Opinion
HHDCV126036028S
03-06-2017
Villages, LLC v. Lori Longhi
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #119, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE LIABILITY #125
A. Susan Peck, Judge Trial Referee.
The plaintiff, Villages, LLC, filed a complaint in this action on October 9, 2012, against the defendant, Lori Longhi, set forth in two counts alleging intentional fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional tortious interference with a business expectancy. In support of its complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff is a Connecticut limited liability company with a principal place of business in Enfield, Connecticut, and the defendant is a resident of Enfield, Connecticut. At all the relevant times, the defendant was a member of the Enfield Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission). On or about May 28, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application with the Commission for a special use permit and an application for an open space subdivision, to be located on property owned by the plaintiff, described as approximately 64 acres adjacent to 87 Simon Road in Enfield. The subdivision was to consist of 38 residential housing lots and a boulevard design for a portion of one of the proposed streets. The Commission held public hearings on both applications on July 9, 2009, July 23, 2009, September 3, 2009, and October 1, 2009. The hearing on October 1, 2009 was closed, and on October 15, 2009, the Commission voted to deny both applications.
During the relevant time period, the defendant was a member of the Commission and a major part of the pertinent hearings. The defendant played a significant role in the deliberations and voted to deny the plaintiff's applications. Throughout the proceedings, the defendant was clearly and egregiously biased against the plaintiff. The defendant's bias was against one of the owners of the plaintiff, specifically the wife of the former mayor of Enfield, Patrick Tallarita. The bias was shown when the defendant stated to another individual that she " felt that the Planning and Zoning commission had treated her unfairly and screwed her, was unhappy with Patrick Tallarita because he did not intervene on her behalf and that she wanted him to suffer the same fate of denial by the Commission that she had suffered." Compl., p. 2, ¶ 7. After the close of the public hearings, but prior to the final meeting, the defendant initiated improper ex parte communications concerning the plaintiff's applications, and made strong negative comments during the October 15, 2009 meeting concerning information obtained during the ex parte communication. The defendant's bias affected the other members of the Commission, and the defendant raised many negative questions about the applications and the facts involved and intended to have a major effect on the deliberations and votes at the October 15, 2009 meeting. Due to the bias demonstrated by the defendant and her biased, aggressive and vociferous arguments against the plaintiff's applications, an honest, legal and fair action by the Commission was not made.
The defendant, by participating in the proceedings on the plaintiff's applications, intentionally misrepresented to the plaintiff that she was a neutral, honest, fair and unbiased member of the Commission. The defendant knew that her representations were false, and she made these representations to the plaintiff willfully, wantonly, maliciously and in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. The defendant made these representations for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to proceed before the Commission. The plaintiff reasonably and justifiably relied on the defendant's misrepresentations and took action based on the representations by proceeding before the Commission and investing substantial money, time and effort into its application. As a result of the plaintiff's reasonable and justifiable reliance on the defendant's representations, the plaintiff suffered substantial monetary damages for which the defendant is liable.
Furthermore, the plaintiff had a business expectation that the Commission would provide it with a fair, honest, and legal proceeding on its applications, to the benefit of both the plaintiff and the community, and proceeded before the Commission on that basis. The defendant knew that the plaintiff had this business expectation, and intentionally and tortiously interfered with the relationship between the plaintiff and the Commission by making biased, aggressive and vociferous arguments against the plaintiff's applications; by engaging in improper ex parte communications; and by making fraudulent intentional misrepresentations to the plaintiff. The defendant's intentional tortious conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial monetary damages. The plaintiff seeks monetary, exemplary, and punitive damages, and such other relief as may in law or equity appertain, in an amount in excess of $15,000.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case before the court has a lengthy procedural history. The plaintiff filed appeals from the decisions of the Commission to the Superior Court. The substance of the appeals was identical. On May 30, 2012, in a memorandum of decision filed in both cases, the court, Rittenband, J., rendered judgment sustaining each appeal, holding that the Commission had not made an honest, legal, and fair action, and remanded the cases to the Commission for further public hearings. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgments. Upon the granting of certification to the Supreme Court, the appeals were dismissed.
See Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5033925-S, (May 30, 2012, Rittenband, J.); Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5033926-S, (May 30, 2012, Rittenband, J.).
See Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, 149 Conn.App. 448, 89 A.3d 405 (2014), appeal dismissed, 320 Conn. 89, 127 A.3d 998 (2015).
On October 9, 2012, the plaintiff filed the complaint in the present action. On January 18, 2013, the defendant filed an answer, denying the material allegations of the complaint, and asserted three special defenses to each count including that each cause of action was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity and absolute immunity. The plaintiff filed a reply, denying each of the defendant's special defenses on February 4, 2013. On December 13, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law. The motion papers included a certified transcript of Patrick Tallarita's deposition, the defendant's affidavit, and the transcripts from each of the Commission's meetings that were pertinent to this action. On January 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff's opposition papers included Judge Rittenband's memorandum of decision and a certified transcript of Patrick Tallarita's deposition.
The transcripts of the meetings were from the following dates: July 9, 2009, July 23, 2009, September 3, 2009, October 1, 2009, and October 15, 2009.
See Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-09-5033925-S; Villages, LLC v. Enfield Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-09-5033926-S.
On January 17, 2014, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment as to liability only. The motion was supported by a memorandum of law and included the exhibits previously filed in opposition to the defendant's motion. On January 21, 2014, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's opposition to her motion, and attached the plaintiff's complaint and appeal from the Commission's original decision. Also on January 21, 2014, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability only, on the ground that it was untimely. The court overruled this objection on February 13, 2014.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a supplemental objection to the defendant's motion on January 22, 2014, and the defendant filed a second objection to the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on February 25, 2014. The matter was heard at short calendar on March 17, 2014, after which the court, Wiese, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on May 7, 2014, and did not rule on the motion for summary judgment [58 Conn.L.Rptr. 155, ]. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal. On July 5, 2016, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of trial court, Wiese, J., holding that qualified immunity, as opposed to absolute immunity, applied to the defendant, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Subsequently, this court heard oral argument on the present motions for summary judgment at short calendar on November 7, 2016. The plaintiff filed a supplemental memorandum on the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation on November 15, 2016, and the defendant filed a reply on November 21, 2016.
See Villages, LLC v. Longhi, 166 Conn.App. 685, 142 A.3d 1162, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 915, 149 A.3d 498 (2016).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried . . . However, since litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury . . . the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " Because . . . collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving [such] a claim . . ." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).
" The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is preventing unnecessary trials . . . If a plaintiff is unable to present sufficient evidence in support of an essential element of his cause of action at trial, he cannot prevail as a matter of law." Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 822-23, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). A party's " conclusory statements, in the affidavit and elsewhere . . . do not constitute evidence sufficient to establish the existence of disputed material facts." Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583, 687 A.2d 111 (1996). " Although the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment . . . A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Escourse v. 100 Taylor Avenue, LLC, 150 Conn.App. 819, 829-30, 92 A.3d 1025 (2014).
" [S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way . . . [A] summary disposition . . . should be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a directed verdict for the moving party . . . [A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).
I
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO LIABILITY ONLY
The plaintiff argues that summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant's liability because the defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether or not she was impermissibly biased against the plaintiff during the Commission hearings. The plaintiff claims that the defendant's conduct is the basis of liability with respect to both counts of the complaint. The defendant counters that she was not a party to either of the prior proceedings, nor in privity with any party, and that the issues sought to be litigated in the instant matter are not identical to those litigated in the prior proceedings, and therefore, collateral estoppel does not apply. The defendant argues in the alternative that even if she were collaterally estopped from arguing the issue of bias, the finding would not be relevant or material to the claims made by the plaintiff in this matter for intentional fraudulent misrepresentation and tortious interference with a business expectancy.
" Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action . . . For an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action. It also must have been actually decided and the decision must have been necessary to the judgment . . . The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296, 596 A.2d 414 (1991).
