Opinion
04-10-1907
VINELAND HISTORICAL & ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY v. LANDIS et al.
Leverett Newcomb, for complainant. H. S. Alvord, for defendant executrix. C. K. Landis, for other defendants.
Bill by the Vineland Historical & Antiquarian Society against Matilda T. Landis, and others, to remove the administration of an estate to the Chancery Court, and for an accounting. Relief granted in part.
Leverett Newcomb, for complainant. H. S. Alvord, for defendant executrix. C. K. Landis, for other defendants.
LEAMING, V. C. (orally). I am convinced that no benefit will be derived from my taking this matter under advisement. I am entirely clear in my own mind as to the proper disposition of the motions at this time. There is no doubt of the jurisdiction of this court to entertain bills of this nature, andthe facts may go to the extent of inducing this court to remove bodily the settlement of the estate from the orphans' court, and conclude the administration of the estate here; but that jurisdiction, by the uniform course of a long line of authorities, will not be exercised, except upon the establishment to the satisfaction of this court that there has been fraud or mistake in the procurement of the account or in the proceedings before the orphans' court. A more limited relief is often given by this court in case where this court can appropriately be of service to the orphans' court in its administrative work. If there are matters of discovery which can be aided by means of the procedure in this court, and which the more limited powers of the orphans' court cannot reach, this court may appropriately act in that sphere and give to complainant the benefit of such procedure here; but, so far as an attempt at the administration of the estate in this court is concerned, jurisdiction should not be exercised, unless there is brought to the knowledge of this court conditions of fraud or mistake in the procurement or settlement, or in the proceedings pending. Further progress of this case may disclose conditions which demand for complainant a broader scope in the information which should be disclosed to him in the nature of a discovery by defendants than appears at this time; but, at this stage of the proceedings, it is entirely clear that, under the averments which are contained in this bill, this court should not compel an answer in advance which undertakes in any way to reveal or discover matters that are open to complainant's procurement in the orphans' court—that is to say, in so far as the bill in this case seeks to compel through an answer statements of account or facts or of conditions which are as easily procured in the orphans' court as in this court, that court should be applied to. And they cannot be appropriately sought through a claim of discovery in this court; but, where information is appropriately needed in which the orphans' court has no means of procuring disclosure, then, of course, it is entirely right and appropriate that the answer itself should set forth, in response to the interrogatories of the bill, matters of that nature. I see no way that this court can properly refuse the complainant his right to a discovery embodied in the answer in response to the interrogatories of the bill touching these matters which the bill alleges constitute a trusteeship upon the part of the executrix consisting of land and personal property standing in her name, and concerning which the complainant has no knowledge, or claims to have indefinite knowledge. If the executrix is able to proceed with the administration of this estate by converting the real estate or personal property which was in the name of the deceased, and also which was in her name, into cash, she must necessarily have possession of or the means of procuring all the information which would be necessary to enable her to disclose by an answer such real estate and personal property as stands in her name in trust for the estate of the deceased, and I cannot conceive that it would be in any sense a hardship to call upon the executrix to disclose with reasonable certainty and detail a list of such real estate and personal property as stands in her name and in fact belonged to decedent. And I can also conceive that it would be appropriate for complainant to seek that information as a matter of equitable right, information in the nature of discovery to which, I think, he is clearly entitled at this preliminary stage; but I cannot conceive that the complainant is entitled to a restatement of accounts, or any statements of account in the answers to be filed, or to any matters in the nature of accounts which are properly procurable in the orphans' court, and which that court can easily reach by its ordinary procedure. It may transpire at a hearing in this cause that matters may be disclosed wherein it becomes necessary to remove the entire administration to this court. At present there is nothing suggested in the bill which would seem to make that possible, because there is no fraud clearly averred; and at this time I cannot see the propriety of compelling the defendant to enter into an account in her answer further than is necessary in the disclosure of the assets, the title to which is inaccessible to the complainant—that is, assets the title to which is in the name of the trustee, who is the same person who is executrix, and the knowledge of which must be in her possession. It may be a burden to list the property, but I think the burden is one which she should assume, and the view which I entertain will lead me to advise an order, which counsel may prepare, allowing the motion to the extent that I have indicated, and denying it as to the rest—that is to say, I will make an order of a nature which exempts the defendant from embodying in detail statements of account, or any amplification of the account already stated—but decline to make an order which will exempt the defendant from making a disclosure of the property which stands in the name of the executrix.
Mr. Newcomb: That applies to both the real and personal assets?
The Court: Yes, any property in the name of the executrix which belongs to the estate. I think it is extremely important that there somewhere be made an exact record of that property. Her duties as executrix are inconsistent with her interest as a holder of the legal estate, and I think such property should be made a matter of record. Just what assets of that nature there are I think complainant should be made acquainted with. I feel entirely clear that the views which I have suggested in a rough way are entirely within the line of the adjudications. All the cases which I have seen clearly point to that view. So far as the money due to the executrixis concerned, as referred to in the will, I can see no difference between a plain legacy to an executrix of a specific amount, and a direction in the will that there be paid to her so much money which the testator says he owes her. I cannot see that it is material what that money was owing for. Therefore there need not be any disclosure of the items of the indebtedness which the will expressly recognizes as existing indebtedness. I think counsel can, with the suggestions which I have made, prepare an order which will meet the interests of the case.
Mr. Alvord: In regard to giving a detailed description of the real estate that was standing in the name of Matilda T. Landis, the defendants desire to know whether that refers to what is now left of the estate or what was standing in her name at the time of the decease of the testator.
The Court: I think Miss Landis ought to disclose a list of all assets that have been in her name from the beginning. I think such a list ought to exist somewhere in this court, or in the orphans' court. It is, to my mind, an important thing that such a list be made. I am not assuming for a moment that it would be within the field of possibilities for Miss Landis to abuse her trust—I know to the contrary—but I do think that an orderly administration should record such a list
Mr. Alvord: A large number of pieces of real estate have been sold and disposed of by her and put in the estate as part of the estate in the same manner as if the land had belonged to Charles K. Landis; that is, stood in his name at the time of his death. Is it material, and is it desirable, that the executrix should list that for the present purposes by way of answer? Or will it be considered sufficient if the executrix by way of answer now sets forth what lands she has still remaining undisposed of that were in her name at the time of the decease of Charles K. Landis which all now operate as a trust in her hands?
The Court: The theory of my decision is such that it would not necessarily call for a list of that which has already been sold; but I think it would be well and desirable to have a list of the whole, that which has been sold and that which may still be on hand.
Mr. Newcomb: I cannot tell how the trust estate has been administered without seeing a statement of what she had from the commencement or what she is possessed of.
The Court: I think she ought to supply with her answer information showing what property there has been from the beginning in her name belonging to the estate of Charles K. Landis.
Mr. Alvord: That will be quite an undertaking, and, of course, I will endeavor to comply with that order to the very best of our ability; but we would like by the order to be given some considerable time for that purpose. I don't mean an unreasonable time, but a reasonable length of time. I would suggest that we be allowed 60 days in which to prepare an answer, and if I should require a longer time than that I can apply to the court.
The Court: I see no difficulty about that.
Mr. Newcomb: And the order that we try to agree upon should include all of these points?
The Court: Yes, that is the better way.