 432 Mich. 656, 698, 443 N.W.2d 734 (1989) (stating that " ‘[a]’ or ‘an’ is an indefinite article often used in the sense of ‘any’ ....") (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally, the present version of the exemption was enacted in 1980. The 1980 amendment, 1980 PA 142, made no material amendments to the exemption at issue here, simply using more modern language and word order, including "occupied as a parsonage" in place of a parsonage "occupied as such." MCL 211.7s now provides, "Houses of public worship, with the land on which they stand, the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and any parsonage owned by a religious society of this state and occupied as a parsonage are exempt from taxation under this act." The 1980 act made a substantive change which does not affect this case: it changed the definition of "houses of public worship" from including "buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used exclusively for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society" to "buildings or other facilities owned by a religious society and used predominantly for religious services or for teaching the religious truths and beliefs of the society." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, although the parsonage exemption has been "re-enacted, amended or revised" on numerous occasions, MCL 8.3u, its provisions "are the same as those of prior laws" and thus "shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments." In other words, to the extent the Legislature's understanding of a word or phrase is at issue, we look to the original 1893 act to determine that understanding, as all the subsequent amendments have simply been reenactments and thus continuations of the 1893 legislation. See id. ; People v. Bolling , 140 Mich. App. 606, 611-612, 364 N.W.2d 759 (1985) (construing the word "timber" as it was understood by the Legislature in 1867, when the statute at issue was enacted).
a. MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT
Despite Michigan's long history of a statutory parsonage exemption from property taxes, few cases have actually addressed it or had occasion to define a "parsonage." Indeed, the parties have identified only three cases, St. Joseph's Church v. Detroit , 189 Mich. 408, 155 N.W. 588 (1915) ; St. Matthew Lutheran Church v. Delhi Twp. , 76 Mich. App. 597, 257 N.W.2d 183 (1977) ; and St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Bay City , 114 Mich. App. 616, 319 N.W.2d 378 (1982), that they believe address the issue; our review of the relevant caselaw has not discovered any additional cases. St. Matthew and St. John's were each decided by this Court before November 1, 1990, and therefore are, at most, persuasive authority. See In re Stillwell Trust , 299 Mich. App. 289, 299 n. 1, 829 N.W.2d 353 (2012) ("Although cases decided before November 1, 1990, are not binding precedent, MCR 7.215(J)(1), they nevertheless can be considered persuasive authority.") (citation omitted). St. Joseph's , however, was decided by our Supreme Court, and although it was decided more than 100 years ago, it retains its precedential authority. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Lansing , 499 Mich. 177, 191-192, 880 N.W.2d 765 (2016) ("The Court of Appeals is bound to follow decisions by this Court except where those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded and is not authorized to anticipatorily ignore our decisions where it determines that the foundations of a Supreme Court decision have been undermined.") (emphasis omitted). Consequently, to construe how earlier cases have defined "parsonage," we first address St. Joseph's before turning to St. Matthew and St. John's .
Given the similarity of the names of the churches in the three leading cases, we will sometimes include the name of the respondent, which might aid the reader in distinguishing the cases.
Congregation B'nai Jacob v. Oak Park , 102 Mich. App. 724, 302 N.W.2d 296 (1981), addressed a situation in which the religious society had multiple clergy, owned multiple homes, and each of the clergy resided in one of the homes. The legal question thus was whether each of the homes qualified for the tax exemption under the statute, such "that a given congregation may have multiple tax exempt parsonages." Id. at 728, 302 N.W.2d 296. We held "that such multiple exemptions are within the scope of the statute." Id. That question is not presented in this case, although we discuss Congregation B'nai Jacob later in this opinion.
In St. Joseph's , our Supreme Court addressed whether the parsonage exception applied to a residence while it was under construction, before the minister moved into it. St. Joseph's , 189 Mich. at 410-412, 155 N.W. 588. To answer that question, the St. Joseph's Court examined the 1911 version of the parsonage exception, 1911 PA 174, which provided that the following was exempt from taxation:
All houses of public worship with the land on which they stand, the furniture therein and all rights in the pews, and also any parsonage owned by any religious society of this State and occupied as such. [1911 PA 174; St. Joseph's , 189 Mich. at 413, 155 N.W. 588.][ ]
The 1911 version of the act was the same as the original 1893 version, except for the deletion of a single comma, which did not affect the meaning. See note 5 of this opinion. The 1911 version thus was a reenactment of the 1893 version, and so for all practical purposes it was the original 1893 version which our Supreme Court construed in St. Joseph's .
