Opinion
A-13823 0375
06-12-2024
JOHN-HENRY J. VOORHIS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Darryl L. Jones, Law Office of Darryl L. Jones, Palmer, for the Appellant. Madeline M. Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Trial Court No. 3PA-17-00526 CR Third Judicial District, Palmer, Kari Kristiansen, Judge.
Darryl L. Jones, Law Office of Darryl L. Jones, Palmer, for the Appellant.
Madeline M. Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
John-Henry J. Voorhis was convicted of eleven counts of sexual abuse of a minor based on his repeated abuse of his step-daughters over the course of many years. On appeal, Voorhis raises two issues.
Specifically, Voorhis was convicted of seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and four counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. AS 11.41.434(a)(2) and AS 11.41.436(a)(3), respectively.
First, Voorhis argues that the superior court erred in ruling that he could not read directly from Office of Children's Services (OCS) records during his cross-examination of K.J., his ex-wife (and the girls' mother). Voorhis argues that these records tended to establish that K.J. also accused her previous husband of abusing their daughters, which would have supported his theory that the allegations against him were fabricated. He argues on appeal that the superior court's ruling violated his right to confrontation.
Voorhis's briefing on this issue is deficient. Among other problems, Voorhis's brief fails to acknowledge that he did not raise the confrontation clause issue in the superior court (and thus must show plain error on appeal); fails to acknowledge that the superior court precluded him from reading the OCS records because they were inadmissible hearsay; fails to discuss the applicable rules of evidence; and fails to cite any OCS records that actually say what he claims they say - i.e., that K.J. accused her previous husband of sexually assaulting their daughters.
We need not decide, however, whether Voorhis has waived this argument due to inadequate briefing because there is no underlying merit to the claim. Although the rules of evidence must sometimes give way to a criminal defendant's right to confront a witness through cross-examination, we have recognized that a trial court abuses its discretion only when its "application of the rules [of evidence] substantially impede[s] a defendant's right to fully and fairly cross-examine a witness."
Pender v. State, 1996 WL 341617, at *5 (Alaska App. Apr. 10, 1996) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Ferguson, 776 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1985)); see also Balentine v. State, 707 P.2d 922, 926 (Alaska App. 1985) (recognizing that "there are occasions when [the] evidence rules must give way to due process considerations").
Here, Voorhis was allowed to ask K.J. about whether she had made allegations of sexual abuse against her previous husband and whether those allegations were false, and he was also permitted to introduce multiple witnesses who testified that K.J. had made such allegations. The superior court's ruling precluding Voorhis from reading the inadmissible OCS records to K.J. did not substantially impede Voorhis's right to fully and fairly cross-examine K.J., and the superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion.
Second, Voorhis argues that his sentence violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Voorhis was a second felony offender, and he received a composite sentence of 88 years to serve. (Voorhis's prior felony conviction was not a sexual felony.)
Voorhis's briefing on this point is again deficient. Under the Alaska Constitution, a sentence is cruel and unusual if it is "so disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice." To determine whether a sentence is disproportionate, we compare the severity of the sentence both to the gravity of the defendant's offenses and to sentences previously imposed for similar conduct. But Voorhis's brief discusses neither. With respect to the gravity of his offenses, for example, Voorhis fails to provide even a basic description of the facts of his case. And with respect to sentences previously imposed for similar conduct, Voorhis discusses none.
Sikeo v. State, 258 P.3d 906, 912 (Alaska App. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 635 (Alaska 1977)). Voorhis nominally argues that his sentence violates the federal constitution. But he cites no federal authority, and his briefing contains no discussion or analysis of federal case law.
See id. at 911-12; see also Olson v. State, 2014 WL 5799571, at *5-6 (Alaska App. Nov. 5, 2014) (unpublished).
Indeed, Voorhis does not even mention our prior case law addressing other cruel and unusual punishment challenges in the context of sexual felony convictions.
Instead, Voorhis argues that the sentencing scheme is cruel and unusual because it was based on an inaccurate factual finding by the legislature that sex offenders are usually serial offenders who are not amenable to rehabilitation and as a result, the scheme results in sentences that are overly harsh. Given this argument, Voorhis appears to be making a "facial" challenge - i.e., an argument that the sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to all offenders. But Voorhis asserts in his brief that his challenge is nonetheless an "as applied" challenge - i.e., an argument that the statute is unconstitutional only as applied to his conduct.
If Voorhis is indeed arguing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, as he claims, we reject that argument because, as we noted, Voorhis has failed to discuss his own conduct or compare his sentence to sentences previously imposed for similar conduct. If Voorhis has instead misdescribed the nature of his challenge, and means to argue that the statute is facially invalid, he would be required to establish that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." Voorhis has failed to make this showing.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
We note that Voorhis has not argued that his sentence is excessive nor did he seek referral of his case to the three-judge sentencing panel, which would have had the authority to reduce his sentence below the minimum presumptive amount otherwise required by the legislature. See AS 12.55.165; AS 12.55.175.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.