" Collateral estoppel may be invoked against a party to a prior adverse proceeding or against those in privity with that party . . . While it is commonly recognized that privity is difficult to define, the concept exists to ensure that the interests of the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted have been adequately represented because of his purported privity with a party at the initial proceeding." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Young v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn.App. 107, 114, 758 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 906, 762 A.2d 912 (2000). " Privity is a difficult concept to define precisely . . . There is no prevailing definition of privity to be followed automatically in every case. It is not a matter of form or rigid labels; rather it is a matter of substance. In determining whether privity exists, [the court] employ[s] an analysis that focuses on the functional relationships of the parties. Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may be interested in the same question or in proving or disproving the same set of facts. Rather, it is, in essence, a shorthand statement for the principle that collateral estoppel should be applied only when there exists such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights so as to justify preclusion." Mazziotti v. Allstate Insurance Co., 240 Conn. 799, 813-14, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997). It has been further stated that " [a]n official sued in an individual capacity is generally not considered to be in privity with the government and consequently not bound by a prior adjudication in which the government was a party." C& H Management, LLC v. Shelton, 140 Conn.App. 608, 615, 59 A.3d 851 (2013) (city engineer sued in individual capacity for denial of construction permit not in privity with city and number of its officials from prior action).
In Wiacek Farms, LLC v. Shelton, 132 Conn.App. 163, 166, 30 A.3d 27 (2011), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 918, 34 A.3d 394 (2012), the court considered whether the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from bringing a claim against the defendant, the mayor of the city, for interference with business and contractual expectations, in light of a prior finding in an injunction proceeding that the city had not acted in bad faith. In the initial proceeding, the plaintiff filed an injunction to preclude the city from condemning property that he wished to acquire, and claimed that the city failed to engage in reasonable negotiations for the purchase of the property, and further that the city acted in bad faith, in part because the defendant owned a parcel of land that had also been identified as a potential area for condemnation. Id. The court rejected these claims and granted judgment in favor the city. In the subsequent case, the plaintiff filed a claim against the city and the defendant, which alleged that the defendant improperly interfered with its business expectancy, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel. Id., 171. The court held that although there was an overlap of the facts relevant to the issues, they were not sufficiently identical. The court reasoned that the issue of whether the defendant caused the plaintiff monetary damages by improperly interfering with its business expectations was sufficiently different from the issue in the injunction proceeding, which determined whether the city acted in bad faith in taking the property. Id.
The defendant in the present case is not in privity with the Commission, the defendant in the prior actions. The defendant herein is being sued in her individual capacity rather than in her official capacity as a member of the Commission. While the parties may have similar interests, they are not sufficiently identical to determine that the Commission represented the same legal rights in the prior action as the defendant seeks to assert in this action. As such, the defendant is not bound by a prior adjudication in which the Commission was a party. See C& H Management, LLC v. Shelton, supra, 140 Conn.App. 615.
In addition, the issues to be determined in the present case are substantially different from the issues in the previous cases. In the earlier proceedings, the issues were whether the plaintiff was aggrieved by the decision of the Commission due to its failure to take honest and legal action on the plaintiff's applications. The Superior Court and the Appellate Court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In the present case, just as in Wiacek Farms, LLC, supra, the issue is whether the defendant caused monetary damages to the plaintiff by intentional tortious interference with a business expectancy and intentional fraudulent misrepresentation. The current issues are, therefore, significantly different from the issues decided in the previous cases. A finding of bias by the defendant in the initial actions does not conclusively determine liability of the defendant for either of the present claims. Therefore, the defendant is not collaterally estopped from disputing liability as to these claims. Accordingly, the plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment must be denied.
