Opinion
10-02-1903
W. & A. FLETCHER CO. v. INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS et al.
Edward Russ and Francis Scott, for complainant. James G. Blauvelt and William Hughes, for defendants.
Suit by the W. & A. Fletcher Company against the International Association of Machinists and others for an injunction to restrain picketing by strikers. Injunction granted as to some defendants, and denied as to others.
Edward Russ and Francis Scott, for complainant.
James G. Blauvelt and William Hughes, for defendants.
STEVENSON, V. C. (orally). In the Injunction suit brought by the Fletcher Machine Company against the International Association of Machinists and others the conclusion which I have reached is that the complainant is not entitled to any further preliminary restraint than that which is now embodied in the restraining orders. The motion was argued on both sides, practically with the admission that there was nothing objectionable in the restraining orders as they now stand; that those orders were proper, and should remain binding upon such of the defendants as stand fairly charged under oath with conduct which brings them within their reach.
The counsel for complainant practically confined his argument to the proposition that a preliminary injunction should go in the case to restrain picketing, without reference to the object of the picketing or its effect. If this view is correct, it follows that workmen maintaining a strike have no right to station pickets merely for the purpose of giving them such information in regard to their late employers' operations as may be discovered by ordinary observation. It seems to me that this claim is not well founded; that it is contrary to the great weight of reason as well as authority.
Picketing may be lawful; picketing may be unlawful. Whether picketing is lawful or unlawful depends wholly upon the purpose with which it is carried on, or perhaps, it would be more accurate to say, the effect which is produced by it if the purpose and effect are to intimidate, to interfere with the liberty of workmen in seeking employment, to interfere with what in another case I called the employer's right to have labor flow freely to him, so that a reasonably courageous person would be restrained from offering his labor to such employer, then picketing is unlawful, and, where the other necessary conditions for the Interference of a court of equity exist, will be prohibited by an injunction.
If, however, the picketing is carried on for the mere purpose of obtaining information, or for the purpose of conveying information to persons seeking or willing to receive the same, or even, in some cases, for the purpose of bringing orderly and peaceable persuasions to bear upon the minds of men who desire to listen to the same, the object of such persuasions not Including in any way the disruption of an existing contract for labor, then there may be no unlawful element in the picketing, and carrying it on may found no action even at law, and certainly may not call for any interference on tbe part of a court of equity.
The insistment of counsel for the complainants would seem to include the proposition that workmen on strike cannot maintain pickets (although merely for the purpose of obtaining such information as can be procured by the use of the eyes and ears) without violating the employer's right to the enjoyment of a free labor market, and thereby causing him substantial and irreparable damage. This proposition seems to me to be utterly untenable. The restraining orders, therefore, will stand in their present form against those defendants, as I stated, who are charged under oath with such conduct as brings them within their operation.
It is admitted that there are a number ot defendants who are not connected in any way with the practices of which the complainant complains, and as to them the order will be vacated. If counsel cannot agree upon the names of the defendants who are to be held subject to restraint, I will go over the list myself, and determine who are to be included and who are to be excluded.