Opinion
8:23-cv-01990-MGL-BM
04-25-2024
Vincent Missouri, Plaintiff, v. John P. Allen, Commissary Supervisor, Defendant.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRISTOW MARCHANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for default judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF Nos. 34; 39. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently confined at the Kershaw Correctional Institution. ECF No. 1 at 2. He is proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the standard form. ECF No. 1. The Court authorized service of process on Defendant Allen by Order dated June 12, 2023, and directed the United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) to accomplish service. ECF No. 15. The Summons was issued that same day and forwarded to the USMS along with a USM-285 Form. ECF Nos. 17; 19 (court only document). On June 30, 2023, the USMS filed a summons returned executed, showing that Defendant Allen was served on June 29, 2023, by delivering a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Defendant Allen's spouse at his personal address. ECF No. 22. The answer deadline for Defendant Allen was therefore July 17, 2023. Defendant Allen did not file an Answer or any other response. Accordingly, the Clerk entered default on August 3, 2023. ECF No. 24. The Clerk's entry of default was served on Defendant Allen by certified mail on August 22, 2023. ECF Nos. 28; 29.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment on October 30, 2023. ECF No. 34. Plaintiff's motion was served on Defendant Allen via certified mail. ECF No. 36. Defendant Allen did not file a response. Plaintiff also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on January 25, 2024. ECF No. 39.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends he brings this action for violations of his Eighth Amendment right not to be sexually assaulted by prison officials. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that, at the time of the incident, Defendant Allen was employed by SCDC as a commissary supervisor at the Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”). Id. at 4. Plaintiff reported sexual harassment and sexual assault to Lieber's executive staff on February 12, 2021. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, while he was conducting his duties in the commissary as an inmate worker, he was pushing a loaded laundry cart out for the day. Id. Defendant Allen snuck up behind Plaintiff and forcefully rammed the antenna of a walkie talkie up Plaintiff's buttocks. Id. Defendant Allen held the walkie talkie in front of his genitals mimicking having intercourse. Id. Defendant Allen's conduct caused Plaintiff to feel discomfort. Id. Other workers laughed at the incident, causing Plaintiff to feel embarrassed and humiliated. Id. Plaintiff was subjected to weeks and months of inmate ridicule based on the incident. Id. Plaintiff got into an altercation with an inmate canteen worker because of the incident and was placed on lockup in December 2021. Id. Plaintiff contends he has suffered psychological trauma due to the intentional sexual assault by Defendant Allen. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges he suffered sexual harassment by Defendant Allen. Id. He alleges that Defendant Allen would attempt to wrestle him “for his own sexual grati[fication], by attempting to grab Plaintiff in his private areas.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff would run away or leave the commissary to escape Defendant's inappropriate behavior. Id.
Further, Plaintiff contends that, on February 12, 2021, Defendant Allen verbally assaulted and abused Plaintiff with racist and derogatory remarks because Plaintiff attempted to report the alleged sexual harassment and assault. Id. Defendant Allen fired Plaintiff from his prison job after Plaintiff's reporting of the assault under the PREA. Id. For his relief, Plaintiff requests money damages. Id. at 7.
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Motion for Default Judgment
“District courts may enter default judgment against a properly served defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.” United Bank v. E. Coast Right of Way Maint., Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00473, 2019 WL 7290072, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 27, 2019). Default judgment under Rule 55(b) is appropriate “when a defendant fails ‘to plead or otherwise defend' in accordance with the Rules.” U.S. v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982).
Upon a showing that a party against whom a judgment is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, the clerk must enter the party's default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). After the clerk has entered a default, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b). In considering a motion for default judgment, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint not relating to the amount of damages. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(b)(6). However, “a default is not treated as an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiffs right to recover” because “[t]he defendant is not held . . . to admit conclusions of law.” Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, regarding default judgments, the “appropriate inquiry is whether or not the face of the pleadings supports the default judgment and the causes of action therein.” Anderson v. Found. for Advancement Educ. & Emp't of Am. Indians, 187 F.3d 628, 1999 WL 598860, at *1 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table opinion). “Upon default judgment, while a court must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the plaintiff must still prove that it is entitled to damages.” Masco Corp. v. Bennett, No. 3:08-cv-161-RJC-DCK, 2010 WL 1405136, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 31, 2010). The Fourth Circuit has a “strong policy that cases be decided on the merits,” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993); however, default judgment “may be appropriate when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party,” S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F.Supp.2d 418, 421 (D. Md. 2005).
DISCUSSION
Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a claim against Defendant Allen for sexual harassment and a claim for retaliation. As noted, Defendant Allen has not filed an answer or otherwise pled and Plaintiff has moved for a default judgment and for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons below, Plaintiff's motions should be denied without prejudice.
Plaintiff's motion for default judgment
In his motion for default judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court award the following relief: (1) general and special damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) taxes and the costs of the action, (4) reasonable attorney fees, (5) “trial by a jury on any foreseeable issues so triable,” and (6) any other just and appropriate relief. ECF No. 34 at 1-2. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
Plaintiff seeks monetary awards from Defendant(s) in the amount of 10,000.000, for emotional, psychological trauma, stress, and physical harm[, and] punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.000; and the [harms] suffered on lock-up, as a direct and approximate result of Defendants actions. $500,000. Or, an amount to be determined by “JURY”.ECF No. 1 at 7. Thus, it appears that Plaintiff seeks actual damages in the total amount of $10,500,000, and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000,000.
However, Plaintiff's motion is completely devoid of any argument or evidentiary support that Plaintiff is entitled to the damages he seeks in his Complaint or in his motion. “When a default judgment has been awarded, a plaintiff must prove damages to a reasonable certainty and when a defendant has failed to respond, the court must make an independent determination-by relying on affidavits, documentation, or an evidentiary hearing-of the sum to be awarded as damages.” Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Logan Oncology Care Assocs., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00073, 2019 WL 3928678, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 19, 2019). A “plaintiff [is] required to prove damages by preponderance of evidence following entry of default before entry of default judgment.” Nehme v. Khoury, No. 5:14-cv-114-FL, 2018 WL 3876579, at *7 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 15, 2018) (citing Consol. Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Const. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1967)), judgment entered sub nom. Nehme v. El Khoury, No. 5:14-cv-114-FL, 2021 WL 4343403 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 23, 2021).
When reviewing a motion for default judgment, courts should review the complaint to determine if the “face of the pleadings supports the default judgment and the causes of action therein.” United Bank v. E. Coast Right of Way Maint., Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00473, 2019 WL 7290072, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 27, 2019). “The court must, therefore, determine whether the well-pleaded allegations in [the plaintiff's] complaint support the relief sought . . .” Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001). “[A] mere ‘generalized statement of the amount due in [the] plaintiff's complaint' does not establish a ‘sum certain' for purposes of Rule 55(b)(1).” Woodring v. Collection Recovery Bureau, No. ELH-11-cv-02106, 2012 WL 94563, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2012) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that he is entitled to the damages he requests. He makes no arguments in his motion and points to no evidence to support his conclusory assertions. Plaintiff has simply failed to carry his burden of showing he is entitled to damages, even accepting as true the facts alleged in the Complaint.
Further, some of the relief requested in Plaintiff's motion is not available to him. For example, although Plaintiff seeks attorney fees, he is not entitled to such relief because “a pro se plaintiff may not collect attorney's fees.” Harman v. Unisys Corp., 746 F.Supp.2d 755, 764 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also Guidetti v. Cnty. of Greenville, No. 6:11-cv-1249-HMH-JDA, 2011 WL 5024287, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2011) (explaining that, even if the plaintiff were to prevail on any of his claims under a statute which allows for the award of reasonable attorneys' fees, the plaintiff was representing himself and was therefore not entitled to attorney's fees), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5024277 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011). Additionally, pro se litigants “cannot recover attorney litigation expenses.” Rhoads v. F.D.I.C., 286 F.Supp.2d 532, 543 (D. Md. 2003), aff'd, 94 Fed.Appx. 187 (4th Cir. 2004).
In sum, Plaintiff's motion is insufficient to support a default judgment. He has not identified with specificity his legal entitlement to relief. And, to the extent Plaintiff is entitled to any relief, he has not identified a “sum certain” pursuant to Rule 55(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings
In his motion for judgment on the pleadings, Plaintiff notes that the Clerk of Court entered a default judgment against Defendant. ECF No. 39 at 1. Plaintiff contends that “a formal ‘JUDGMENT' is ripe to forward to Plaintiff, as the former employee is both bonded and insured with the South Carolina Department of Correction[s] during all times in which the misconduct and sexual assault took place on the Plaintiff, making Defendant(s) liable for damages as requested within the civil suit.” Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff's motion should be denied as moot. The motion is redundant to Plaintiff's motion for default judgment and essentially makes the same argument and requests the same relief. As such, and in light of the analysis above regarding Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, his motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment be DENIED without prejudice and that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings be DENIED as moot. This case is now ready for a trial/merits hearing on the amount of damages to be awarded, if any.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.