Opinion
23A-CR-1538
08-14-2024
Gregory C. Vaughn, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT RYAN M. GARDNER DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER FORT WAYNE, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA JUSTIN F. ROEBEL SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D05-2003-F1-3
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT RYAN M. GARDNER DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER FORT WAYNE, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA JUSTIN F. ROEBEL SUPERVISING DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Gregory C. Vaughn, Jr. ("Vaughn") appeals, following a jury trial, his convictions and aggregate sentence for Level 1 attempted murder and Level 6 felony theft of a firearm. Vaughn argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to discharge him under Criminal Rule 4; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of mitigating circumstances; and (3) his aggregate sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that: (1) Vaughn has waived his argument under Criminal Rule 4; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Vaughn; and (3) his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm Vaughn's convictions and sentence.
[¶2] We affirm. Issues
1. Whether Vaughn waived his argument under Criminal Rule 4.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing Vaughn.
3. Whether Vaughn's sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[¶3] Vaughn had two children with Jenae Crawford ("Crawford"). At some point, Crawford was engaged to Anthony Davis, Jr. ("Davis"), whose nickname was Ant. In March 2020, Davis was paralyzed from the waist down and was living in an assisted-living facility. Davis had a black Cadillac ("Davis' Cadillac") and was able to drive.
[¶4] On March 3, 2020, Vaughn contacted Marcus Brown ("Brown") and asked Brown for a ride. Vaughn had previously paid Brown to give him rides to various places. Vaughn told Brown that he needed to look for Crawford and his children. Vaughn had Brown drive him to Davis' sister's house, where Vaughn asked a person if "Ant" or Davis was there. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 234). Davis was not at the house, and Vaughn then told Brown to drive to Davis' assisted-living facility. Vaughn went into the facility and returned to Brown's car a few minutes later. Vaughn then told Brown to take him to Crawford's apartment complex to see if his children were getting off the school bus.
[¶5] Around 3:00 p.m., Vaughn called Davis' cellphone and left a voicemail. In Vaughn's voicemail message, he addressed Davis as "Ant" and then told Davis that he had just left Davis' sister's house and Davis' assisted-living facility. (State's Ex. 32). Vaughn ended his voicemail by telling Davis, "Get in touch with me boy. It's gonna get ugly for ya. I'm about to smother your ass." (State's Ex. 32).
[¶6] When Brown drove Vaughn to Crawford's apartment complex, Vaughn saw his children get off the bus and then walk into their apartment building. Vaughn told Brown that "his kids [we]re good" and to leave. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 237). As Brown was driving away from the apartment complex, Vaughn saw Davis' Cadillac driving into the apartment complex. At that time, Davis was driving his Cadillac, and Crawford was a passenger. Vaughn told Brown, "bro that's my baby momma, turn around." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 237).
[¶7] Brown drove Vaughn to the parking lot by Crawford's apartment building. Crawford had already exited Davis' car and was walking into her apartment with a neighbor. Brown parked his car a few spots from Davis' Cadillac. Without Brown's permission, Vaughn grabbed Brown's gun that he had in his center console. Vaughn then exited Brown's car, walked to Davis' Cadillac, and repeatedly fired the gun into Davis' car where Davis was sitting in the driver's seat. Specifically, Vaughn fired multiple times into the driver's side windshield and the front driver's side window. When Brown saw Vaughn repeatedly shoot at Davis' Cadillac, Brown ran towards the apartment building and called 911. Crawford and her neighbor heard gunshots as they were walking inside their apartment building. They looked out a window to the parking lot and saw Vaughn standing there. Crawford also called 911.
[¶8] Vaughn then got into another car and left the scene. Davis also drove from the scene and was later found in a parking lot of a nearby business. Vaughn had fired fourteen shots into Davis' Cadillac. Davis had eleven gunshot wounds, including four bullets that remained inside Davis' chest area. The gunshots also fractured Davis' elbow and scapula and caused bleeding to his spleen. Davis had surgery and was hospitalized for twenty-three days. Davis later died from medical reasons not related to his gunshot wounds.
[¶9] The State charged Vaughn with Level 1 attempted murder and Level 6 felony theft of a firearm, and the trial court issued a warrant for Vaughn's arrest. In April 2020, the State arrested Vaughn. During Vaughn's initial hearing, the trial court ordered Vaughn to be held without bond on his attempted murder charge. Thereafter, on May 29, 2020, the trial court issued an order setting Vaughn's jury trial as a three-day trial to begin on September 29, 2020.