II
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The defendant argues that summary judgment in her favor is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff cannot satisfy the elements of the claims for intentional fraudulent misrepresentation and tortious interference with a business expectancy, and therefore, she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot show that she intentionally made any false statement to the plaintiff upon which the plaintiff relied to its detriment. Nor has the plaintiff shown that it would have entered into a contract or made a profit, but for the defendant's alleged conduct. In response, the plaintiff counters that the defendant is collaterally estopped from the factual determinations as to the defendant's bias and impermissible gathering of evidence ex parte. The plaintiff further argues that the defendant cannot demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant's intentional misrepresentation to the plaintiff and as to the defendant's intentional interference with a business expectation of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the defendant cannot show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.
A
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
" The essential elements of an action in [fraudulent misrepresentation] are that: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury . . . Under a fraud claim of this type, the party to whom the false representation was made claims to have relied on that representation and to have suffered harm as a result of the reliance . . . [A] fraudulent representation . . . is one that is knowingly untrue, or made without belief in its truth, or recklessly made and for the purpose of inducing action upon it . . . This is so because fraudulent misrepresentation is an intentional tort." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sturm v. Harb Development, LLC, 298 Conn. 124, 142, 2 A.3d 859 (2010).
The court notes that while the parties consistently referred to this claim as Intentional Fraudulent Misrepresentation in the complaint and their memoranda, the actual cause of action is for fraudulent misrepresentation, which includes the requirement that the misrepresentation be intentional.
" It is well settled that silence can constitute fraud under certain circumstances. Fraud is defined as [d]eceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender some legal right . . . Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of the truth, or other device contrary to the plain rules of common honesty . . . [U]nder certain circumstances, there may be as much fraud in a person's silence as in a false statement." (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garrigus v. Viarengo, 112 Conn.App. 655, 669-70, 963 A.2d 1065 (2009).
" Mere nondisclosure . . . does not ordinarily amount to fraud . . . It will arise from such a source only under exceptional circumstances . . . To constitute fraud on that ground, there must be a failure to disclose known facts and, in addition thereto, a request or an occasion or a circumstance which imposes a duty to speak." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiMichele v. Perrella, 158 Conn.App. 726, 731, 120 A.3d 551 (2015). " A duty to disclose may be imposed by statute or regulation . . . or such a duty may arise under common law . . . Under the common law, a duty to disclose is imposed on a party insofar as he voluntarily makes disclosure. A party who assumes to speak must make a full and fair disclosure as to the matters about which he assumes to speak . . . Additionally, [w]hether or not there is a duty to disclose depends on the relationship of the parties . . . or, to put it in another way, whether the occasion and circumstances are such as to impose a duty to speak . . . A duty to disclose will arise if the parties share a 'special relationship.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 731-32. See, e.g., Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., 312 Conn. 286, 313, 94 A.3d 553 (2014) (no special relationship existed between buyer and seller; as such, no duty imposed on defendant to disclose to plaintiff deception attendant to transaction).
In the present case, after reviewing the lengthy transcripts from the relevant proceedings, the deposition transcript of Patrick Tallarita, and the memoranda of law, the court finds that there is no evidence beyond the plaintiff's conjecture as to the nature of the facts that indicates a misrepresentation by the defendant. The plaintiff attempts to rely on the prior decision of the court, Rittenband, J., which held that the defendant was biased towards the plaintiff during the Commission proceedings. This does not, however, suffice to show that the defendant intentionally misrepresented herself in any way in the course of the proceedings. In response to being asked whether the defendant ever stated anything inaccurately during the proceedings before the Commission, the plaintiff responded that the defendant merely exaggerated. See Pl.'s Dep., p. 32. The plaintiff continued by stating that the defendant " called into question things that necessarily didn't need to be called into question." See Pl.'s Dep., p. 33. Neither of these statements establish that the defendant made a false statement of fact.
The plaintiff further argues that the defendant's representation that she was an " unbiased decisionmaker" was a fraudulent misrepresentation. Assuming that the defendant was indeed biased, the plaintiff provided no evidence to show that the defendant had a duty to represent that she was biased, or that such a request was made of the defendant. Furthermore, outside of the plaintiff's conclusory statement that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to proceed before the zoning commission with its applications, there is no evidence demonstrating that the defendant actually intended to do so. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to present evidence that would sufficiently support the essential elements of the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation that the defendant knowingly made misrepresentations to the plaintiff with the intention of inducing the plaintiff to rely on such misrepresentations.
