Opinion
NSC 955/10.
Decided February 22, 2011.
Cincy Vinueza, plaintiff pro se, Rego Park, New York.
Michael Scotto, defendant pro se, Wilson Lane, Bethpage, New York.
DECISION AND ORDER AFTER TRIAL
This is a small claims action to recover $3,600.00 that the plaintiff contends she is owed by defendant, Michael Scotto, an individual. It is the plaintiff's contention that she is owed these monies based upon a promissory note (the "Note") dated September 26, 2009, which provides in its entirety that: "I Michael Scotto owe Cindy Vinueza $2,970 (two thousand and nine-hundred seventy dollars) [sic] agree to pay her back in full. Signed on this 26th day of September 2009." Indicated on the bottom of the Note are the signatures of Michael Scotto and Cindy Vinueza.
It is uncontested that the defendant borrowed the monies. The defendant however, contends that he repaid the amount in full, and that he lacked the capacity to execute the Note on September 26, 2009, since during that time he allegedly suffered from a chemical dependency, namely opiates.
Pursuant to section 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code, "any writing to be a negotiable instrument . . . must (a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and (b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and (c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and (d) be payable to order or to bearer" (UCC 3-104). Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no time for payment is stated (UCC 3-108). Thus, an instrument is payable immediately if no time is fixed and no contingency specified upon which payment is to be made ( Nuri Farhadi, Inc. v. Anavian, 58 AD2d 546, 546-47 [1st Dept 1977]). "A writing which complies with the requirements of [section 3-104] is . . . a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit" (NYUCC 3-104 [d]). "A "promise" is an undertaking to pay and must be more than an acknowledgment of an obligation (NYUCC 3-102 [c]).
Applying these principles to the facts in the instant matter, all of the requirements establishing that the Note is a valid negotiable instrument and a "note" within the Uniform Commercial Code are met as: (1) the Note is signed by Mr. Scotto, the maker; (2) there are no conditions or promises which must occur, other than the unconditional promise to pay the sum certain of $2,970; (3) absent a defined repayment date, the sum certain is payable upon demand; and (4) the sum certain is payable to Ms. Vinueza, the bearer.
The defendant does not deny the existence of the Note and this Court rejects his thinly supported claim that he did not know he was signing the document. At trial, the plaintiff produced two letters: the first letter, dated October 18, 2010, is from Mr. Scotto's treating physician and indicates that Mr. Scotto has been under his care since April 2010 for the treatment of opiate dependency; the second letter, from Mr. Scotto's primary counselor at the Chemical Dependency Inpatient Program at South Oaks Hospital, indicates that Mr. Scotto was admitted to the facility in December 8, 2009, was discharged following successful completion of the program on December 22, 2009 (two-and-one-half months after the execution of the note), and was referred to outpatient treatment. Absent these documents, but for Mr. Scotto's testimony of being under the influence of drugs at the time the Note was executed, no additional evidence supporting his defense was proffered. Similarly, the defendant proffered no credible evidence supporting his defense that the sum was repaid in full.
The plaintiff signed his name to the Note, and it is the law in New York that "if the signer of an agreement could have read it in its entirety, to not have read it was gross negligence" ( Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 135 AD2d 488, 491 [2d Dept. 1987]. Similarly, the defendant is presumed to have read and understood the document that he signed, and cannot avoid liability by claiming that he failed to read it or understand the obligation imparted by the Note ( Marine Midland Bank, N .A. v. Dino Artie's Automatic Transmission Co., 168 AD2d 610, 611 [2d Dept 1990]).
It is axiomatic that in a civil action the plaintiff has the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the credible evidence. The court finds, after reviewing the court transcript and documentary evidence, that the plaintiff has met this burden and has demonstrated that she is owed $2,970.00 from the defendant. The remaining $630.00, which represents the remainder of her claim, however, is unsupported by credible evidence. Accordingly, the defendant, having failed to prove a valid defense, is hereby ordered to remit payment in the amount of $2,970.00 to the plaintiff, Ms. Vinueza, and she is awarded said sum.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.
See judgment.
SO ORDERED: