Opinion
No. CV-07-5005253 S
October 29, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The issue before the court is whether the plaintiff needs to comply with Connecticut C.G.S. 52-190a(c), because medical malpractice is the underlying basis of the cause of action rather than ordinary negligence.
The complaint alleges that on or about March 10, 2006, the plaintiff's decedent was a patient at the defendant hospital and was being transported in a wheelchair by an employee of the defendant hospital from the x-ray department to his room. While being transported via wheelchair, the defendant's employee allowed the plaintiff's decedent to get out of the wheelchair without assistance in order to use the men's room facility. During this movement from the wheelchair, the decedent fell and sustained personal injuries.
The defendant moves in its motion to dismiss that the plaintiff's decedent needs to comply with Connecticut General Statute § 52-190a, et seq. which requires that the plaintiff "obtain a written and signed opinion of a similar health care provider as defined in C.G.S. § 52-184c . . . that there appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such opinion." The plaintiff's response is that this is not a complaint or a cause of action based on medical malpractice, but rather on ordinary negligence and, therefore, the requirements of § 52-190a should not be invoked. The plaintiff has not attached a certificate of good faith nor a written opinion of a similar health care provider in compliance with said statute and, therefore, is subject to dismissal of the complaint according to the defendant.
One of the controlling cases cited by both parties is Trimel v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, 61 Conn.App. 353 (2001) in which a three-pronged test is invoked. The facts as alleged in the complaint would appear to take this cause of action outside of medical malpractice under Trimel and other cases that have been cited. Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551 (2005); Oats et al v. United Community Family Services et al, Superior Court Judicial District of New London, docket number CV-065000450, 2007 (Hurley, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 26].
The line of superior court cases are cited extensively in the plaintiff's memorandum (pages 8-9) in which it's clearly held that a patient who was injured during a transportation or movement within the hospital sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice. Those routine perfunctory tasks do not require any particular medical knowledge or skill.
The standard of care under the alleged facts is that of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 568 (1969); Todd v. Malafonte, 3 Conn.App. 16 (1984). The defendant cites a series of cases that border on the case at hand and yet can be distinguished under the Trimel test. The factual nuances between each of these matters is beyond the scope of this decision. The plaintiff's allegations are sufficient in themselves to withstand the defendant's motion to dismiss and, therefore, the defendant's motion is denied.