Opinion
March 16, 1932.
April 11, 1932.
Negligence — Railroads — Automobiles — Collision at crossing — Contributory negligence — Judgment n. o. v. — Case for jury — Incontrovertible physical facts — New trial.
1. On motion for judgment n. o. v., the testimony should not only be read in the light most advantageous to plaintiff, all conflicts therein being resolved in his favor, but he must be given the benefit of any facts and inferences from facts, pertaining to the issues involved, which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence. [258]
2. The rule as to incontrovertible physical facts is only applicable in clear cases. It applies only where a person enters upon a railroad track and is struck by a moving train so instantaneously as to raise a legal presumption that he did not stop, look and listen, and to rebut any presumption that he had done so. Where there is doubt as to negligence on the part of plaintiff, the case is for the jury. [257-258]
3. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for death of plaintiff's husband killed in a collision between his automobile and a train, it is reversible error to enter a judgment for defendant n. o. v. where the evidence shows that the accident happened at night, that deceased stopped, looked and listened before going upon the tracks, that he then started across the tracks and had gone nearly over the second track, when his car stalled, that it did not appear what length of time the car stopped, that decedent, having tried unsuccessfully to start the motor, alighted from the car and was struck by a train and killed, and that the train was brought to a halt after it had traveled over 700 feet from the point of collision. [257]
4. In such case it was possible for the train to have come in view of the automobile after decedent started to make the crossing. [258]
5. An order refusing judgment for defendant may be reversed, and the record remanded for consideration of a pending motion for a new trial, where plaintiff's testimony is vague and uncertain, and the verdict may have been against the weight of the evidence. [258]
Before FRAZER, C. J., SIMPSON, KEPHART, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.
Appeal, No. 44, March T., 1932, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. Allegheny Co., April T., 1930, No. 939, entering judgment for defendant, in case of Catherine Vlasich v. Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company. Reversed.
Trespass for death of plaintiff's husband. Before ROWAND, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Verdict for plaintiff. Judgment for defendant n. o. v. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was in entering judgment for defendant n. o. v., quoting record.
B. P. Brasley, of Brasley, Rubin, Balter Cole, for appellant.
William H. Eckert, with him Smith, Buchanan, Scott Gordon, for appellee.
Argued March 16, 1932.
Plaintiff appeals from judgment non obstante veredicto for defendant, granted by the court below after verdict in her favor in an action of trespass, brought for the death of her husband, in an accident at a grade crossing in the Borough of Braddock. From the testimony it appears the accident occurred about seven o'clock on the evening of November 4, 1929, at the intersection of the B. O. Railroad tracks with Sixth Street. The tracks are six in number and run in a general easterly and westerly direction, intersecting Sixth Street at right angles. The evidence shows that the tracks are straight for half a mile both east and west of Sixth Street, and the crossing is seventy-eight feet wide. At any point within twenty-five feet south of the crossing, a train approaching from the east can be seen for approximately 2,800 feet in daytime. There was no fog on the evening of the accident.
There was considerable conflict in the testimony as to just how the accident occurred, but the following facts seem to be clearly established: Decedent was driving his automobile northwardly along Sixth Street. Witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant testified he stopped his car before proceeding over the crossing. He then started across the tracks and had gone nearly over the second track when the car stalled. After unsuccessfully attempting to start the motor, he alighted from the car, either to seek safety for himself from the oncoming train, or (as some witnesses testified) to try to push the automobile off the track. At this moment the train struck the back of the car, hurling deceased to the ground with such force that he died within a few hours from the injuries received. The train, a long freight consisting of nine loaded and one hundred and four empty cars, was brought to a standstill after the locomotive had traveled over seven hundred feet from the point of impact, although the engineer testified he had applied the brakes before the train struck the automobile.
From the facts relating to the physical surroundings of the crossing, the learned judge of the court below decided that plaintiff's decedent must necessarily have been guilty of contributory negligence — "that but one of two inferences is possible — either that the decedent did not stop, look and listen and continue to be observant, or that, having seen the train approaching, he nevertheless took the chance of clearing the crossing ahead of it." Accordingly he granted defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; and in so doing, we are of opinion he committed error. This is not a case for the application of the rule of infallible mathematical calculation, let alone a presumption based upon physical surroundings of the place of the accident. We have. frequently said this rule is only applicable in clear cases. "It applies only where a person enters upon a railroad track, and is struck by a moving train so instantaneously as to raise a legal presumption that he did not stop, look and listen, and to rebut any presumption that he had done so. Where there is doubt as to negligence upon the part of plaintiff, the case is for the jury": Howard v. B. O. R. R., 219 Pa. 358, 360; Mills v. P. R. R. Co., 284 Pa. 605, 607-8.
In the case before us it did not clearly appear for what length of time the automobile of decedent was stalled upon the tracks. It is possible that it was stopped sufficiently long for the train to have come in view after decedent started to make the crossing. "On motion for judgment n. o. v., the testimony should not only be read in the light most advantageous to plaintiff, all conflicts therein being resolved in his favor, but he must be given the benefit of every fact and inference of fact, pertaining to the issues involved, which may reasonably be deduced from the evidence": Mountain v. American W. G. Co., 263 Pa. 181, 183; Thomas v. P. R. R. Co., 275 Pa. 579, 581.
Although we are of one mind that the judgment non obstante veredicto must be reversed, a question remains as to whether defendant is not entitled to a new trial owing to vagueness and uncertainty of portions of plaintiff's testimony, or as was suggested by the court below, because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or because of other considerations arising from the trial.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the record remanded with direction that the pending motion for a new trial be disposed of.