B
Tortious Interference with a Business Expectancy
" It is well established that the elements of a claim for tortious interference with business expectancies are: (1) a business relationship between the plaintiff and another party; (2) the defendant's intentional interference with the business relationship while knowing of the relationship; and (3) as a result of the interference, the plaintiff suffers actual loss." Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 27, 761 A.2d 1268 (2000). " A cause of action for tortious interference with a business expectancy requires proof that the defendant was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation or molestation . . . or that the defendant acted maliciously . . . It is also true, however, that not every act that disturbs a contract or business expectancy is actionable." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn.App. 11, 21, 771 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 601 (2001). " Stated simply, to substantiate a claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy, there must be evidence that the interference resulted from the defendant's commission of a tort." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In order for the plaintiff to establish actual loss, " it must appear that, except for the tortious interference of the defendant, there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a contract or made a profit . . . If the question is whether the plaintiff would have succeeded in attaining a prospective business transaction in the absence of [the] defendant's interference, the court may, in determining whether the proof meets the requirement of reasonable certainty, give due weight to the fact that the question was made hypothetical by the very wrong of the defendant." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert, 101 Conn.App. 83, 97, 920 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 901, 931 A.2d 261 (2007). Furthermore, " [t]he plaintiff need not prove that the defendant caused the breach of an actual contract; proof of interference with even an unenforceable promise is enough." Golembeski v. Metichewan Grange No. 190, 20 Conn.App. 699, 702, 569 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 214 Conn. 809, 573 A.2d 320 (1990).
Our Supreme Court has recognized that before a zoning commission, " the special permit process is, in fact, discretionary . . . [The court has] concluded that general considerations such as public health, safety and welfare, which are enumerated in zoning regulations, may be the basis for the denial of a special permit . . . [B]efore the zoning commission can determine whether the specially permitted use is compatible with the uses permitted as of right in the particular zoning district, it is required to judge whether any concerns, such as parking or traffic congestion would adversely impact the surrounding neighborhood." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 244 Conn. 619, 626-27, 711 A.2d 675 (1998). " Thus, the zoning commission can exercise its discretion during the review of the proposed special exception, as it applies the regulations to the specific application before it." Id., 628. This liberal discretion is afforded to a zoning commission in applications for conventional or open space divisions as well. See Krawski v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 21 Conn.App. 667, 671, 575 A.2d 1036, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 814, 576 A.2d 543 (1990).
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that the business expectancy with which the defendant interfered was that the Commission would provide a fair and honest forum for his applications to be heard. Thus, the plaintiff is required to make a showing, outside a mere assertion of fact, that there was a business relationship between the Commission and the plaintiff. The court was presented with simply no evidence that such a relationship existed. The plaintiff appeared before the Commission with two applications, with the hope of having them approved. That was the extent of the relationship. The plaintiff did not present evidence that this created a business relationship. Proof of such a relationship is an essential element of the cause of action.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo, that the court did find that there was a business relationship between the plaintiff and the Commission, the plaintiff has still failed to show that but for the defendant's actions, the plaintiff would have succeeded in its applications before the Commission. There was no evidence of a promise made by the Commission that the plaintiff's applications would be granted, nor is there any requirement by the Commission to grant applications, where there is a question of compliance with regulations or a concern regarding parking and congestion. See Irwin v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 244 Conn. 626-27.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was biased against it. Although bias was indeed found in Commission decisions, the plaintiff did not state that any of the Commission's concerns regarding the regulations and the applications in general were misplaced or, in fact, incorrect. Thus, there was no guarantee that, but for the defendant's actions, the plaintiff's applications would have been granted. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the defendant's actions interfered with a contract or promise between the plaintiff and the Commission. Accordingly, the defendant has successfully met her burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is hereby denied and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.