Opinion
Case No. 5D20-2274
12-04-2020
Jonathan HERNANDEZ VELEZ, Petitioner, v. Gloritaz LAFONTAINE, Respondent.
Jonathan Hernandez Velez, Orlando, pro se. Clifford J. Geismar, of The Law Office of Clifford J. Geismar, P.A., Winter Park, for Respondent.
Jonathan Hernandez Velez, Orlando, pro se.
Clifford J. Geismar, of The Law Office of Clifford J. Geismar, P.A., Winter Park, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
The petition for a writ of prohibition to preclude the assigned trial judge from further presiding over the post-final judgment of paternity litigation below is denied on the merits. See Krawczuk v. State , 92 So. 3d 195, 201 (Fla. 2012) (recognizing that for a motion to disqualify a trial judge to be legally sufficient the "fear of judicial bias must be objectively reasonable"); Wall v. State , 238 So. 3d 127, 143 (Fla. 2018) ("[T]he context of the hearing and history of the case as reflected in the record are relevant to understanding whether a movant has a well-founded fear of judicial bias."); Pilkington v. Pilkington , 182 So. 3d 776, 779 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) ("Adverse or unfavorable legal rulings, without more, are not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification."); Erlinger v. Federico , 242 So. 3d 1177, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (finding that the movant's allegation that the trial judge was biased on grounds that the judge became an active participant in the proceedings by asking the movant questions during cross-examination was both speculative and conclusory where the movant neither described the types of questions asked by the judge nor alleged how those questions demonstrated bias or prejudice).
PETITION DENIED.
LAMBERT, HARRIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.