Immediately after quoting the statutory language, the St. Joseph's Court held:
A parsonage may be defined as a house in which a minister of the gospel resides. In its ecclesiastical sense the word was ‘glebe (or land) and house’ belonging to a parish appropriated to the maintenance of the incumbent, or settled pastor of a church; but its modern general signification is in the sense of its being the residence of a parson, and it may be with land or without it. [ St. Joseph's , 189 Mich. at 413, 155 N.W. 588.]
The reference to the ecclesiastical definition is merely a historical aside; the Court was obligated to apply the same statutorily-mandated rule of construction which exists to the present day, encompassing the common understanding of a word. It is the "modern general signification" which constitutes a word's "common and approved understanding," not its ecclesiastical definition. In St. Joseph's , our Supreme Court ruled that the house was not a parsonage because the minister did not yet live in it. Id. at 413-415, 155 N.W. 588. The Court held that under the statute, a "parsonage must first be occupied as a parsonage, before it can be held to be exempt from taxation. In other words, it is an essential requirement of the statute that the parsonage must be occupied as such before it can be legally exempted from taxation." Id. at 413, 155 N.W. 588. Once the property was occupied, the city, "finding that a parsonage had been built, and was at that time occupied, exempted the property from further taxation." Id. at 411, 155 N.W. 588 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the common understanding or "general signification" of the meaning of "parsonage" was simply "the residence of a parson," whether "with land or without it." Id. at 413, 155 N.W. 588. For the same reason, that aspect of the definition was not obiter dicta, as petitioner argues, because it was the controlling, common definition when enacted and was relied on by the Legislature.
See 1893 CL 50(l), which provided:
All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.
See also current MCL 8.3a. The current versions of MCL 8.3 to MCL 8.3w were unchanged from their enactment in 1846 until 1959. See Green, The Revised Statutes of the State of Michigan, Passed and Approved May 18, 1846 (Detroit: Bagg & Harmon, 1846), pp. 35-36; 1915 CL § 3(1). In 1959, without changing any of the text, the various subsections were changed from numbered paragraphs in MCL 8.3 to the various lettered subsections in the current version "to stand as sections 3a to 3w." See 1959 PA 189. That change was merely of the form of numbering. Thus, we are obliged to apply the same rules of construction as our Supreme Court applied in 1915. See current MCL 8.3u ("The provisions of any law or statute which is re-enacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of prior laws, shall be construed as a continuation of such laws and not as new enactments.").
In applying the commonly understood meaning of "parsonage," St. Joseph's did not hold or even advert that the resident of a parsonage must minister to a particular congregation, although it was clear in that case that "the rector" did so. Id. at 411, 155 N.W. 588. We are, of course, bound by St. Joseph's , but its scope is not clear. One could read St. Joseph's as foreclosing an argument that a pastor must minister to a particular congregation for a church-supplied residence in which the minister resides to constitute a parsonage, as it defined a parsonage simply as the residence of a pastor; or one could view St. Joseph's as holding that because the case did not present that issue, the Court simply did not address it and it remains an open question today. In conducting its analysis, St. Joseph's did not use a dictionary to determine the "common or approved understanding" of "parsonage," nor was it required to do so. See Hecht v. Nat'l Heritage Academies, Inc. , 499 Mich. 586, 621 n. 62, 886 N.W.2d 135 (2016) ("A lay dictionary may be consulted to define a common word or phrase that lacks a unique legal meaning.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, St. Joseph's did cite a legal encyclopedia. It seems that St. Joseph's implicitly relied on 1893 as the controlling date, as its statement of the "modern general signification" came directly from the 1891 case it cited, In re Wells’ Estate , 63 Vt. 116, 21 A. 270 (1891). See St. Joseph's , 189 Mich. at 413, 155 N.W. 588. And in any event, an 1893 dictionary would have given the same definition. See Sebring v. Berkley , 247 Mich. App. 666, 678-679, 637 N.W.2d 552 (2001) (explaining that because the meaning of a word or the primary accepted definition can change over time, courts often look to dictionary definitions in use at the time a statute was enacted); see also Cain v. Waste Mgt., Inc. (After Remand) , 472 Mich. 236, 247, 697 N.W.2d 130 (2005) (showing that the statute was amended many times over nearly 100 years without changing the word "loss" and stating that "[b]ecause the statute itself does not define ‘loss,’ " the Court "must ascertain the original meaning the word ‘loss’ had when the statute was enacted in 1912"). As of 1893, the dictionary definition of "parsonage" was the same as that used by St. Joseph's for the "modern general signification," viz., "[t]he house and glebe belonging to a parish or ecclesiastical society, and appropriated for the use of the minister of a church." A Dictionary of the English Language (1893). The 1915 dictionary definition, the year St. Joseph's was decided, was no different. See The Student's Practical Dictionary (1915) (defining "parsonage" as "[t]he house of the minister of a parish"). Furthermore, in 1893 and 1915, "parson" was defined as "[a] clergyman." A Dictionary of the English Language (1893); The Student's Practical Dictionary (1915).
