Opinion
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
84 A.F.T.R.2d 99-5385
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Paul G. Rosenblatt, District Judge, Presiding.
Before FARRIS, HAWKINS, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Elmer P. Vild appeals pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States in his action seeking a refund of federal income taxes and penalties, tort damages for conversion of property and to quiet title to funds seized by the IRS. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, see Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1998). However, we note that Vild does not challenge the grant of summary judgment on the merits, but rather challenges two procedural rulings of the district court. We review for an abuse of discretion a district court's decision to grant a continuance and discovery sanctions,see Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Broad., Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 296 (9th Cir.1997) (decisions to grant a continuance); Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir.1997) (imposition of discovery sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37), and we affirm.
Vild contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his first motion for summary judgment without prejudice to refiling the motion at the close of discovery. This contention lacks merit because a district court may refuse to grant a party's motion for summary judgment if the opposing party requires time to conduct additional discovery, and provides affidavits setting forth particular facts expected from the movant's discovery that would preclude summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir.1998).
Here, after Vild filed his motion for summary judgment, the United States filed a motion for additional time to conduct discovery which was supported by affidavits. The district court entered an order establishing new deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions, and denied Vild's motion for summary judgment without prejudice to afford him the benefit of additional discovery. Accordingly, because the United States required additional time to conduct discovery, and provided affidavits in support of its motion the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Vild's motion for summary judgment without prejudice to refiling after the close of discovery. See id.
Vild contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike evidence, consisting of certificates of assessment and payments and references to prior bankruptcy proceedings, supporting the United States' motion for summary judgment. This contention lacks merit because Vild was provided copies of the documents shortly after they were created and he failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from the United States' failure to disclose this information earlier. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (stating that a "party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) and 26(e)(1) shall not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence ... on a motion ... information not so disclosed."); Payne v. Exxon Corp., 121 F.3d at 508.
AFFIRMED.