Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-3195, Section "L" (1)
December 4, 2002
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of plaintiffs, Anthony Vogt, et al., ("Landowners") seeking a ruling from this Court as to the following issues: (1) that the actions of the defendants, the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District ("Orleans Levee District") and James Huey, in his official capacity as president of the Orleans Levee District, amounted to an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) that they are entitled to affirmative relief for the Fifth Amendment violation of the defendants; and (3) that an award of attorneys fees is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring this action under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution seeking to recover mineral royalties they claim were taken by the defendants. In 1924 Act 99 of the Louisiana Legislature authorized the Orleans Levee District to take, by expropriation, certain mineral producing lands for the purpose of constructing the Bohemia Spillway between the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. The Orleans Levee District exercised that authority and acquired properties necessary for construction of the spillway. The legislature subsequently determined that the public purposes behind Act 99 had ceased to exist, and in 1984, the Louisiana Legislature, pursuant to an amendment to Article VII, § 14(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, declared that the land should be returned to its original owners; the state further directed the levee board to provide an accounting for and return all revenues derived from the use of the land. Following several legal battles in both state and federal courts, the Orleans Levee District, in 1991 and 1992, issued quitclaim deeds to the owners restoring their ownership interests. However, the Orleans Levee District refused to remit any mineral royalties received between 1984 and the time the land was returned.
The Landowners then brought suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment of their ownership of the royalties, an accounting of the mineral royalties received by the board, and a money judgment in that amount. In 1998, the Louisiana trial court found in the plaintiffs' favor and ordered the levee board to reimburse more than $2.8 million to the plaintiffs. Additionally, the trial court also found that the Orleans Levee District's actions did not constitute a wrongful taking prohibited by the Louisiana and United States Constitutions and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. This particular aspect of the trial judge's holding has been the source of much dispute, as to what the judge held was not a taking. However, it is clear from the transcript that the trial judge stated that "initial acquisition of the land by the Levee Board from the then owners in the 1930's pursuant to legislative dictates to sell the property that became the Bohemia Spillway" was not a taking. Similarly, in reviewing the trial court's decision, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to award attorney's fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to La. R.S. 13:5111, which provides for an award of attorney's fees when there has been a taking of property by a politicial subdivision, other than through an expropriation proceeding. Vogt v. Board of commissioners of Orleans Levee District, 738 So.2d 1142, 1149 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1999). As such, the Louisiana Court of Appeal effectively held that the initial acquisition of the land by the Orleans Levee District in the 1930's was not a taking. No such ruling was made regarding the mineral royalties.
Additionally, the Landowners also dispute the claim that they ever asserted a "takings" claim in any state court proceeding. Rather, they maintain that the trial judge mistakenly believed they had asserted a "takings" claim. The trial court mistakenly confused the actual appropriations argument the plaintiffs asserted with a takings claim. In reality, the plaintiffs argued that the Levee Board's failure to escrow the funds generated from their property between 1984 and 1992-93 constituted an "appropriation" of their property, and, that under La. R.S. 51:3111, they were authorized to recover attorney's fees. Additionally, the Landowners claim that they made it clear to the Louisiana Court of Appeal that they did not and were asserting a "takings claim."
Despite the court's ruling that the Orleans Levee District pay over $2.8 million to the plaintiffs, the defendants still refused to satisfy this judgment. The plaintiffs then pursued various remedies in state courts, in an attempt to satisfy the judgment, including a motion for writ of seizure to satisfy judgment and a writ of mandamus requesting that the trial court direct the Orleans Levee District to satisfy the final judgment from available funds or, in the alternative, to levy a tax on all persons within the district to satisfy the judgment. These attempts were unsuccessfu. In particular, in reference to the plaintiffs' attempts to enforec the judgment, the fourth circuit held that "no coercive means exit to force the State, state agencies, or politicial subdivisions to comply with judgments rendered against them." Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 814 So.2d 648, 655 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2002).
The plaintiffs have now filed suit in federal court against the Orleans Levee District seeking the return of unpaid mineral royalties they claim are being withheld by defendants as an unconstitutional taking. The distinction between the taking adjudicated in the state courts, the original property that was expropriated in the 1930's, and the taking alleged before this Court, the mineral royalties themselves, is crucial and will be discussed below. This Court, based on prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court, which expressly identified the Orleans Levee District as an arm of the state, felt constrained to conclude the Orleans Levee District was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 2001 WL 664580 (E.D. La., 2001). The Landowners appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed this Court and held that the cases cited by the district court were not applicable or dispositive and that the Orleans Levee District was not an arm of the state and thus not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and further that state courts' determination that the judgement against the Orleans Levee District was unenforceable did not preclude a takings claim from being asserted by the Landowners. Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 294 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit remanded to this Court for further proceedings. Id.
Following remand, the Landowners moved for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that an unconstitutional taking has occurred, an order that the defendants satisfy the Judgment of the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, and an award of reasonable attorneys fees for the successful prosecution of this action. The defendants oppose the plaintiffs' motion and argue that the jurisdictional doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and/or res judicata serve to bar this Court from hearing the action. Alternatively, the defendants maintain that even if the court has jurisdiction to hear the action, no taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution has occurred.
II. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A district court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the "'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court "will review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must find "[a] factual dispute . . . [to be] 'genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party . . . [and a] fact . . . [to be] 'material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Techs., Inc., 882 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
"If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative." summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
B. LANDOWNERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
1. The actions of the Orleans Levee District, in refusing to return the mineral royalties, constitute an unconstitutional taking.
The Takings Clause embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that private property cannot be taken for public use, unless "just compensation" is paid to the property owner. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Before addressing the question of whether a taking has occurred, this Court must first determine the exact property that has allegedly been taken. Neither the state court decision nor the plaintiffs' motions nor the defendants' responses are consistent in their labeling of the property that has been taken. There are vast inconsistencies among the parties and courts as to whether the failure of the Orleans Levee District to pay the judgment rendered against it by the state court or whether the mineral royalties are the subject of the alleged taking. The defendants incorrectly assert that the alleged property taken was the defendant's refusal to pay the judgment against it. Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, 294 F.3d 684, 696 (5th Cir. 2002). However, what has actually been taken are the mineral royalties because the actual judgement is just an accounting or quantification of the mineral royalties themselves. The judgment that defendants refer to is simply an order by the Louisiana state court ordering the Orleans Levee District to return to the plaintiff's the mineral royalties, which the Orleans Levee District accumulated from the plaintiffs' property. This conclusion is consistent with the dicta from the Fifth Circuit's decision labeling the property alleged to have "taken" as the mineral royalties. See Vogt, 294 F.3d at 696 (stating that a taking is alleged where "the government has forcibly' appropriated private property [the mineral royalties] without a claim of right or of public or regulatory purpose."). The issue of the nature of the alleged taking having been resolved, the Court may now examine whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred. In order to have an unconstitutional taking, it is first necessary to determine whether an actual taking has occurred. For the Orleans Levee District's failure to return the mineral royalties to the Landowners to constitute a taking, both components of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause must be satisfied. The first component of the takings clause requires that the property alleged to have been taken must constitute "private property." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that while the meaning of "property" as used in the Fifth Amendment is a federal question, property will normally obtain its content by reference to local law. United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S 266, 279, 63 S.Ct. 1047, 1054, 87 L.Ed. 1390 (1943). The right to receive mineral royalties is a recognized property interest under Louisiana law, according to the Louisiana Mineral Code. See La. Rev. Stat. ann. § 31:30 (West 2000). Thus, the first component is satisfied.
The second component of the Takings Clause requires that the private property in question must have been "taken for public use". U.S. CONST. amend. V; See Williamson County Regional Planning Commission, 473 U.S. 172 at 195-97. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the "public use" requirement loosely, and it is clear that in the instant case, the appropriation of the mineral royalties was for public use. The mineral royalties arose out of the bundle of property rights of the original land that was appropriated so that the Orleans Levee District could construct the levee, which was obviously a public use. Although the mineral royalties are in and of themselves property and are the sole property alleged to have been taken, they also originate from and arise out of the original land that was expropriated, hence everything can be related back to that land which was appropriated for public use. Therefore, it is clear that both requirements necessary to amount to a taking are present.
Once it has been established that the plaintiffs' claim constitutes a taking, the last two requirements necessary, namely, that just compensation is required and has been denied, can be analyzed together. Just compensation is due whenever a "taking" has occurred; however, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied by the one who owes it. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3121 (1985). Since the above discussion established that a taking has occurred in the instant matter, the plaintiffs are clearly entitled to just compensation. The critical inquiry in the instant case is whether the Orleans Levee District denied just compensation to the plaintiffs. A judgment, issued by the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish and affirmed by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal was rendered to force the Orleans Levee District to homologate an accounting of the mineral royalties due to the plaintiffs. See Vogt v. Board of Commissioners, 738 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1999). However, the Orleans Levee District has not satisfied the judgment, and the plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in securing any relief under Louisiana law. See id. The Orleans Levee District contends that they have not affirmatively asserted that they will not pay the judgement. However, the fact remains that the Orleans Levee District has not paid the judgment or more accurately returned the mineral royalties and has not noted any future plans to do so. To allow the fact that the defendants have never asserted that they will not return the mineral royalties to prevent the plaintiffs in this case from collecting just compensation would undermine the entire premise behind the takines clause. The aim of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960). If the defendants are allowed to circumvent the Takings Clause by claiming that they have not stated they will not return the mineral royalties then future plaintiffs in takings cases could feasibly be prevented from recovering just compensation as the time frame would expire provided a defendant had not affirmatively stated he would not pay just compensation or return the property. It is evident that just compensation has been denied by the defendants, and, as such, a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution has occurred.
The essential facts regarding the taking of this property is not at issue. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate where the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have shown the existence of a taking based on undisputed facts. Therefore, summary judgement is appropriate provided the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and/or res judicata doctrines do not bar recovery. The applicability of these doctrines will be considered seriatim.
2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the subsequent re-litigation of these issues.
Defendants argue that even if a taking has occurred, plaintiffs still cannot recover because they cannot be required to re-litigate an issue that has already been decided by the state court. They assert that the plaintiffs' claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on principles of comity and federalism and additionally draws its roots from statutory interpretation of congressional grants of jurisdiction. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). At its core, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a party who has lost his case in state court "from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Rather, the jurisdiction to review such state court decisions lies exclusively with state supreme courts and finally the United States Supreme Court. Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997).
The reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends farther than just to issues actually decided by state courts. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies to "constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by the state courts." Id. Hence, even though the state courts did not decide the specific issue of whether the actions of the Orleans Levee District, in failing to return the mineral royalties, constituted an unconstitutional taking, it does not necessarily mean that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear the issue. In fact, a federal court will only have jurisdiction in view of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if the present issue is not "inextricably intertwined" with the previous state court judgment.
The Supreme Court has stated that a "federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987). It is clear that the success of the takings claim before this Court however, will not hinge on the incorrectness of any of the preceding state court decisions. The Landowners in the instant case are asking this court to determined whether a taking occurred when the Orleans Levee District failed to return the mineral royalties that the state court adjudged to belong to the Landowners, rather than the state court's holding that the land appropriated by the Orleans Levee District in 1924 was not a taking. The Landowners in this case are not claiming that the state court decision was incorrect; nor is it necessary for this Court to hold such in order to determine whether mineral royalties were taken in violation of the United States Constitution. Therefore, in this case, this Court can determine the takings issue without regard to the state court's decisions. See Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Gauthier v. Continental Diving Serv. Inc., provides additional support for the conclusion that the instant matter is not barred from being heard by this Court because it is not inextricably intertwined. Gauduier v. Continental Diving Serv. Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987). In Gauthier the Fifth Circuit stated that this Circuit has not permitted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to impede an action in federal court when the same action would be permitted in the state court of the rendering state. Id. As such the Fifth Circuit has consistently treated the doctrine in a manner consistent with the requirements of the doctrine of full faith and credit. Id. As the subsequent analysis of the doctrine of res judicata will illustrate, a Louisiana state court would not be precluded from hearing this matter now.
In sum, it is clear that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar this Court from deciding the federal takings issue before it. Based on the jurisprudence of both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit and the inapplicability of the primary policy reason for the doctrine itself, the issue sought to be heard by the plaintiffs is not "inextricably intertwined" to the state court judgement and the issue is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It is now appropriate to consider whether the claims are affected by res judicata.
3. The claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata as argued by the defendants.
Based on the doctrine of Full Faith and Credit, the Supreme Court has held that by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the doctrine of res judicata applies to § 1983 suits. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101, 103-04 (1980). The doctrine of res judicata is comprised of two separate, though linked, preclusive doctrines: (I) true res judicata or claim preclusion and (2) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2000). In true res judicata, once a judgment is rendered, it is viewed as having the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." Id. at 436. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, precludes the re-litigation of issues that were actually decided, and "essential to the judgment" in a previous suit between either the same or other parties on another claim or cause of action. Id. In order to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata as a whole, precludes this court from adjudicating the case, the requirements of Full Faith and Credit require that this Court, "must refer to the preclusion law of the state in which judgement was rendered". See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 2000).