For Vaughn's theft charge, the trial court ordered that Vaughn could be released on his own recognizance.
[¶10] In July 2020, the State filed a motion for joinder. The trial court held a hearing on the State's motion on August 21, 2020. During the hearing, Vaughn made an oral request for a speedy trial. Thereafter, the trial court designated Vaughn's previously scheduled September 29 trial setting as a speedy trial. The trial court also denied the State's motion for joinder.
The State had also charged Vaughn, under Cause Number 02D05-2003-F3-28, with Level 3 felony robbery, Level 3 felony battery, Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime based on alleged offenses that had involved Crawford and had occurred on March 2, 2020.
[¶11] On September 29, 2020, the parties appeared in court, and the trial court continued Vaughn's trial due to "court congestion caused by the jury trial in State of Indiana v. Darrin S. Shinkle[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 14, 96). In the trial court's order, it noted that defendant Shinkle had filed a speedy trial request before Vaughn had. The trial court reset Vaughn's trial to commence on March 9, 2021. The trial court's order further noted that Vaughn had "waive[d] his right to a speedy trial." (App. Vol. 2 at 14, 96).
[¶12] On March 4, 2021, the trial court held a status conference. During that conference, Vaughn's counsel acknowledged the fact that Vaughn's upcoming trial was a third setting and might be continued due to other scheduled trials. The trial court confirmed that the court's calendar was "horribly congested" due to COVID-19 and the Indiana Supreme Court's "directive that [trial courts] not conduct jury trials for an extended period of time[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 5). Vaughn then informed the trial court that his counsel had explained to him that "since [he] [had] waived [his] right to a speedy trial, that [he] wasn't eligible for another one[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6).
[¶13] On March 9, 2021, the parties appeared in court, and the trial court continued Vaughn's trial date due to court congestion. In its order, the trial court specifically noted that the continuance was due to the jury trial in State of Indiana v. Brent Taylor. The trial court's order also referenced the tolling of time limits for speedy trials due to the Indiana Supreme Court's Order on Allen County's Petition for Administrative Rule 17 Emergency Relief and the fact that in-person jury trials had just been recommenced on March 1, 2021. The trial court reset Vaughn's trial to commence on September 21, 2021.
[¶14] Also on March 9, 2021, Vaughn orally requested to be released on his own recognizance. On March 19, 2021, the trial court held a bond review hearing on Vaughn's request. During that hearing, Vaughn's counsel noted that the current charges had been filed against Vaughn in March 2020 when "the COVID shutdown had already begun[.]" (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15). Additionally, Vaughn's counsel acknowledged that Vaughn had, "[o]n the record," "waiv[ed] his right to a speedy trial" when his September 29 trial setting had to be continued due to court congestion. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15). Vaughn's counsel told the trial court that Vaughn was "not requesting a speedy trial" and explained that Vaughn was seeking an "O.R. release" or, "in the alternative," to have the trial court set a bond for his release. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 17, 20). Following the hearing, the trial court denied Vaughn's request to be released on his own recognizance.
[¶15] In June 2021, Vaughn filed a pro se "writ of mandamus[,]" in which he asked the trial court to set a trial date pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B). Vaughn also filed a pro se objection to his September 2021 trial setting. At the time that Vaughn filed these pro se motions, he was represented by counsel. The trial court issued an order to note that it would "take[] no action on [Vaughn's] pro se pleadings . . . as he is represented by [counsel.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 167).
[¶16] On September 21, 2021, the trial court issued an order in which it continued Vaughn's trial date due to court congestion. The trial court specifically noted that the continuance was due to the jury trial in State of Indiana v. Rogan. The trial court reset Vaughn's trial date to commence on March 8, 2022.
[¶17] In December 2021, Vaughn filed a pro se motion and asked to be immediately released from custody until his March 8 trial date. Vaughn also filed a pro se motion to dismiss. At the time that Vaughn filed these pro se motions, he was represented by counsel. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order to note that it would take no action on Vaughn's pro se motions.
[¶18] On March 8, 2022, the trial court issued an order in which it continued Vaughn's trial date due to court congestion. The trial court specifically noted that the continuance was due to the jury trial in State of Indiana v. Demetre Payton. The trial court reset Vaughn's trial date to commence on August 16, 2022.
