Opinion
No. 5-238 / 04-1359
Filed June 15, 2005
Appeal from the District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L. Pearson, Judge.
Julia Von Ah appeals the district court's order denying her motion to amend her petition. AFFIRMED.
James H. Cook of Dutton, Braun, Staack Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Connie Alt, Nancy J. Penner and Patricia Hoffman-Simanek of Shuttleworth Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
We consider a second appeal in a medical malpractice action, this time from the district court's denial of a motion to amend the petition. Finding no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In October 1994, Julia VonAh sought medical treatment for a knee injury from Dr. Terence Alexander. Seven years later, cancer was found in VonAh's knee.
In 2002, VonAh sued Dr. Alexander, alleging he was negligent in failing to inform her of anomalies in an x-ray of her left knee and in failing to schedule or recommend follow-up examinations. Dr. Alexander moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the statute of repose set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a) (2001). precluded claims for acts "more than six years after the date on which the act or omission occurred." VonAh resisted the motion. She claimed she would be able to show that the standard of care required annual monitoring of the knee.
The district court granted Dr. Alexander's motion to dismiss, reasoning the purpose of the statute of repose was to "achieve finality and avoid the trial of stale claims." The district court also stated VonAh's interpretation of the statute "would completely defeat" these purposes "and eviscerate its operation."
On appeal, we affirmed. See VonAh v. Alexander, No. 03-0546 (Iowa Ct.App. Feb. 27, 2004). In a split decision, we held that the petition, on its face, alleged an act of negligence outside that six-year statute of repose, mandating dismissal. A dissent asserted that dismissal was not warranted in light of VonAh's claim that Dr. Alexander was negligent in failing to annually monitor the situation in the six years preceding the lawsuit. The Supreme Court denied further review of our opinion.
In the wake of our decision, VonAh filed a motion for leave to amend her petition. The amendment alleged:
Defendant Alexander was negligent in providing medical care to Mrs. VonAh during the period in question. Specifically, Dr. Alexander failed to use the degree of skill, care and attention ordinarily exercised by medical practitioners under like circumstances including, but not limited to, instituting monitoring of Plaintiff's enchondroma on at least an annual basis.
(Emphasis added). The district court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
II. Motion to Amend
Our review of the denial of a motion to amend is for clear abuse of discretion. Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Iowa 2002). Our inquiry is focused upon whether the district court's ruling "lacks a solid legal basis." Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Iowa 1987).
VonAh argues (1) amendments to pleadings are liberally granted, (2) our first opinion was not an adjudication on the merits, (3) the cause of action was never dismissed and the amendment, therefore, relates back to the original petition, and (4) justice would not be served by not allowing the amendment.
We agree with VonAh on the first point. See Iowa R.C.P. 1.402(4) (2003) (stating "[l]eave to amend . . . shall be freely given when justice so requires"). However, the fact that leave to amend should be freely given begs the question of whether leave to amend should have been granted here, given our prior application of the statute of repose.
This brings us to VonAh's second point, that our first opinion did not operate as an adjudication on the merits. As VonAh cites no authority for this proposition we could, deem the argument waived. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( c). We elect to Bypass this waiver argument. We conclude our earlier opinion did indeed operate as an adjudication on the merits. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.946 (stating "all dismissals not governed by rule 1.943 [voluntary dismissals] or not for want of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify otherwise"); cf. Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 1998) (holding dismissal on statute of limitations grounds in first action was "a final and valid judgment for purposes of issue preclusion" and barred constitutional claims in subsequent action); Cooley v. Maine, 183 Iowa 560, 562, 165 N.W. 1015, 1016 (1918) (accepting argument that dismissal of first action on statute of limitations operated as adjudication, justifying dismissal of second petition). Therefore, the amendment to the petition was barred.
VonAh's third contention, that the "cause of action itself has never been dismissed," is refuted by our first opinion. There, we concluded "[t]he district court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss." Because the action was dismissed, it could not be revived by amendment. National Bank of Woodbine v. Board of Sup'rs, 221 Iowa 348, 351, 264 N.W. 281, 284 (1935). For the same reason, VonAh cannot prevail on her follow-up contention that the amendment "relate[s] back to the original filing date." See Cooley, 183 Iowa at 561, 165 N.W. at 1015 (rejecting any argument that relation back statute "saves [appellants] from the statute of limitations if the judgment in the first suit constitutes an adjudication").
VonAh's fourth contention, that denial of the amendment would amount to "a serious miscarriage of fundamental justice," is premised on the fact that we relied on the face of the petition in affirming the district court's dismissal of the petition. VonAh contends "a simple amendment would cure everything." In fact, it would not. As the district court stated, "Even if the amendment to the petition is granted, dismissal based on the statute of repose is the ultimate outcome. Justice is better served by addressing the issue now." This resolution is consistent with justice. See Bailiff v. Adams County Conference Bd., 650 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Iowa 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion where amendment would have been futile).
As for the merits, we conclude the district court's ruling did not "lack a solid legal basis." Neylan, 400 N.W.2d at 543. The court stated, "There is no dispute that, even under an amended petition, the one and only event between Dr. Alexander and the plaintiff occurred on October 4, 1994." The court continued:
Accepting the plaintiff's arguments at face value, it is on this date that Dr. Alexander did not disclose to Ms. VonAh that her condition warranted regular follow-up examinations. . . . It is the events of this date that start the argued domino effect that ultimately brings the last year in which no annual exam was conducted within the statute of repose.
The court concluded that "[a] duty of care to conduct annual exams only has meaning in the context of the initial exam. Without that initial event there is no duty of any kind." The court did not abuse its discretion in issuing this ruling, as the initial exam was unquestionably outside the six-year statute of repose. AFFIRMED.
The district court's ruling also contains a discussion of the continuous treatment doctrine. The Iowa Supreme Court recently examined this doctrine and, while declining to reject it outright, limited its applicability. Ratcliff v. Graether, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2005).