A Federal takings claim amounts to a § 1983 suit. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
The contention that the doctrine of res judicata bars the instant case from being heard by this Court can easily be disposed of if it is based on a theory of collateral estoppel. The essential elements necessary to prove collateral estoppel, are that the issues before the instant court were either actually decided or "essential to the judgment" in a previous suit between the same parties on a different claim. These elements are clearly not met in this case since none of the Louisiana state courts ever determined that taking of the mineral royalties amounted to a taking. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 224 F.3d at 436.
When the determination of preclusion is based on the doctrine of true res judicata, this determination is not as clear cut. True res judicata treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978). Therefore, in order for this Court to be precluded from hearing the instant matter by way of the doctrine of true res judicata, all elements of the doctrine must be satisfied, including that (1) the parties in the instant suit are the same as the parties that appeared before the various Louisiana state courts and (2) the instant suit must involve the same 'claim' or 'cause of action' as was previously decided. Id. In the instant suit it is readily apparent that the first requirement of the doctrine is satisfied since the parties seeking to come before this Court are identical to the parties that appeared before numerous Louisiana state courts.
Nevertheless, the second requirement namely, that the suit before this Court must involve the same claim or cause of action as was previously adjudicated, presents a more problematic situation. The doctrine of true res judicata incorporates the doctrines of merger and bar, thereby extending the effect of a judgment to the litigants of all issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not those issues were raised at trial. St. Paul Mercuty Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, if a claim based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was adjudicated in any state court, this Court will be barred by the doctrine of true res judicata from hearing any claim based on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and as such, the instant matter. See id. As stated in the factual description of the instant case, it is clear that the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans did find that a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, had not occurred. However, simply because the two requirements specific to the doctrine of true res judicata have been met, does not mean that res judicata serves as an automatic jurisdictional bar.
However, the taking that the trial judge held did not occur was not that of the mineral royalties, but rather the original land expropriated in the 1930's.
Rather, a defense under the doctrine of res judicata must be resolved under a Full Faith and Credit analysis pursuant to Louisiana law. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.3d 317, n. 1 (5th Cir. 2000). Louisiana law imposes two essential prerequisites to the doctrine of res judicata: first the claim must "arise out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the state court litigation" and second the claim did "exist at the time of the prior state court judgement." See Lafraniere Park Foundation v. Broussard, 221 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Kelty v. Brumfield, 633 So.2d 1210, 1215 (La. 1994)).
In this case the taking that the state court referenced was not the "taking" complained of in the instant situation, and the failure to return the mineral royalties did not "arise out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject of the state court litigation" which was the expropriation of the Landowners' original property in the 1930's. The taking at issue in this case is a taking that only occurred (1) when the property was adjudicated as belonging to the Landowners as of 1984, (2) when the Levee Board refused to return the property even after the adjudication and (3) when the Landowners received a determination that Louisiana law offered them no remedy to obtain return of the private property. Thus it is clear that the taking complained of before this Court, the taking of the mineral royalties, only arose as a result of the State Court's holding that Louisiana law immunizes the Orleans Levee District from compliance with the judgment ordering the return of the Landowner's property. The instant complaint could not have arisen out of the transaction or occurrence of the subject of the state courts determination, which was the expropriation of the original land in the 1930's, since all the facts necessary to constitute a takings claim had not yet transpired.
Furthermore, another prerequisite to imposing the doctrine of res judicata as a jurisdictional bar is that the action complained of in the instant case must have existed "at the time of the prior state court judgment." See Lafraniere Park Foundation v. Broussard, 221 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2000). It is clear from the above discussion pertaining to the timing in which the taking complained of in the instant case arose, that the taking complained of in this case did not exist at the time of the state court judgement. The payment of compensation had not yet been denied by the Orleans Levee District. The state court proceedings were for the purpose of establishing the absence of a remedy in state court to satisfy the judgment and as such the cause of action did not exist at the time the trial court held that a taking did not occur.
