Opinion
5-23-CV-00631-JKP-RBF
08-17-2023
BERT D. VILLA, DIANA GARZA, Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTOPHER VILLA, SR., ET AL., Defendants.
To the Honorable United States District Judge Jason Pulliam
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RICHARD B. FARRER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Report and Recommendation concerns Plaintiffs' pro se Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and proposed civil complaint. See Dkt. No. 1. The IFP application and related matters were automatically referred for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the October 8, 2019, Standing Order regarding Court Docket Management of Cases Involving Applications to Proceed in Forma Pauperis for the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas. Authority to enter this recommendation stems from 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' IFP application, Dkt. No. 1, is GRANTED. However, this case should be DISMISSED for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with Court orders, and for failure to state a non-frivolous claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The District Court should also assess sanctions against Plaintiff Bert D. Villa to deter future frivolous IFP applications.
Background
Plaintiffs Bert D. Villa and Diana Garza filed this pro se IFP action on May 10, 2023. Plaintiffs allege that they have been forced out of their jobs and vehicles, and then forced to be insane and subjected to stalking by force. See Dkt. No. 1-2. The proposed complaint contains no specific factual allegations, nor is it clear how Defendants are allegedly responsible for the alleged harms. Much of the proposed complaint is unintelligible.
On June 28, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to refile their IFP applications, amend the proposed complaint, and show cause why this case should not be dismissed as frivolous. See Dkt. No. 5. The Court warned that sanctions may result from failure to respond. See id. at 5-8. Return receipts indicate that the Court's Order, sent by certified mail to Plaintiffs' last-known address, was unclaimed or undeliverable as addressed. See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9. Plaintiffs nonetheless filed supplemental exhibits on July 18, 2023, apparently containing witness statements that Plaintiff Bert D. Villa has been having trouble with his brother, Defendant Christopher Villa, and several police officers for the past few years. See Dkt. No. 7. Plaintiffs filed nothing more in response.
IFP Application
The Court previously set forth the standard for waiving the initial filing fee and costs in its Order to Show Cause. See Dkt. No. 5 at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988) (permitting waiver for undue financial hardship); Startti v. United States, 415 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that whether to grant IFP status is discretionary). Those standards still apply here.
Due to certain deficiencies in the original IFP application, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to refile separate IFP applications with full and truthful explanations of their monthly incomes and expenses. See Dkt. No. 5 at 3. The Court explicitly warned that failure to comply may result in dismissal. Plaintiffs filed no response. Nevertheless, construing the many gaps in Plaintiffs' original IFP application in their favor, the Court, in its discretion, concludes that imposition of the full filing fee will likely cause undue financial hardship.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' IFP application, Dkt. No. 1, is GRANTED.
Section 1915(e) Analysis
The Court previously set forth the law governing the process of screening IFP complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Dkt. No. 5 at 3-4. An action is “frivolous” where there is no arguable legal or factual basis for the claims. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. And an IFP action is “malicious” where “it is virtually identical to and based on the same series of events as a claim previously brought by the plaintiff.” Shakouri v. Davis, 923 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2019).
A. Dismissal Is Proper for Failure to Prosecute or Comply with Court Orders.
Plaintiffs' failure to timely respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause is grounds for dismissal. Courts have authority to dismiss any action for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (dismissal by motion); Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing the “inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte” for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders); McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). The Court previously ordered Plaintiffs to refile their IFP applications and amend the complaint in response to several concerns, explicitly warning them that failure to respond could result in dismissal. See Dkt. No. 5 at 7. The deadline for Plaintiffs to respond was July 28, 2023. Despite those instructions and ample time to comply, Plaintiffs have filed no response. The only subsequent activity in this case was Plaintiffs' filing of self-described “exhibits” consisting of several hand-written letters. See Dkt. No. 7. The letters are apparently written and signed by Plaintiff Bert D. Villa, although allegedly with the permission of each purported witness. Aside from confirming the existence of some long-standing animosity between Villa and his brother, the letters do not clarify any relevant facts. Although dismissal is generally an extreme sanction for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders, that sanction is warranted here.
B. Dismissal Is Appropriate for the Reasons Stated in the Show Cause Order.
The Court previously set forth several reasons why Plaintiffs' claims likely fail. See Dkt. No. 5 at 4-5. The proposed complaint contains no factual allegations, only conclusory assertions that Plaintiffs “will explain” further in the future. See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4. And what few allegations the Court can decipher merely describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios” duplicative of claims dismissed in Villa's previous IPF actions. See Dkt. No. 5 at 5. The proposed complaint thus fails to satisfy the most basic pleading standards. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Because Plaintiffs filed no response, those reasons are unchallenged, and the Court need not analyze Plaintiffs' claims any further. Plaintiffs' allegations warrant dismissal for the reasons previously stated in the Court's Order to Show Cause, Dkt. No. 5, which is incorporated in full here.
C. Sanctions Are Appropriate to Deter Future Frivolous Lawsuits.
As the Court previously explained, this is not Villa's first frivolous pro se IFP action, and his abuse of the federal courts may necessitate sanctions. Although the three-strikes provision in § 1915(g) only applies to prisoners, courts retain several inherent powers “to protect the efficient and orderly administration of justice,” including “the power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1993). Courts thus have the discretion to designate those who abuse the judicial system as “vexatious litigants” and “impose a pre-filing injunction to deter vexatious filings.” Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2008). Upon affording notice and an opportunity for a hearing, courts must weigh several factors before imposing a pre-filing injunction, including:
(1) the party's history of litigation, in particular whether he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the party's filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.Id. (quoting Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 818 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Including the lawsuits Villa filed while incarcerated, for which he was previously placed on the three-strikes list, this is now Villa's tenth frivolous IFP action filed in this District under the names of Bert D. Villa, Bert D., and Bert Delgado. The Court previously warned Villa that it was considering sanctions based on his history of frivolous and malicious litigation in this District. See Dkt. No. 5 at 5-6. Villa was thus ordered to show cause why sanctions, including a pre-filing injunction, should not be assessed. See id. at 6. Reviewing Villa's history of frivolous litigation, his non-response to the Show Cause Order, and the apparent lack of any good-faith basis for his repeated IFP actions against the same defendants, the Court is of the opinion that sanctions are warranted here. Under these circumstances, Villa should be declared a vexatious litigant and barred from filing suit in this District without first seeking leave to file.
See Villa v. Villa et al., 5:22-cv-00113-FB (filed Feb. 8, 2022, closed May 31, 2022); Delgado v. Villa et al., 5:22-cv-00190-XR (filed Feb. 23, 2022, closed July 1, 2022); D. v. Villa et al., 5:22-cv-00271-JKP (filed Mar. 17, 2022, closed June 27, 2022); Villa v. Yoa et al., 5:18-cv-00581-FB (filed June 11, 2018, closed July 24, 2018); Villa v. Ramos et al., 5:18-cv-00725-FB (filed July 11, 2018, closed Aug. 27, 2018); Villa v. McKinney, 5:18-cv-00907-OLG (filed Aug. 28, 2018, closed Sept. 7, 2018); Villa v. Wayne et al., 5:18-cv01118-FB (filed Oct. 19, 2018, closed Oct. 31, 2018); Villa v. McKinney et al., 5:18-cv-01276- XR (filed Dec. 6, 2018, closed Dec. 19, 2018); Villa v. FNU et al., 5:19-cv-00192-OLG-HJB (filed Feb. 26, 2019, closed Mar. 1, 2019).
Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' IFP application, Dkt. No. 1, is GRANTED. However, it is further recommended that this case be DISMISSED as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Alternatively, this case should be DISMISSED for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders.
It is finally recommended that Plaintiff Bert D. Villa a/k/a Bert. D. a/k/a Bert Delgado be declared a vexatious litigant and enjoined from filing any civil lawsuit in the Western District of Texas without first obtaining permission of a judge of the Western District of Texas.
Having considered and acted upon all matters for which this case was referred, it is ORDERED that this case is RETURNED to the District Court for all purposes.
Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy by certified mail, return receipt requested, to those not registered. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Objections, responses, and replies must comply with the same page limits as other filings, unless otherwise excused by the district court's standing orders. See Rule CV-7. The objecting party shall file the objections with the clerk of the court, and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-52 (1985); Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to timely file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
IT IS SO ORDERED.