[¶19] The trial court held a three-day jury trial in August 2022. Vaughn's theory of defense was to challenge identification. The State presented the facts of Vaughn's offenses as set forth above, including Brown's eyewitness testimony. Additionally, a forensic firearm examiner from the Indiana State Police testified that the type of semiautomatic handgun that Vaughn had used would have required him to pull the trigger each time he fired a shot into Davis' car. The jury found Vaughn guilty as charged.
[¶20] Prior to Vaughn's September 2022 sentencing hearing, he filed a sentencing memorandum. Vaughn specifically requested the trial court to consider the following as mitigating circumstances: (1) he had a history of substance abuse; (2) undue hardship to his minor children; (3) he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder as a child; and (4) he had grown up in an environment where he had been exposed to drugs, gangs, and violence. Vaughn's memorandum and the presentence investigation report ("PSI") revealed that Vaughn had used drugs and alcohol since his childhood. Vaughn reported that he had started using marijuana at age ten or twelve and dealing marijuana at age fourteen.Vaughn reported that he had a "[d]aily use of marijuana" for the last twenty years. (App. Vol. 3 at 129). Vaughn also reported that he had started consuming alcohol at age fourteen and had used it on a daily basis. Vaughn indicated that the only time that he had not been a daily user of marijuana and alcohol was during previous incarcerations. In his sentencing memorandum, Vaughn also admitted that he had "developed a habit of using prescription pain killers" and reported that "Percocet was his pill of choice" for daily use. (App. Vol. 3 at 130). Vaughn asserted that "he ha[d] never been offered substance use counseling." (App. Vol. 3 at 130). Additionally, Vaughn did not report that he had ever sought substance abuse counseling.
In Vaughn's sentencing memorandum, he reported that he had used marijuana since age twelve, and in the PSI, he reported that he had used marijuana since age ten.
[¶21] In his sentencing memorandum, Vaughn reported that he had first become a father when he was thirteen years old and that he had fathered eight children with four women over the last twenty years. The youngest children were aged fourteen, eight, six, and four. Vaughn reported that all his children lived with their respective mother and that "he ha[d] never been ordered to pay child support for any of his children." (App. Vol. 3 at 128).
[¶22] Vaughn also stated in his sentencing memorandum that he had been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder when he was twelve years old and that he had "been on and off mental health medications since he was a child[.]" (App. Vol. 3 at 129). Vaughn reported that at the time of his current offense, he had been taking medication for depression and anxiety.
[¶23] During the sentencing hearing, Vaughn asked the trial court to consider the mitigating circumstances as set out in his sentencing memorandum. At the time of sentencing, Vaughn was thirty-five years old. The PSI showed that Vaughn's criminal history included five felony convictions and five misdemeanor convictions for offenses that Vaughn had committed in three states. Specifically, Vaughn's criminal history included the following convictions: (1) a 2007 felony possession of a controlled substance conviction in Illinois, which included a revocation of Vaughn's probation; (2) a 2009 felony aggravated unlawful use of a weapon or a vehicle conviction in Illinois; (3) a 2012 felony manufacturing or delivering controlled substances conviction in Illinois; (4) a 2015 misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction in North Dakota and included an order for Vaughn to complete anger management; (5) a 2015 misdemeanor driving while suspended conviction in North Dakota; (6) a 2015 misdemeanor criminal trespass in North Dakota; (7) 2016 misdemeanor possession of a controlled substances conviction in North Dakota, which included a motion to revoke probation filed in 2017 and a bench warrant issued in 2018, which was still active at the time of sentencing in this case; (8) a 2020 felony armed robbery conviction in Indiana; (9) a 2020 felony battery conviction in Indiana; and (10) a 2020 misdemeanor invasion of privacy conviction in Indiana.
[¶24] When sentencing Vaughn, the trial court reviewed Vaughn's "multi-state criminal record" and further noted that Vaughn had "been given short, intermediate, and longer jail sentences; community or public service; time in the Illinois Department of Correction; anger management counseling; unsupervised probation" and had had a "frightening escalation of [his] criminal conduct[.]" (Tr. Vol 2 at 211). The trial court also noted that Vaughn had had his probation revoked and had an active warrant out of North Dakota. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances, and it found Vaughn's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the crime to be aggravating circumstances. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty (40) years on Vaughn's Level 1 felony attempted murder conviction and two and one-half (2%) years on his Level 6 felony theft conviction, resulting in an aggregate forty-two and one-half (42%) year sentence.
