Opinion
2012-01-5
In the Matter of Wesley VAUGHN, Appellant, v. Kevin KOKTOWSKI, as Senior Counselor of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.
Wesley Vaughn, Dannemora, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), for respondent.
Wesley Vaughn, Dannemora, appellant pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, J.P., SPAIN, MALONE JR., KAVANAGH and EGAN JR., JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Gilpatric, J.), entered March 15, 2011 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the petition.
Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. When he was first committed to a state prison facility in 1986, petitioner was classified as a maximum A security risk because he had, among other things, been previously arrested and charged with escape in the second degree. Between 1991 and 1994, he was released from state prison and placed on parole, only to be incarcerated because he had been charged with additional crimes. Upon his return to state prison, petitioner was classified as a medium security risk. In 2006, the Department reviewed petitioner's classification and determined that he should be classified as a maximum A security risk. Notably, petitioner did not challenge this determination to reclassify him as a maximum A security risk and he was subsequently released to parole supervision. Once again, petitioner was returned to the Department's custody based upon a parole violation and again classified as a maximum A security risk. After petitioner unsuccessfully appealed this classification through administrative channels, he commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding. Upon the dismissal of the petition, petitioner now appeals.
Supreme Court dismissed the petition based upon respondent having raised an objection in point of law that the proceeding was untimely. On appeal, respondent now concedes that the proceeding is not barred by the four-month statute of limitations ( see CPLR 217[1] ) and was timely commenced. Since the parties have addressed the merits of the proceeding in their briefs, we will consider them in the interest of judicial economy rather than remit the matter ( see Matter of Geames v. Travis, 284 A.D.2d 843, 726 N.Y.S.2d 506 [2001], appeal dismissed 97 N.Y.2d 639, 735 N.Y.S.2d 495, 760 N.E.2d 1291 [2001] ).
Petitioner challenges his classification as a maximum A security risk as being arbitrary and capricious on the ground that, for more than 10 years while incarcerated and classified as a minimum security risk, nothing occurred that would warrant an elevation of his security status. We disagree. “[P]rison administrators have broad discretion in matters concerning institutional security” ( Matter of Mohsin v. Fischer, 51 A.D.3d 1233, 1234, 858 N.Y.S.2d 452 [2008] ). As previously stated, petitioner did not challenge the Department's decision in 2006 to reinstate his classification as a maximum A security risk. Also, while petitioner now claims that there was no reason for such a change, we note that during this intervening period petitioner was charged with numerous violations of parole and was returned to state prison no less than three times. This record, coupled with petitioner's prior criminal history, which includes a charge of escape in the second degree, provides a rational basis for the Department's decision to classify him as a maximum A security risk ( see generally Matter of Frejomil v. Fischer, 59 A.D.3d 790, 791, 872 N.Y.S.2d 746 [2009]; Matter of Georgiou v. Daniel, 21 A.D.3d 1230, 1231–1232, 801 N.Y.S.2d 421 [2005] ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.