Thus, under St. Joseph's , the resident of a parsonage is not required to minister to a particular parish. See St. Joseph's , 189 Mich. at 413, 155 N.W. 588. Rather, a parsonage is merely the residence of a parson. See id.
In addition, an alternative dictionary definition of "parish" in 1893 was "[t]he precinct or territorial jurisdiction of a secular priest or ecclesiastical society, or the precinct, the inhabitants of which belong to the same church" or "[a]ny religious or ecclesiastical society"; "ecclesiastical" was defined as "[p]ertaining to the church or to its organization or government"; and "church" was defined as "[a] building set apart for Christian worship," "[a] formally organized body of Christian believers worshipping together," "[a] body of Christian believers, observing the same rights and acknowledging the same ecclesiastical authority," "[t]he collective body of Christians," or "[e]cclesiastical influence, authority, &c." A Dictionary of the English Language (1893).
Based on these definitions, over the last approximately 130 years, the common understanding of "parsonage" plainly has not required that a pastor minister to one particular congregation. Rather, "parsonage" merely referred to a property belonging to a religious society and housing a minister of a church. That definition has not changed to the present; in 1980, when the present statute was amended, The Random House College Dictionary (1980) defined "parsonage" as "the residence of a parson or clergyman, as provided by the parish or church," and defined "church" as "organized religion as a political or social factor" and as "a Christian denomination." We provide the 1915 and 1980 definitions only out of historical interest; the 1893 common understanding of parsonage is controlling. See note 5 of this opinion.
b. MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS CASES
We now turn to the more recent cases. In St. Matthew , this Court considered whether properties lived in by church employees, who were a school instructor and a youth minister, qualified as parsonages. St. Matthew , 76 Mich. App. at 598-599, 257 N.W.2d 183. The St. Matthew Court quoted the St. Joseph's Court's definition of parsonage and held that "the [parsonage] exemption applies to any church owned house occupied by a minister ordained in that church." Id. at 599, 257 N.W.2d 183. Referring to the school instructor and youth minister, because "[n]either is ordained and they are referred to as lay ministers," id. at 598, 257 N.W.2d 183, the Court held that the exemption did not apply; rather, the school instructor and youth minister were simply "church employees," id. at 599, 257 N.W.2d 183 with no ministerial function. A dissent would have found that the lay ministers were ministers; the dissenting judge stated that the residences were "occupied by ‘ministers of the gospel’ " and that "I find no requirement that the ministers be formally ordained." Id. at 600, 257 N.W.2d 183 ( WALSH , P.J., dissenting). Thus, St. Matthew is clear that, as a legal matter, ordination is the key to whether or not an individual qualifies as a minister; however, the opinion does not shed much light on how the Court determined that fact, and the resolution of that factual question divided the Court.
