Opinion
Hearing Granted by Supreme Court Oct. 31, 1927.
COUNSEL
James C. Hollingsworth, of Ventura, for petitioner.
Clarke & Bowker and Walter E. Barry, all of Los Angeles, for respondent.
OPINION
YORK, J.
The question involved in this application for a writ of mandate is whether or not the respondent is entitled to collect fees in accordance with the provisions of section 4290 of the Political Code, to wit, 6 per cent. of the total amount received by him as such assessor as unsecured taxes levied on personal property taxed within Ventura county.
Respondent’s contention is that, although the amendment in 1923 (St. 1923, p. 1209) to section 4252 of the Political Code swept a way the provisions contained in section 4290 of the Political Code, in so far as fees and commissions of the assessor on personal property taxes collected is concerned in Ventura county, the subsequent "repeal" of section 4252 of the Political Code (by amendment [St. 1925, p. 70] omitting certain provisions thereof) would have the effect of reviving or reinstating section 4290 of the Political Code so as to enable such assessor to retain the 6 per cent. claimed by him on unsecured personal property tax collections.
We are of the opinion that section 4290 of the Political Code has never been revived or re-enacted since its repeal, in so far as it affects such assessor, by the 1923 amendment to section 4252 of the Political Code. As was said in People v. Hunt, 41 Cal. at page 439:
"The repeal of an act repealing a former act does not revive the former act, or give it any force and effect. This result can be accomplished only by the re-enactment of the former act. The repeal of the act of 1864 [St. 1863-64, p. 243] by section 3 of the act of 1868 [St. 1867-68, p. 448] worked the same result as would an act directly repealing the act of 1864."
See, also, Thomason v. Ruggles, 69 Cal. 465, 11 P. 20.
Section 4290 of the Polltical Code is a general act, while section 4252 is an act affecting Ventura county only, therefore this is a case where a general act has been repealed by an act of more limited application, and the law is as stated in 23 California Jurisprudence 708, § 92:
"* * * The more general provisions of a prior general act are considered as superseded and repealed by a valid special act subsequently approved, relating to the same subject-matter, so far as the two are necessarily inconsistent, although the special act contains no words of repeal."
In other words, under the act of 1923, section 4290 was superseded, and therefore repealed, by reason of paragraph 6 of section 4252, because in said act of 1923 the following words were used:
"All commissions or fees now or hereafter allowed by law shall be paid into the county treasury."
In 1925 the Legislature did not pass a general county government act affecting Ventura county, but did by its statutes of 1925 make many changes by way of amendment in various provisions contained in the County Government Act as then set forth in the Political Code. Paragraph 6 of such amending act eliminated the provisions which we have heretofore quoted from the act of 1923 with reference to the assessor, and there were no provisions therein repealing or amending section 4290 of the Political Code.
We therefore hold that the part of the act of 1923 hereinbefore quoted did not suspend only, but did actually repeal, section 4290 of the Political Code as the same applied to Ventura county, and that section 4290 did not thereafter become effective merely by the failure of the Legislature to incorporate the provisions hereinbefore quoted of the act of 1923 in any later legislation or by the adoption of a reenactment of the act of 1923 omitting the portion hereinbefore specifically quoted.
The demurrer is therefore overruled, and the peremptory writ of mandate is ordered issued out of this court commanding respondent to pay the sum of $8.85 to the county treasury of Ventura county, Cal., as such.
We concur: CONREY, P. J.; HOUSER, J.