Federal law is consistent with the preceding sate requirements necessary to impose true res judicata. The Fifth Circuit has held "the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar the relitigation of issues actually decided or that could have been decided between the same parties." See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc., 575 F.2d at 535. Since it has already been established that the Landowners did not assert this federal takings issue in state court nor was that issue actually adjudicated by any state court tribunal, the only way res judicata could serve as a bar to this Court hearing the claim is if the plaintiffs could have brought the claim that the mineral royalties were taken, in state court. However, due to the principle of ripeness, the Landowners could not have brought their takings claim in state court at the time of the other decisions; rather they had to first pursue the various state court remedies to be able to assert such takings claim. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The Supreme Court has determined that in a federal takings claim, a would-be federal litigant is required, "to first establish that compensation is not forthcoming from the state government." Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 195-97. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that before a takings claim can be asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff is required to exhaust all state remedies to secure compensation. See Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority, 953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992). The rationale for both holdings is that otherwise, the plaintiff cannot assert that "just compensation" has been denied to him, and as such will not satisfy the requirements for a taking. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195. In order to satisfy this requirement to show that compensation was not forthcoming from the Orleans Levee District, the plaintiffs attempted to utilize a variety of remedies in state court. For instance, the Landowners informed the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal that a takings claim was not ripe until after the court adjudicated the issue of whether the Louisiana Constitution permitted the Orleans Levee District to retain the Landowner's property. Thus, it is clear that the Landowners could not have brought their takings claim prior to the proceedings that occurred in Louisiana state courts.
Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not serve as a jurisdictional bar to this Court hearing the instant case since the instant claim did not exist at the time the state court adjudicated the prior claim and did not arise out of the same occurrence or transaction as the prior claim. Additionally, the instant claim was not and could not have been brought in state court at the time the other claim was adjudicated.
C. LANDOWNERS' MOTION REQUESTING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF FOR DEFENDANTS 42 U.S.C. § 1983 VIOLATION
The plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to affirmative relief and attorneys fees for the defendants' refusal to return the mineral royalties, which this Court has held amounted to a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. A remedy for any taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment is provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399-400, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1176 (1979); U.S.C.A. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983., the relief granted for an "uncompensated taking" may be "declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, or a combination thereof." See Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, Iowa, 716 F.2d 1194, 1201 (8th Cir. 1983). Thus, in light of the discretion 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allots to the court in reference to the particular remedy that may be awarded, this Court holds that the defendants must satisfy the Judgment of the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish, State of Louisiana. As previously stated, the Judgment itself represents a quantification of the mineral royalties, the property actually taken. Therefore, this Court GRANTS the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement requesting the award of affirmative relief and holds that the proper affirmative relief that must be granted to the plaintiffs is the payment by the defendants of the Judgment rendered by the Civil District Court.
D. LANDOWNERS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C § 1983.
Moreover, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as part of the affirmative relief that can be granted for a violation of the Takings Clause, it is proper for attorneys fees to be awarded to the plaintiffs. According to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b), in any action or proceeding brought to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the court has the discretion to award the "prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b); See Louisiana Debating and Literary Association v. City of New Orleans, 1995 WL 510074 (E.D.La.1995); See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, n. 85 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, although 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) places the issue of whether or not to award attorney's fees within the discretion of the court, "it is settled law in this circuit that this means more than it appears to say and that such prevailing parties as plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorneys fees unless special circumstances would render an award of them unjust." See id. at *2, citing Concerned Democrats of Florida v. Reno, 601 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979); See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 998 (5th Cir. 1983) ("absent special circumstances, a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded section 1988 fees as a matter of course."). This Circuit has rarely found such "special circumstances" which render the award of attorney's fees unjust, specifically neither a plaintiff's ability to pay his own attorney's fees nor the presence of good faith on the pail the defendant has been held to amount to such "special circumstances." See Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, it is clear in the present instance that the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs are proper and as such this Court GRANTS the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment requesting attorney's fees which will be Fixed after a hearing to be noticed in due course.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that the actions of the Orleans Levee Board constitute an unconstitutional taking, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Landowners' Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue be GRANTED. The Court further Finds that the Landowners have shown that the appropriate remedies are affirmative relief and reasonable attorney fees. Thus, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Orleans Levee District shall satisfy the Judgement of the Civil District Court for Orleans Parish and shall pay attorney fees to the Landowners to be fixed after a hearing.