Finally, in St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 617, 319 N.W.2d 378, the principal case relied on by respondent, this Court addressed the question of whether the church-owned residence of a "teaching minister" who was the superintendent of the church-run school qualified as a parsonage. The Court, relying on the tenets of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, which was the religious society of which the petitioner was part, drew a distinction between a "teaching minister" and a "preaching minister" who carried out the more traditional pulpit-minister functions. Id. at 618-619, 621, 319 N.W.2d 378. In contrasting teaching ministers and preaching ministers, the Court noted that "[t]he church views them equally as ministers of the gospel," id. at 619, 319 N.W.2d 378, and that among other qualifications and duties, the teaching ministers received theological training and were theologically equipped to perform marriages, id. at 621-622, 319 N.W.2d 378. St. John's then quoted the definitions of "parsonage" from St. Joseph's and St. Matthew before turning to a contemporary dictionary, concluding that "the parsonage exemption applies to a residence of the pastor or his assistants who are ordained teaching ministers for a particular congregation," id. at 624-625, 319 N.W.2d 378, then adding that it "agrees with the definition in St. Matthew [sic]," id. at 625, 319 N.W.2d 378. It is that language regarding "for a particular congregation" on which respondent relies for its argument that the residence is not exempt.
The holdings of St. Joseph's , St. Mathew , and St. John's are consistent and straightforward: a parsonage is the home of a minister, and a minster is someone who is "ordained in that church," St. Matthew , 76 Mich. App. at 599, 257 N.W.2d 183, or, to use the statutory language, ordained in a "religious society," MCL 211.7s. Ordination thus is defined by the doctrine or rules of the particular religious society at issue. For example, in regards to teaching ministers, if the religious society "views them equally as ministers of the gospel," St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 619, 319 N.W.2d 378, then they are ministers for purposes of the exemption, see id. at 621, 319 N.W.2d 378 (determining ordination by reference to "church canon and rules of theology of the Lutheran Church," which are "mandated from the headquarters of the church and [are] not a matter of local discretion," and stating that "[t]eaching ministers are installed or ordained"). By contrast, when an individual is not ordained, he or she is not a minister and the residence therefore is not a parsonage. St. Matthew , 76 Mich. App. at 599, 257 N.W.2d 183.
Respondent argues that in passing on the eligibility of the teaching ministers for the tax exemption, St. John's imposed a requirement that a purported pastor minister to a particular congregation. The origin of the "for a particular congregation" language is unclear; St. John's did not expressly tie it to any of the various definitions of "parsonage" it cited, although the Court noted that the word parsonage "has a local connotation, associating the clergyman and a particular church or congregation." St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 623, 319 N.W.2d 378. It is difficult to read that sentence as holding that a residence is a parsonage only if the minister who lives in it ministers to a particular congregation; it follows immediately after the sentence which reads, "Different dictionaries define a ‘parson’ as ‘any clergyman’ or as ‘the clergyman of a parish or congregation,’ and a ‘parsonage’ as a clergyman's dwelling, especially a free official residence provided for a parson or pastor or minister by his congregation.’ " Id. The term "any clergyman" is more expansive than the definition for which respondent argues, as is "a clergyman's dwelling," and neither encompasses a limitation regarding a particular congregation. And a more reasonable reading of the "for a particular congregation" language, if it were, in fact, intended as a limitation, refers not to the definition of parsonage but rather to the requirement that the residence be used as a parsonage, MCL 211.7s. In the context of St. John's , which involved a local minister of a local church, a residence could only be used as a parsonage if it was associated with "a particular congregation," as there is no indication that there was a supervisory church hierarchy, as in the present case. Thus, given the facts of St. John's , a residence could be a "parsonage" only if it was supplied to a "minister" associated with a particular church or congregation, as there was no other manner, factually, in which a residence could be used as a parsonage. Rev. Dr. Crawford's residence, by contrast, clearly can be used as a parsonage as it is a church-owned property occupied by an ordained minister serving church functions but whose ministerial duties involve administrative functions for numerous congregations.
