Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000823-MR
04-26-2013
LAJUAN VAUGHN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: LaJuan Vaughn, Pro Se West Liberty, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Perry T. Ryan Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-001443
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. LAMBERT, JUDGE: LaJuan Vaughn appeals, pro se, from the Jefferson Circuit Court's denial of his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to alter, amend, or set aside a judgment. Specifically, Vaughn contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to ensure that a mental examination be performed and by advising him to enter a plea of guilty under the indictment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's order denying Vaughn relief.
As there was no trial, the facts of this case are taken from the guilty plea. On April 17, 2008, Vaughn, while armed with a pistol, discharged a pistol and struck victims Jermaine Bibb, Devogue Peppers, and Jaray Smith. Victim Bibb died and victims Peppers and Smith received serious physical injuries. The shooting occurred while Vaughn was trying to recover allegedly stolen property from the victims.
On April 30, 2008, the Jefferson County grand jury indicted Vaughn, charging him and two other co-defendants with the murder of Bibb; criminal attempt to commit the murders of Peppers and Smith; three counts of robbery in the first degree; and two counts of assault in the first degree (Peppers and Smith). On August 8, 2008, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty against Vaughn.
On July 2, 2009, Vaughn's trial counsel filed a motion for a competency evaluation and attached an affidavit indicating his concerns about Vaughn's competency to stand trial. Also included with this motion were numerous other motions concerning the upcoming trial, including motions concerning voir dire, the jury pool, and a motion to extend the trial date. Several of these motions were heard on July 6, 2009, and after the trial court addressed several motions, defense counsel asked to approach the bench. Curiously, defense counsel then advised the court that it had reached a plea agreement with the Commonwealth; Vaughn would plead guilty to all of the charges against him, and in exchange for the plea, the prosecutor recommended a concurrent sentence of imprisonment for twenty years. Prior to the plea colloquy, the Commonwealth raised the issue of defense counsel's pending motion for a competency evaluation. At both sides' request, the trial court orally denied the motion, ruling that there was nothing raised in defense counsel's affidavit that warranted granting the motion. The trial court then went on to accept Vaughn's plea of guilty after a thorough and detailed plea colloquy, in which Vaughn clearly and unequivocally stated that he understood the charges against him and understood the consequences of pleading guilty, including giving up his right to cross examine witnesses and to testify in his own defense.
On July 9, 2009, in accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court entered judgment against Vaughn. A month later, Vaughn filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion, while filed by counsel, did not specify any grounds for withdrawing the plea, other than the fact that Vaughn had directed his trial counsel to file the motion.
The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on August 27, 2009, during which it considered Vaughn's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the circuit court entered judgment against Vaughn on August 28, 2009, sentencing him to concurrent terms totaling twenty years' imprisonment.
In May 2011, Vaughn filed a motion to vacate judgment under RCr 11.42, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilty plea proceedings. Along with the motion, Vaughn filed an affidavit wherein he claimed he was revoking his signature on the guilty plea form. In September 2011, the trial court denied Vaughn's RCr 11.42 motion, finding that the record refuted Vaughn's allegations. Vaughn now appeals the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion.
Vaughn argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing, contending that the record did not refute his allegations. He also argues that he did not competently and intelligently plead guilty.
The standard of review for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is well known.
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), the Supreme Court of Kentucky adopted the Strickland standard to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under RCr 11.42. In the context of guilty pleas, in Hill v. Lockart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the United States Supreme Court expounded upon the Strickland test and held that, to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, the defendant must show that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty but, instead, would have gone to trial. See also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Ky. 1986).
In the instant case, we note that Vaughn did not ensure that the video of his guilty plea hearing was included as part of the record on appeal. Under Kentucky Civil Rule (CR) 75.01, it is the appellant's responsibility to designate the contents of the record on appeal and to obtain transcriptions or videotapes of all proceedings upon which his appeal relies. However, in light of the circumstances of this case, this Court obtained a copy of the video record of the hearing conducted on July 6, 2009.
A review of the video record of the hearing indicates, as stated above, that the Commonwealth raised the issue of the pending motion for a competency evaluation. Defense counsel then responded that the trial court need not rule on the motion given the entry of a guilty plea, or in the alternative, that it be denied. The trial court then ruled that the motion was denied, as there was nothing in the affidavit supporting the motion indicating that an evaluation was warranted.
Regarding Vaughn's claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we agree with the Commonwealth that in all actuality, he did not. Rather, the record clearly indicates that his trial counsel rendered effective assistance in successfully negotiating a favorable plea agreement on his behalf. Vaughn was charged with eight felonies, including the capital offense of murder and seven Class B felonies. Under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.010 and 532.020, had Vaughn gone to trial and been convicted by a jury, he could have received a sentence of death, and the record indicates that the Commonwealth intended to seek the death penalty had the case gone to trial. He also faced the possibility of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years or life imprisonment, under which he would not have been eligible for parole for twenty years for the murder charge alone. Instead, in exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended concurrent sentences of twenty years' imprisonment for all the charges, and Vaughn will likely be eligible for parole after serving eighty-five percent of that, or seventeen years.
The test is not, as Vaughn seemingly suggests in his brief to this Court, whether the defendant might have received a lighter sentence or might have even been acquitted, but instead the test is whether the advice received from counsel fell below the objective standard of reasonableness considering all of the circumstances of the case at the time. Vaughn cites nothing to support his allegations that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea, other than his trial counsel's motion for a competency evaluation prior to the entry of his guilty plea and his bare allegation that he did not voluntarily and intelligently plead guilty. Vaughn points to no subsequent evidence from a mental health professional or affidavit which would substantiate his claims.
Absent any evidence that Vaughn is or was incompetent to stand trial, and absent any record indicating that Vaughn's plea was not voluntarily made, we agree with the trial court that Vaughn did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilty plea proceedings and, instead, made a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty to avoid the death penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court's September 20, 2011, order denying Vaughn's motion for RCr 11.42 relief.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: LaJuan Vaughn, Pro Se
West Liberty, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky