Opinion
521503.
01-21-2016
Law Office of John A. Piasecki, Malone (John A. Piasecki of counsel), for appellant. Brian S. Stewart, Malone, for respondent.
Law Office of John A. Piasecki, Malone (John A. Piasecki of counsel), for appellant.
Brian S. Stewart, Malone, for respondent.
Opinion
LYNCH, J.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered February 2, 2015 in Franklin County, which, among other things, awarded summary judgment to defendant.
Plaintiff is a municipal housing authority (see Public Housing Law § 493) located in the Village of Malone, Franklin County. Prior to January 2012, plaintiff procured fire protection services through a cooperative agreement with the Village. In 2011, the Legislature enacted home rule legislation authorizing defendant to incorporate the Village into its fire protection district (L. 2011, ch. 144). Thereafter, in January 2012, defendant issued a tax bill to plaintiff, which included a fire protection charge. In response, plaintiff commenced this action seeking a declaration that it is exempt from the payment of the charge pursuant to Public Housing Law § 52(3), which exempts plaintiff from the payment of all local and municipal taxes. Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and, after searching the record, granted summary judgment in defendant's favor and declared that the property was not exempt.
We affirm. At issue is whether the charge for fire protection services constitutes a general tax, for which plaintiff would be exempt, or a special ad valorem levy, which plaintiff would be obligated to pay (see RPTL 10214, 20 ). “Taxes are public burdens imposed generally for governmental purposes benefiting the entire community, whereas an ad valorem levy is an assessment imposed for specific municipal improvements which confer a special benefit on the property assessed beyond that conferred generally” (Matter of Crandall Pub. Lib. v. City of Glens Falls, 216 A.D.2d 814, 815, 629 N.Y.S.2d 100 1995 [citations omitted] ). The costs of fire protection services or fire district charges have been recognized as ad valorem levies, not embraced within the exemption for taxes under Public Housing Law § 52(3) (see Tuckahoe Hous. Auth. v. Town of Eastchester, 208 A.D.2d 521, 522, 616 N.Y.S.2d 810 1994, lv. denied 85 N.Y.2d 808, 628 N.Y.S.2d 51, 651 N.E.2d 919 1995; see also Matter of L.P.A. Assoc. v. Daby, 231 A.D.2d 827, 828, 647 N.Y.S.2d 867 1996; Matter of Crandall Pub. Lib. v. City of Glens Falls, 216 A.D.2d at 815, 629 N.Y.S.2d 100). We agree with this characterization and conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that Public Housing Law § 52(3) does not exempt plaintiff from the payment of the fire protection charge at issue.
Because plaintiff's properties were and are funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a federal agency, the applicable tax exemption is set forth in Public Housing Law § 52(3) (
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
LAHTINEN, J.P., McCARTHY, EGAN JR. and CLARK, JJ., concur.
compare Matter of Crandall Pub. Lib. v. City of Glens Falls, 216 A.D.2d at 815, 629 N.Y.S.2d 100 authority funded by state loans governed by exemption set forth in Public Housing Law § 524[a] ).