Opinion
No. 1:15-cv-01360-DAD-JDP (PC)
10-28-2020
JARED M. VILLERY, Plaintiff, v. JAY JONES, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MARCH 18, 2020 ORDER
(Doc. No. 82)
Plaintiff Jared M. Villery is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
This matter is before the court on plaintiff's request for limited reconsideration of the assigned magistrate judge's order of March 18, 2020 ruling on plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses from defendants. (Doc. No. 82.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's request for reconsideration will be granted.
BACKGROUND
On May 29, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery responses from defendants. (Doc. No. 57.) On March 18, 2020, the assigned magistrate judge issued an order granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion to compel. (Doc. No. 81.) On April 6, 2020, plaintiff filed the pending request for limited reconsideration of the magistrate judge's March 18, 2020 order. (Doc. No. 82.) Therein, plaintiff argues that: (1) "[t]he Court's conclusion that Defendants Jones and Escarcega do not have constructive possession, custody, or control over specific [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR")] Internal Affairs records is clearly erroneous and contrary to law," and (2) "[t]he Court clearly erred when finding that Defendant Jones's response to Request for Production No. 6 was adequate." (Id. at 5.)
In the pending request for reconsideration, plaintiff also argues that "[t]he Court committed clear error when failing to reopen discovery and reset the Discovery cut-off deadline," as previously requested by plaintiff. (Doc. No. 82 at 5; see also Doc. No. 58.) That basis for reconsideration, however, has been rendered moot by the magistrate judge's September 1, 2020 order reopening discovery for ninety days and continuing the dispositive motion deadline for an additional sixty days thereafter. (Doc. No. 98.)
Pursuant to Local Rule 303(d), defendants' opposition, if any, needed to be filed by April 14, 2020. However, defendants have not filed an opposition to the pending request for reconsideration and the time in which to do so has long since passed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that non-dispositive pretrial matters may be referred to and decided by a magistrate judge, subject to review by the assigned district judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also L.R. 303(c). The district judge shall modify or set aside any part of the magistrate judge's order which is "found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law." L.R. 303(f); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Discovery motions are non-dispositive pretrial motions which come within the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Thus, the orders of a magistrate judge addressing discovery motions are subject to the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard of review. Rockwell Int'l, Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983). The magistrate judge's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Merchant v. CIR, 947 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991). "A magistrate judge's decision is 'contrary to law' if it applies an incorrect legal standard, fails to consider an element of [the] applicable standard, or fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure." Martin v. Loadholt, No. 1:10-cv-00156-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL 3563312, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2014). "[R]eview under the clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sec. Farms v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 124 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 1997).
DISCUSSION
In denying plaintiff's motion to compel defendants Escarcega and Jones to produce the documents requested by him, the magistrate judge ruled that:
Rule 34(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to serve discovery request for certain relevant items "in the responding party's possession, custody, or control." "[F]ederal courts have consistently held that documents are deemed to be within the 'possession, custody or control' for purposes of Rule 34 if the party has actual possession, custody or control, or has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand." In re Bankers Tr. Co., 61 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. International Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.[]1989) ("Control is defined as the legal right to obtain documents upon demand."). Here, plaintiff has failed to show that defendants have the legal right to obtain more documents. The court finds that defendants' responses are adequate and denies plaintiff's request for more.(Doc. No. 81 at 4.)
Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erroneously concluded that defendant Escarcega and Jones did not have possession, custody, or control over CDCR Internal Affairs documents that he had requested from them in his Requests for Production Number 18 and 24, respectively. (Doc. No. 82 at 4). The magistrate judge did not address plaintiff's contention that defendants Escarcega and Jones have constructive control of the requested documents by virtue of their employment with CDCR and the fact that they are both represented in this action by the California Attorney General's Office. (Doc. No. 57 at 31; Doc. No. 82 at 7-8). Indeed, judges of this district have often compelled defendants to produce CDCR documents that they have constructive control over. See Mundo v. Carmona, No. 1:16-cv-01687-AWI-MJS, 2018 WL 1083889, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018) (noting that in the court's experience "individual defendants who are employed by CDCR and/or the Attorney General can generally obtain documents . . . from CDCR by requesting them," and ruling that defendant had control over requested documents and had to produce them because he was employed by non-party CDCR and was represented by the Attorney General's Office); Mitchell v. Adams, No. 2:06-cv-02321-GGH, 2009 WL 674348, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009) (requiring documents to be produced because, "[w]hile the defendant warden in his personal or individual capacity may not have custody of the documents at issue, because 'control' is determined by authority, he has constructive possession, custody or control"). Although motions to compel discovery from CDCR employees who have contended that they do not have constructive possession over the requested documents and have provide factual support for that contention have been denied, see Woodall v. California, No. 1:08-cv-01948-LJO-DLB, 2011 WL 240717, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2011), here defendants Escarcega and Jones have not argued that they do not have ready access to the requested documents or that they cannot request them from CDCR.
The undersigned acknowledges that after the magistrate judge reopened discovery in this case, see footnote 1 above, the magistrate judge granted plaintiff's motion for the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum on the warden of the facility at issue in this action, the chief of the office of CDCR's Internal Affairs Office, and the inspector general for the State of California, seeking what appear to be the same documents that he is seeking from defendants Escarcega and Jones. (Compare Doc. Nos. 100, 101, with Doc. No. 57 at 30.) Even if the documents plaintiff is seeking from non-parties overlap with those he is seeking from defendants Escarcega and Jones, the fact that plaintiff may be able to obtain copies of the requested documents from those non-parties does not absolve defendants of their obligations to comply with plaintiff's appropriate discovery requests.
Accordingly, defendants Escarcega and Jones will be ordered to produce the documents requested by plaintiff in his Requests for Production Number 18 and 24, respectively.
Next, the court addresses plaintiff's contention that the magistrate judge erred in finding that defendant Jones adequately responded to plaintiff's Request for Production Number 6, which sought identification and production from each defendant of any and all staff complaints that have ever been filed by other inmates against them while employed with CDCR. (Doc. Nos. 57 at 25; 82 at 11.) Defendant Jones responded and produced lists of staff complaints filed against him and some of the other defendants in this action with redactions. (See Doc. No. 71 at 20-24.) Plaintiff contends that "it is impossible for [him] to glean anything from a list of Complaints, which provides no information whatsoever pertaining to the substance of the complaints, or the basis for why they were filed . . .." (Doc. No. 82 at 11.)
The magistrate judge's order as to this issue provided no analysis as to why producing a list of complaints filed by inmates against some of the defendants is an "adequate" response to plaintiff's request for production of copies of the complaints themselves. Because plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged "in a pattern of repeated violations of his right to be free from retaliation, occurring as retribution for [his] pursuit of constitutionally protected activities" (Doc. No 16 at 2), the substance of any complaints by other inmates alleging similar conduct by some or all of the defendants is relevant to plaintiff's claims at issue in this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.") (emphasis added). Indeed, courts have recognized that "[c]omplaints against officers . . . may show, among other things, the character or proclivity of such officers toward violent behavior or possible bias." Taylor v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, No. 99-cv-0383-RT(RCX), 1999 WL 33101661, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1999). Moreover, "such documents would bear upon [each defendants'] . . . previous alleged misconduct and/or responses to such alleged misconduct." Ramirez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 412 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, the magistrate judge's ruling that defendant Jones' production of a list of complaints that failed to describe the substance of those complaints was an adequate response to plaintiff's Request for Production Number 6—is clearly erroneous and contrary to law.
Accordingly, defendants will also be ordered to produce documents responsive to plaintiff's Request for Production Number 6.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above,
1. Plaintiff's request for reconsideration (Doc. No. 82) of the magistrate judge's March 18, 2020 order is granted; and/////
2. Within thirty (30) days of the date of issuance of this order:
IT IS SO ORDERED.a. Defendant Escarcega shall respond to and produce the documents requested by plaintiff in Request for Production No. 18;
b. Defendant Jones shall respond to and produce the documents requested by plaintiff in Request for Production No. 24; and
c. Defendants shall respond to and produce the documents requested by plaintiff in Request for Production No. 6.
Dated: October 28 , 2020
/s/_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE