Opinion
No. CV04-47000236
August 11, 2008
Memorandum of Decision
The petitioner, Pablo Vazquez, inmate #319864, alleges in his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus initially filed on December 9, 2004 and amended for the final time on May 30, 2007, that he was deprived the effective assistance of counsel when he rejected a pretrial settlement offer extended by the state of ten years confinement, suspended after the service of four years and five years probation with a right to argue for a lesser sentence, and proceeded to trial on the merits. After a trial before the jury, the petitioner was indeed found guilty and thereafter sentenced by the Court, Shortall, J. to a term of confinement of sixteen years, suspended after the service of eight years and five years probation. The thrust of the petitioner's complaint is that both of his trial defense counsel were ineffective for not insisting that the petitioner accept the state's pretrial offer. This petition now before the Court does not in any way challenge the effectiveness of the petitioner's counsel nor the fairness of the petitioner's trial before the jury.
The Petitioner's initial trial defense counsel was Attorney Raul Davila. Mr. Davila did advocate accepting the offer, but recognized that there was a viable self-defense claim that could prevail at trial. The petitioner adamantly did nor want to plead guilty and ultimately fired Atty. Davila, in no small part because he advocated for acceptance of the pretrial offer. Atty. Richard Cohen was the replacement Trial Defense Counsel who actually tried the case.
This habeas petition came on for trial before the Court on August 27th, 2007, December 3rd, 2007, and for a final argument after the filing of briefs by the parties on June 12th, 2008. The Court received testimony from the petitioner; the petitioner's trial defense counsel, Atty. Richard Cohen; the petitioner's original trial defense counsel, Atty. Raul Davila; and, Atty. John Watson who testified as an Expert in Criminal Defense and Plea negotiations. In addition, the Court received the trial transcripts as well as other pieces of documentary evidence.
Briefs were initially scheduled to be submitted by January 18, 2008, however, the Petitioner requested three extensions of time in which to file the brief and requested oral argument, granted by the Court, and that took place on June 12th, 2008.
Findings of Fact
1. The petitioner was arrested for Assault in the 1st degree and was a defendant in a criminal case captioned State v. Vazquez under docket number CR-01-0198802 proceeding in the Judicial District of New Britain.
2. The first attorney who undertook representation of the petitioner was Atty. Raul Davila. He was hired by the petitioner in November 2001.
3. Atty. Davila entered into negotiations with Supervisory State Attorney Scott Murphy, the prosecutor assigned to this case with an eye towards resolving the case with a pretrial agreement.
4. A proposed resolution of the case would have required the petitioner to plead to a count of Assault in the 2nd degree and in exchange receive a sentence of ten years, suspended after the service of four years to be followed by five years probation. In addition, the petitioner would be able to order a Pre-Sentence Investigation and to argue for a lower sentence. There was no minimum confinement that had to be imposed.
5. Atty. Davila did convey this offer to the petitioner and at the same time advised him that it was unlikely that the end result would be a totally suspended sentence. Atty. Davila and the petitioner discussed the merits and the demerits of the state's case, including a detailed discussion of the defense of self-defense that could be raised.
6. The petitioner maintained that he was innocent and was adamant that he had a viable and valid self-defense claim and that he did not want to plead guilty. The petitioner became disenchanted with Atty. Davila because he recommended an acceptance of the pretrial agreement. Consequently, on July 1, 2002, the petitioner replaced Atty. Davila with Atty. Richard Cohen, whose brief was to take the case to trial.
7. On March 18, 2004, the petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury of one count of assault in the first degree with serious physical injury in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-59(a)(1).
8. On May 14, 2004, the petitioner was sentenced to a total effective sentence of sixteen years confinement, execution suspended after the service of eight years, to be followed by five years probation.
9. Additional facts will be discussed, as necessary, in subsequent portions of this decision.
Discussion
The petitioner now comes before this Court seeking to have this court order specific performance of what he styles the "contract" between him and the state; the contract that the petitioner explicitly chose to reject. It is important to understand that this instant proceeding is an action seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. This case is now in the "court of last resort." A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefore, an application for extraordinary judicial relief in which, contrary to the criminal trial court, the burden rests with the petitioner.
This may seem to be difficult for a layman to accept, given the oft-repeated phrase that "one is innocent until proven guilty." However, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner is not innocent and has, in fact been already proven guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. Moreover, a habeas petitioner has more likely than not had the opportunity to have at least one appellate court review the case to determine if there have been any errors of law that were made by the trial court. Given that a habeas petition is often called the "court of last resort" it should not be unexpected that the burden of showing an irregularity must now rest with the petitioner.
At the outset, one must understand that there is a critical difference between the legal status of a person who has been accused of a crime as opposed to one who has been convicted of a crime. While the person who has been accused of a crime is entitled to a presumption of his or her innocence, the petitioner in a habeas corpus petition is not. "It is undoubtedly true that '[a] person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 385, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).' . . . The presumption of innocence, however, does not outlast the judgment of conviction at trial." Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397 at 422-23 (1994). Consequently, even though our courts have recognized that "a substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by the petitioner of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his criminal trial," Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397 at 422 (1994), the burden of proving entitlement to the grant of a writ rests with the petitioner. "Thus, in the eyes of the law, [the] petitioner does not come before the Court as one who is 'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted by due process of law." Summerville v. Warden, infra, at 422.