Moreover, we note that previous decisions of this Court have gone beyond the strict limitation in the definition which respondent suggests. For example, the definition on which respondent relies defines "parson" as "the clergyman of a parish or congregation," St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 623, 319 N.W.2d 378 (emphasis added), which, if read strictly, would mean that each congregation could have only one parson and thus only one parsonage. Rather than adopt such a strict meaning, however, this Court has read the statute as permitting multiple ministers (or, more precisely in the context of the pertinent case, multiple rabbis) whose residences all qualified as parsonages. See Congregation B'nai Jacob v. Oak Park , 102 Mich. App. 724, 302 N.W.2d 296 (1981). St. John's noted the holding in Congregation B'nai Jacob , see St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 624, 319 N.W.2d 378, stating that "the Court put great emphasis on the fact that the rabbis involved therein were each equally responsible for the religious needs of the congregation," id. In other words, St. John's recognized that the "general signification" of definitions depends to some extent on the context. Thus, "the minister" can refer to multiple clergy members when the facts establish that there are multiple clergy members living in multiple residences owned by a religious society. Similarly, any general understanding that the term "parsonage" is limited to the residence used by a pastor to a particular congregation must give way when, as in this case, the pastor is part of a hierarchy and ministers to a number of churches. In fact, St. John's acknowledged some definitions of "minister" which seem to anticipate just that situation, noting that "[b]oth parson and pastor connote a minister, or rector, having charge of a local church or parish or body of churches. " St. John's , 114 Mich. App. at 624, 319 N.W.2d 378 (emphasis added; quotation marks and citation omitted). Rev. Dr. Crawford undisputedly has charge of a body of churches.
It is important to note that in discussing the definitions of "minister" and "parsonage" and their various meanings depending on the context, we are not construing actual statutory language, which must be strictly applied, but rather the general or common understanding of words which the Legislature left undefined. The common or general understanding of a word can have more than one definition. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p. 418 ("Because common words typically have more than one meaning, you must use the context in which a given word appears to determine its aptest, most likely sense.").
Finally, we note that it is not at all clear what the "for a particular congregation" language adds to the definition of parsonage. The holding of St. John's would have been the same had the Court said, "Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that the parsonage exemption applies to a residence of the pastor or his assistants who are ordained teaching ministers for a particular congregation," as it did, id. at 624-625, 319 N.W.2d 378, or if it had said, "Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that the parsonage exemption applies to a residence of the pastor or his assistants who are ordained teaching ministers" and not added the words "for a particular congregation." Even without the additional words, the statement would have been factually correct and would not have changed the holding that the exemption applied. Indeed, the issue of whether the school superintendent was associated with "a particular congregation" was not an issue at all in St. John's ; rather, the only question was whether he was ordained as a minister.
4. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
What we are left with, then, are the consistent holdings of the three cases and the plain language of the statute. The core definition of "parsonage" derives from St. Joseph's : a residence owned by a religious society, which is occupied by a minister ordained under the rules of that society. St. John's and St. Matthew each turned on the definition of ordination and fleshed out its meaning. The "for a particular congregation" language from St. John's is not part of that case's definition of ordination; St. John's also noted other definitions, including one which plainly did not encompass the limitation respondent seeks. St. John's express agreement with St. Matthew's definition of parsonage, which contains no limitation regarding a particular congregation, makes it quite apparent that St. John's did not impose such a limitation. Moreover, the statute refers to a "religious society," which is broader than the minister of a particular local church or parish; its plain meaning encompasses a minister who is part of the church hierarchy. We find no basis for reading the limitation respondent advocates into the statute. The statute, however, does impose the additional requirement that a residence be used as a parsonage to qualify for the exemption. MCL 211.7s.
Here, of course, there is no question that Dr. Rev. Crawford is a fully ordained minister in the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, a religious society. The residence undisputedly is owned by petitioner, a religious society; it is the residence of a parson, Dr. Rev. Crawford; and it is used as a parsonage because Dr. Rev. Crawford is an actively practicing minister of the religious society. The residence thus fully satisfies the requirements for exemption under the plain language of the tax statute, and no further construction is permitted. See Part III(B)(1) of this opinion. Respondent's attempt to tease a local limitation out of the terms "minister"—or "parson"—and "parsonage" is simply contrary to the common meaning of those words and the statute. We thus have no occasion to consider two rules of construction regarding tax law: (1) that "[a] property tax exemption is in derogation of the principle that all property shall bear a proportionate share of the tax burden and, consequently, a tax exemption will be strictly construed," Retirement Homes , 416 Mich. at 348, 330 N.W.2d 682 ; Mich. United Conservation Clubs , 423 Mich. at 664-665, 378 N.W.2d 737 (same), and (2) that we "generally defer to the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering and enforcing," Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 270 Mich. App. 539, 541, 716 N.W.2d 598 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The result would be different if, for example, Dr. Rev. Crawford were retired. That is because, if the minister living in a church-owned house is retired, then it is not used as a parsonage because its resident no longer has a connection to any church function.
