Opinion
NO. 09-14-00503-CR
02-03-2016
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 13-06-06569 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jose Manuel Villarreal pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced Villarreal to life in prison. In three appellate issues, Villarreal challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "First, we afford almost total deference to a trial judge's determination of historical facts." Id. Second, we review a trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We sustain the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any applicable legal theory. Id. at 447-48.
In his motion to suppress, Villarreal sought suppression of evidence obtained as the result of a traffic stop. At the suppression hearing, Houston police officer Carlos Cantu testified that on the day of the offense, he was patrolling an area known for burglary of vehicles. Cantu saw a darkly tinted Dodge Charger drive into the Twin Peaks parking lot, circle the lot while passing by empty parking spaces, and never attempt to either park or conduct business. He testified that this type of behavior is consistent with that of burglary suspects. Cantu followed the Charger as it left Twin Peaks and entered a Fuddrucker's parking lot, where the driver of the Charger engaged in the same behavior as in the Twin Peaks lot. The Charger left Fuddrucker's and parked at a nearby Whataburger. Three men got out of the Charger and went inside Whataburger. Cantu decided that the men must have been looking for a place to eat, so he left Whataburger and returned to Twin Peaks.
Shortly thereafter, Cantu saw the Charger return to Twin Peaks and park. A GMC Yukon subsequently pulled into the lot, circled around, and parked near the Charger. The Charger's driver approached the Yukon to speak with the Yukon's driver and then returned to the Charger. A few minutes later, Cantu saw a Mercedes enter the parking lot and park near the Charger. Cantu testified that he later learned that Villarreal was driving the Mercedes. The three men from the Charger, the driver of the Yukon, and Villarreal looked inside the trunk of the Mercedes and then entered the Mercedes. Cantu testified that he believed the men were involved in a drug transaction. When the men exited the Mercedes and returned to their respective vehicles, all three cars left Twin Peaks and Cantu followed the Mercedes.
Cantu saw Villarreal fail to signal when changing lanes. Because Cantu was in an unmarked unit, he contacted an officer in a marked patrol vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. Officer Keith Mountain testified that he responded to Cantu's call and when he approached the Mercedes, Mountain saw Villarreal turn without signaling. Mountain initiated a traffic stop for failure to signal. When Mountain ran Villarreal's driver's license, he discovered open warrants for traffic violations. Mountain placed Villarreal in handcuffs and advised Villarreal that he was being detained for an open warrant. He did not give any Miranda warnings.
When Cantu arrived at the scene, he asked Villarreal if the Mercedes contained anything illegal, and Villarreal admitted that the Mercedes contained a small amount of cocaine and showed Cantu where the cocaine was located. Cantu testified that Villarreal was nervous, sweating, and breathing heavily. Cantu subsequently opened the trunk and observed a bag of diamonds. When Cantu asked Villarreal about the diamonds, Villarreal said, "Just take me to the station, and I'll tell you everything." At no time did Cantu read Villarreal Miranda warnings, nor did he see anyone else give the warnings. According to Mountain, the Mercedes had to be towed, so an inventory was required per police department policy.
Montgomery County Detective Chad May testified that he was investigating the aggravated robbery of a jewelry store when the Houston Police Department contacted him about Villarreal. He learned that Villarreal was in possession of items stolen from the jewelry store and wanted to speak with May. After May gave Villarreal Miranda warnings, Villarreal waived his rights and agreed to speak with May. Villarreal discussed the details of the jewelry store robbery with May. Villarreal told May that on the day of the traffic stop, he met with the four men from the Yukon and the Charger to show them that he had not sold the jewelry. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Villarreal's motion to suppress.
On appeal, Villarreal maintains that he was under arrest when Houston police officers questioned him regarding the contents of his vehicle and failed to record his statement. He argues that the cocaine, diamonds, and interview with May should have all been excluded as the product of an illegally obtained statement. "[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985). "The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine . . . does not apply to mere violations of the prophylactic requirements in Miranda: while the statement taken in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, other evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that statement (i.e. the 'fruits' of the statement) need not be suppressed." Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "The rule . . . requires suppressing the fruits of a defendant's statement only when the statement was obtained through actual coercion." Id.
Although Villarreal gave unwarned statements to the Houston officers, the record does not indicate that Villarreal made such statements in response to coercion. Thus, evidence obtained as a result of those statements, i.e., the cocaine and diamonds, was not required to be suppressed. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318; see also Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22. "[M]ere noncompliance with Miranda does not result in a carryover taint beyond the statement itself." Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 23.
Additionally, Detective May's subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to Villarreal removed the conditions that precluded admission of Villarreal's previous statement. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 ("A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement."); see also Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31, 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Accordingly, the trial court was not required to suppress Villareal's confession to May. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314; see also Carter, 309 S.W.3d at 42; Williams v. State, 257 S.W.3d 426, 435-36 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref'd) (Statement taken in accordance with Miranda was not tainted by prior unwarned statement.). Under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied Villarreal's motion to suppress. We overrule issues one, two, and three, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice Submitted on January 18, 2016
Opinion Delivered February 3, 2016
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.