The writ of habeas corpus is an ancient and time-honored component of our Anglo-American jurisprudence. "We do well to bear in mind the extraordinary prestige of the Great Writ, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, in Anglo-American jurisprudence: 'the most celebrated writ in the English law.' 3 Blackstone Commentaries 129. It is 'a writ antecedent to statute, and throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law . . . It is perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 at 399 (1963). When the United States achieved independence from England, the writ was embodied in our law as well. "Received into our own law in the colonial period, given explicit recognition in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, incorporated in the first grant of federal court jurisdiction, Act of September 24, 1789, 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82, habeas corpus was early confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall to be a 'great constitutional privilege.' Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch 75, 95." Fay v. Noia, infra at 400 (1963).
Edward I reigned in England in the late 13th century A.D.
Issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy whose "most basic traditions and purposes are to avoid the grievous wrong of holding a person in custody in violation of the federal constitution and thereby protect individuals from unconstitutional convictions and help guarantee the integrity of the criminal process by ensuring that trials are fundamentally fair." O'Neal v. McAnnich, 513 U.S. 432 at 442 (1995). Moreover, when a court reviews a petition for habeas corpus, "it must decide whether the petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. The court does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the petitioner's custody simpliciter." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 at 730 (1991). So, the writ of habeas corpus "has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314 (1996).
A criminal defendant has an absolute Constitutional right to persist in a plea of not guilty, even in the face of seemingly insurmountable obstacles and overwhelming evidence. He or she has an absolute right to hold the government to its justifiably high burden of proof and take the matter to a jury of his or her peers. The Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut collectively guarantee the fundamental right of a person to plead not guilty and have his or her case decided before a jury of his or her peers. Our common law has interpreted these Constitutional guarantees as requiring that the government seeking to deprive a person of freedom must first prove that person's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. "This does not mean, of course, that a criminal defendant has an absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court." Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
"The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula "beyond a reasonable doubt" seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all essential elements of guilt.'" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 at 361 (1970).
This brings us precisely to the interesting point in the instant case. The petitioner was accused of a crime and, in full exercise of his state and federal Constitutional rights, elected to have his case tried before a jury of his peers. He was presented and tried before that jury and was found to be guilty of the charged offense beyond all reasonable doubt. It is clear from the petition that there is no argument that the actual trial was in any way constitutionally suspect or deficient. There is no argument or suggestion that Attorney Cohen was anything other than professional in his trial representation of the petitioner when the case was presented to the jury. In short, there simply are no Constitutional infirmities in the actual trial and sentence of the petitioner, consequently this conviction and the process by which it came about cannot be deemed unreliable.
Notwithstanding this apparently flawless exercise of his Constitutional rights, the petitioner argues that his lawyers were ineffective because they did not convince him to accept the state's offer of a pretrial agreement. The petitioner asserts that both counsel were overly optimistic as regards the viability of the self-defense argument.
"The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities." Santobello, infra at 260. When criminal cases are resolved by plea agreement, it is axiomatic that each party must be required to perform the actions to which agreement was made. "It is well-established that the interpretation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law, and that each party should receive the benefit of its bargain." United States v. Peglera, 33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir. 1994). This is so because by entering into a plea agreement, a defendant gives up a number of critically important constitutional rights. "However important plea bargaining may be in the administration of criminal justice, . . . [U.S. Supreme Court) opinions have established that a guilty plea is a serious and sobering occasion inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to a jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, to present witnesses in one's defense, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, to remain silent, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358." Santobello at 264.
Moreover, here in Connecticut it is clear that "[p]retrial negotiations implicating the decision of whether to plead guilty is a critical stage in criminal proceedings; . . . and plea bargaining is an integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditions and fair administration of our courts . . . Plea bargaining leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned." Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 153-54 (1995).
Notwithstanding, the instant case involves the unequivocal rejection of a pretrial offer of settlement that had been properly conveyed and explained to the petitioner. While evidence that a guilty "plea was entered due to incorrect advice given by an attorney may provide constitutional grounds for permitting the plea to be withdrawn, . . . [s]imilar safeguards do not exist, however, to protect defendants who reject proffered plea agreements. Rejections of plea bargains . . . cannot be reversed even if the rejection resulted from an attorney's incorrect advice." Heredia v. Commissioner of Correction, 106 Conn.App. 827, 836, n. 4. This is clearly dispositive of the issue in this case. The petitioner received a pretrial offer, rejected the pretrial offer, elected to plead not guilty, had his case submitted to a jury for trial and was, thereafter, duly convicted and ultimately sentenced. To be sure this meant that he received a sentence almost exactly double to that which he could have had if he had elected to accept the pretrial offer. On the other hand, had the jury accepted his claim of self-defense, then he would have been found to be not guilty and would have been free from further obligation to the State of Connecticut.
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is Denied.