IV. CONCLUSION
The MTT correctly applied the definition of "parsonage" based on that word's common understanding, that is, the home of a parson, as well as the remainder of the statutory language of the tax exemption. The facts of this case are undisputed, and thus our review is limited solely to that legal conclusion; for the reasons stated, the MTT committed no error of law. Contrary to respondent's argument, the statute has no requirement that in order for a residence to constitute a "parsonage," its resident be a pastor who ministers to a particular congregation. The statute does require, though, that the residence be used as a parsonage. In this case, those statutory requirements are met.
The MTT's order granting summary disposition to petitioner is affirmed. Petitioner, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
Markey, J., concurred with Tukel, J.
Swartzle, P.J. (concurring).
I fully concur in the majority's well-reasoned opinion. I write separately to address an issue that is cited by the majority, though not outcome-determinative in this case—the oft-stated directive that courts must give "respectful consideration" to an agency's statutory interpretation and the related directive that we should not deviate from that interpretation without "cogent reasons" for doing so. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich. , 482 Mich. 90, 103, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008). I will admit to a certain confusion regarding the "respectful consideration" directive aimed specifically at agency interpretations. As our Supreme Court explained in In re Complaint of Rovas , this directive is not one of deference to the agency's interpretation of statute. Id. at 107-108, 754 N.W.2d 259. For sound reasons, our Supreme Court has expressly rejected anything approaching Chevron deference in Michigan courts. Id. at 111, 754 N.W.2d 259 (discussing Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984) ).
Rather, our courts review questions of statutory construction under a de novo standard, whether the particular case before us originated in a circuit court or an agency. Under this standard, courts apply the plain meaning of the statute, or, if there is an actual ambiguity in the statute, we use various semantic, syntactic, and contextual canons of construction to try to resolve the ambiguity. Only when, "after applying all the normal tools of interpretation, an ambiguity cannot be resolved (which is never" ... or, at least, hardly ever), Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p. 233, should we resort to judicially created canons of last resort, see, e.g., TOMRA of North America, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 505 Mich. 333, 340-344, 952 N.W.2d 384 (2020).
In this process of interpretation, we do not defer to a circuit court's or agency's interpretation of a statute, though we certainly give that interpretation "respectful consideration," as we should. But crucially, this is no different, in my opinion, than what we are required to do with respect to the interpretation offered by the criminal defendant, the prosecutor, the individual plaintiff, the corporate defendant, the taxpayer, or any other party before the Court. What is the alternative—disrespectful consideration? No consideration? Something close-to-but-not-quite-respectful consideration? The alternatives are absurdities.
To be clear, my confusion is not with being required to give "respectful consideration" to an agency's interpretation, but rather it is with the fact that our caselaw has singled out the agency's interpretation for such consideration. I believe that our courts are required to give—and, in fact, do give—"respectful consideration" to the interpretation of a statute made by a circuit court, an agency, a party, an amicus curiae, or any other interested party, and there is no good jurisprudential reason for singling out the agency's interpretation in this regard. Similarly, there seems no good jurisprudential reason for singling out an agency's interpretation for approval absent "cogent reasons" favoring an alternative interpretation. In re Complaint of Rovas, 482 Mich. at 103, 754 N.W.2d 259. Again, what is the alternative, that courts would have non-cogent reasons for disagreeing with an agency's interpretation, or that a more persuasive argument offered by a taxpayer must be rejected because the agency's interpretation has satisfied some vague, undefinable quantum of cogency?
As I read our caselaw, the directives to give "respectful consideration" to an agency's interpretation and not depart from it unless there are "cogent reasons" for doing so are little more than judicial dross. The directives add nothing in substance to what we should do in every case involving statutory interpretation—give "respectful consideration" to the interpretations offered and select an interpretation supported by the most "cogent reasons." If, instead, these directives require courts to do something different when considering an agency interpretation than we do when considering a circuit court's or party's interpretation, then this is just a legalistic way of loading the dice in favor of the agency.
A court should adopt the best interpretation of a statute, based on a fair reading of the text, using clear, even-handed criteria objectively applied—full stop. If an agency's subject-matter expertise gives that agency some insight into what the Legislature meant when it enacted a particular statute, then that agency should rely on the persuasive force of its arguments, not loaded dice. See Marbury v. Madison , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
Because the majority opinion does precisely what a court should do, I concur in full.