Vaughn initially filed a direct appeal under Cause Number 22A-CR-5277, but he then suspended that appeal, pursuant to the Davis/Hatton procedure, to file a petition for post-conviction relief. Vaughn filed a post-conviction petition but then withdrew that petition and returned to this Court for his direct appeal, which was filed under this current appellate cause number.
Decision
[¶26] Vaughn argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to discharge him under Criminal Rule 4; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of mitigating circumstances; and (3) his aggregate sentence is inappropriate. We will review each argument in turn.
1. Criminal Rule 4
[¶27] We first address Vaughn's argument that the trial court erred by failing to discharge him under Criminal Rule 4(C). "Criminal Rule 4 implements a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial." Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224, 1230 (Ind. 2024) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12). Criminal Rule 4 "places the onus on the State to bring defendants to trial[,]" and it "gives [defendants] a procedure to invoke their speedy-trial right." Grimes, 235 N.E.3d at 1230. "Although a defendant is not obliged under this rule to push the matter to trial, a defendant whose trial is set outside the one-year period must object to the setting at the earliest opportunity or the right to discharge under the rule is waived." Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823, 825 (Ind. 2000). If the defendant does not raise a timely objection under Criminal Rule 4, "[t]he issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal when it is too late to do anything but discharge the defendant." Id.
[¶28] Here, the State charged Vaughn in March 2020 and arrested him in April 2020. In May 2020, the trial court initially scheduled Vaughn's trial for September 29, 2020. During an August 21, 2020 hearing, Vaughn made an oral request for a speedy trial. Thereafter, the trial court designated Vaughn's September 29 trial as a speedy trial. On September 29, 2020, the parties appeared in court, and the trial court continued Vaughn's trial due to court congestion in another case, and Vaughn specifically "waive[d] his right to a speedy trial." (App. Vol. 2 at 14, 96). The trial court then reset Vaughn's trial date, which it had to reschedule on multiple occasions due to the COVID-19 pandemic and court congestion. The trial court ultimately held Vaughn's trial in August 2022. Aside from explicitly waiving his Criminal Rule 4 right to speedy trial, Vaughn did not raise a Criminal Rule 4 objection to the trial court's scheduling of his trial. Accordingly, Vaughn has waived his argument that the trial court erred by failing to discharge him under Criminal Rule 4. See Brown, 725 N.E.2d at 825. See also Bostic v. State, 980 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) (holding that a defendant had waived his Criminal Rule 4 argument on appeal by failing to object or file a motion for discharge).
Vaughn also seems to suggest that he had raised a Criminal Rule 4(A) motion for discharge on March 9, 2021. However, as noted in the facts set forth above, Vaughn did not file such a motion. Indeed, Vaughn's counsel acknowledged that Vaughn had, on the record, waived his Criminal Rule 4 rights.
2. Abuse of Discretion - Sentencing
[¶29] Vaughn also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of mitigating circumstances. We disagree.
[¶30] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion in several ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[¶31] Vaughn argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of mitigating circumstances. Specifically, Vaughn contends that the trial court erred by failing to find his substance abuse history, undue hardship to his dependent, and mental health history as mitigating circumstances.
[¶32] The determination of mitigating circumstances lies within the trial court's discretion. Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied. A trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant's claim as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). In fact, a claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[¶33] Turning to Vaughn's first challenged mitigator, we acknowledge that a defendant's history of substance abuse may be considered a mitigating factor. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. However, "when a defendant is aware of a substance abuse problem but has not taken appropriate steps to treat it, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting the addiction as a mitigating circumstance." Id. Indeed, in such circumstances, a trial court could consider this factor to be an aggravating circumstance. See Bennett v. State, 787 N.E.2d 938, 948 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied. On appeal, as in his sentencing memorandum, Vaughn asserts that his extensive drug use should have been considered a mitigating factor because others, such as the criminal justice system, had not previously offered him substance abuse treatment. Vaughn attempts to place the blame on others and completely ignores his own knowledge of his substance abuse and his ability or responsibility to seek treatment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find that Vaughn's history of substance abuse was a mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., Hape, 903 N.E.2d at 1002 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find mitigation in the defendant's substance abuse history where the defendant was aware of his substance abuse issue and had not sought treatment); Bennett, 787 N.E.2d at 948 (explaining that the defendant's awareness of his substance problems and failure to seek help for it was not a mitigating circumstance and could have been considered an aggravating circumstance).
[¶34] We next turn to Vaughn's assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find undue hardship to his dependents to be a mitigating circumstance. "Many persons convicted of crimes have dependents and, absent special circumstances showing that the hardship to them is 'undue,' a trial court does not abuse its discretion by not finding this to be a mitigating factor." Benefield v. State, 904 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied. Here, Vaughn asserted that four of his eight children were minors, that all the children lived with their respective mothers, and that he had never been ordered to pay child support for them. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find undue hardship as a mitigating circumstance. See, e.g., id. (explaining that there is no requirement that a trial court find a defendant's incarceration would result in undue hardship to his dependents).
[¶35] Lastly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Vaughn's mental health history as a proposed mitigating circumstance. "[I]n order for a [defendant's] mental history to provide a basis for establishing a mitigating factor, there must be a nexus between the defendant's mental health and the crime in question." Steinberg v. State, 941 N.E.2d 515, 534 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. At sentencing below and on appeal, Vaughn made no argument that there was a nexus between the commission of his crimes and his mental health history. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to find Vaughn's mental health history as a mitigating circumstance. See e.g., id. (holding that in order for a defendant's mental history to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the defendant must show a nexus between his mental health and his crime).
Vaughn also argues that the trial court gave "too much weight" to the aggravating circumstances and failed to give proper weight to his proffered mitigating circumstances. (Vaughn's Br. 20). Vaughn's argument is without merit because our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that the degree of weight the trial court assigns to a particular mitigating factor is not an appropriate basis for appeal. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 ("Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to 'weigh' aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, . . . a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to 'properly weigh' such factors.").
3. Inappropriate Sentence
[¶36] Lastly, Vaughn argues that his aggregate sentence is inappropriate. We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a Rule 7(B) review "should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 'correct' result in each case." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). "Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis is not to determine whether another sentence is more appropriate but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate." Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), reh'g denied.
[¶37] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that the advisory sentence "is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed." Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Vaughn was convicted of a Level 1 felony and a Level 6 felony. A person who commits a Level 1 felony "shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years." I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). A person who commits a Level 6 felony "shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2%) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year." I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty (40) years on Vaughn's Level 1 felony conviction and two and one-half (2%) years on his Level 6 felony conviction, resulting in an aggregate forty-two and one-half (42%) year sentence.
[¶38] Turning first to the nature of Vaughn's offenses, we note that on an afternoon in March 2020, Vaughn set out on a search to find Crawford and Davis, who was a paraplegic. Vaughn searched for them at Davis' sister's house and at Davis' assisted-living facility. Vaughn then left a voicemail for Davis and told Davis the following: "Get in touch with me boy. It's gonna get ugly for ya. I'm about to smother your ass." (State's Ex. 32). Vaughn continued his search by going to Crawford's apartment complex, where he ultimately found Davis as he sat in his car in the parking lot. After stealing Brown's handgun from Brown's car, Vaughn fired multiple times into the driver's side windshield and the front driver's side window of Davis' car. Davis sustained eleven gunshot wounds, including four bullets that remained inside Davis' chest area. Nothing about the nature of the offenses renders Vaughn's sentence inappropriate.
[¶39] In reviewing Vaughn's character, we note that Vaughn's criminal history includes five felony convictions and five misdemeanor convictions for offenses that Vaughn committed in three states. At the time of Vaughn's offenses, he had a probation revocation petition and had an active warrant out of North Dakota. The trial court noted that Vaughn had a "frightening escalation of [his] criminal conduct[.]" (Tr. Vol 2 at 211). Vaughn's criminal history reflects poorly on his character. See Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (explaining that any criminal history reflects poorly on a person's character). Additionally, Vaughn's PSI revealed that he had used drugs and alcohol and drugs on a daily basis since he had been a child. Vaughn explained that the only times he had not used these substances was during prior incarcerations. Vaughn's sentence is also not inappropriate in light of his character.
[¶40] Vaughn has not persuaded us that his aggregate forty-two and one-half-year sentence for his Level attempted murder and Level 6 felony theft of a firearm convictions is inappropriate. Therefore, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
[¶41] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.