Opinion
1:22-cv-00317 (GTS/TWD)
05-25-2022
CHRISTOPHER J. VAZQUEZ, Plaintiff, v. ST. MARY'S HEALTHCARE, Defendant.
CHRISTOPHER J. VAZQUEZ PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
CHRISTOPHER J. VAZQUEZ PLAINTIFF, PRO SE
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Christopher J. Vazquez (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, commenced this action against St. Mary's Healthcare (“Defendant”) on April 4, 2022, and, in lieu of paying the Northern District of New York's filing fee, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP). (Dkt. Nos. 1, 3.)
This action was administratively closed on April 4, 2022, due to Plaintiff's failure to comply with the filing fee requirements, and Plaintiff was directed to respond within thirty (30) days if he wished to pursue this action. (Dkt. No. 2.) On May 2, 2022, Glenn T. Suddaby, Chief United States District Court Judge, ordered Plaintiff to show cause why he should not be enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in the Northern District of New York pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee (except pleadings or documents in an action that is open at the time of the issuance of the Court's anti-filing injunction or “Pre-Filing Order, ” until that action is closed). In Re: Christopher J. Vazquez, Respondent, 1:22-PF-0002-GTS (N.D.N.Y.) (filed 05/02/22). Although this matter was administratively closed at the time Chief Judge Suddaby issued the Order to Show Cause, because Plaintiff timely filed an application to proceed IFP (see Dkt. Nos. 2, 3), this action was reopened and restored to the Court's active docket. (Dkt No. 4.) Thereafter, Plaintiff failed to timely respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause. (See generally 1:22-PF-0002-GTS, Docket Activity.) On May 23, 2022, Chief Judge Suddaby issued a Pre-Filing Injunction. Id., Dkt. No. 2.
I. IFP APPLICATION
Plaintiff declares that he is unable to pay the filing fee for this action. (See Dkt. No. 3.) The undersigned has reviewed Plaintiff's IFP application and determines that he financially qualifies to procced IFP. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application is granted.
Plaintiff is advised that he will still be required to pay any costs and fees that he may incur in this matter, including, but not limited to, any copying fees or witness fees.
II. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
A. Legal Standard
Under Section 1915(e), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, when the Court lacks subject -matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this Rule “is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.” Hudson v. Artuz, 95 CIV 4768, 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (citations omitted). The statement should be “short and plain” because [u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)). Rule 10 provides, in part:
(b) Paragraphs; Separate Statements. A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “provid[ing] an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too a heavy burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims, ” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). “Dismissal, however, is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Artuz, 1998 WL 832708, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Summary of Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff does not submit a formal complaint in this matter. (See Dkt. No. 1.) His submission consists of a one-page, handwritten letter that states, in full:
Christopher Javier Vazquez Carbuccia here. I am suing St. Mary's Medical Institution for not prescribing me the medication that I have requested. I have already told them that the medication they have given me is of no use to me and does not feel well. I demand that I be given what I have requested. I have already been enrolled in their reference programs which I have communicated to them as well.
I need 60, 000 USD for the disrespect and to be allowed back-to the premises, as I did nothing to be discharged. I need a primary care physician and this is the second one that discharges me due to their incompetent behavior.
Take Care.Id. at 1; see also id. at 2 (letter from St. Mary's Healthcare Amsterdam dated March 30, 2022, discharging Plaintiff from the practice.)
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the page numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office. Unless noted, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
See Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991) (the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference).
On May 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a letter demanding “25 million USD from St. Mary's Institution Non-Negotiable.” (Dkt. No. 5.) Plaintiff also filed a letter motion requesting to “take an Oath, to insure confidentiality for all courthouse matters.” (Dkt. No. 6.) He also seeks “Diplomatic Immunity”. Id.
Plaintiff also filed this letter in Vazquez v. Hometown Health Center, 1:21-cv-001371-MAD-CFH (N.D.N.Y.) (Dkt. No. 7).
Plaintiff also filed this letter in Vazquez v. Hometown Health Center, 1:21-cv-001371-MAD-CFH (N.D.N.Y.) (Dkt. No. 7).
C. The Court's Analysis
Initially, Plaintiff's complaint and submissions fails to meet the pleading standards of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff provides almost no context to his allegations. More importantly, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate this Court's jurisdiction as he demonstrates neither federal question jurisdiction nor diversity jurisdiction. See Smith ex. rel. Bey v. Kelly, 12-CV-2319, 2012 WL 1898944, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (court is obligated to analyze whether subject matter jurisdiction exists as a part of § 1915(e) initial review and to dismiss the complaint when subject matter jurisdiction is found lacking); see, e.g., Vazquez v. Times Union Newspaper, 1:21-cv-1359-DNH-CHH (N.D.N.Y.) (filed 12/20/21; dismissed 03/21/22 on initial review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
To properly allege diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff must allege (1) diversity of citizenship between the parties, and (2) an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, Plaintiff cannot establish diversity jurisdiction because Plaintiff and Defendant are all citizens of the same state, New York. Plaintiff provides that he lives in Amsterdam, New York, and St. Mary's Healthcare is located in Amsterdam, New York.
In addition, Plaintiff has also failed to establish federal question jurisdiction as he has not set forth a federal law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers onto federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over all federal questions, or “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Federal question jurisdiction exists where the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). Even liberally construed, Plaintiff identifies no statute under which his complaint is brought and the Court can discern none.
Generally, in cases involving pro se plaintiffs, a court should not dismiss a complaint without granting leave to amend “at least once” “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”).
Here, the Court recommends the complaint be dismissed because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a substantive defect, Deul v. Dalton, 1:11-CV-0637 (GTS/RFT), 2012 WL 235523, at *8 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2012), the Court recommends dismissal without prejudice. Hollander v. Garrett, 710 Fed.Appx. 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[D]ismissal for subject matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice.”).
Moreover, because Plaintiff has a history of filing multiple cases, often making frivolous allegations, that are dismissed at the screening stage for failure to state a claim, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and or/failure to comply with the filing-fee requirements, see In Re: Christopher J. Vazquez, Respondent, 1:22-PF-0002 (GTS) (N.D.N.Y.) (filed 05/02/22) (collecting cases), the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See, e.g., Johnson v. Progressive.com, 19-cv-11202-CM, 2020 WL 589127, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020) (declining to grant pro se plaintiff leave to amend in light of the plaintiff's “abusive litigation history” and where amendment would be futile).
In light of the foregoing recommendation, Plaintiff is not prevented from filing his complaint in an appropriate state court, should he wish to do so. However, the undersigned makes no finding as to whether Plaintiff can successfully or properly bring the complaint in state court.
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's application to proceed IFP (Dkt. No. 3) is GRANTED FOR PURPOSES OF FILING; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall file a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a).
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.