Opinion
1:24-CV-2970 (LTS)
07-31-2024
VAUGHN OF THE FAMILY ATKINS, Plaintiff, v. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES (DSS) MOLLY WASOW COMMISSIONER; NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT; CAROL ANN JORDAN - SUPPORT MAGISTRATE; VERDELLA BROWN, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Vaughn Atkins, of Yonkers, New York, who describes himself as “Vaughn of the Family Atkins,” proceeds in this action pro se, asserting claims for damages against the defendants under the court's federal question jurisdiction.He sues: (1) the Administration for Children & Families (“ACF”), a division of the United States Department of Health & Human Services; (2) Molly Wasow Park, the Acting Commissioner of the New York City Department of Social Services; (3) the “New York State Division of Child Support Enforcement,” which the Court understands to be the New York State Division of Child Support Services (“NYSDCSS”); (4) Carol Ann Jordan, a Support Magistrate of the New York Family Court, Westchester County; and (5) Verdella Brown, of Charolette, North Carolina. Plaintiff lists the following as the federal- law bases for his claims: “45 CFR 303.101, 18 U.S.C. 242, the 13th Amendment, 31 USC 3729, the 4th Amendment, the 14th Amendment, 18 USC 241, the 5th Amendment, 42 USC 1983, the 6th Amendment, separation of powers [sic].” (ECF 1, at 4.) The Court understands Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under the False Claims Act. The Court also construes the complaint as asserting claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the ACF, as well as claims of federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims under state law, against the NYSDCSS and against the individual defendants.
Under Rule 5.2(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions that refer to a person's date of birth must refer only to the person's birth year and not to the exact date of birth. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a)(2). In his complaint, Plaintiff lists the exact dates of birth of two other individuals. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to the complaint to a “case participant-only” basis.
By order dated April 23, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead the specified claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that the events that are the bases for his claims, namely, the births of his children, occurred in 2006, and again in 2012. He states that he “never received conditions of the acknowledgment of paternity.” (ECF 1, at 5.) He also states that he “did not receive documents or a video explaining [the] conditions of the paternity contract.” (Id.) Plaintiff further states that he was incarcerated for six months, lost his employment, and has been unable to find employment since being released. (Id. at 6.) He also alleges that, “as a result of what the wrongdoers have done, [he] now suffer[s] from depression, emotional distress, . . . severe financial loss, high anxiety, [and] loss of family (son and daughter).” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $500,000 in damages “for loss of wages, loss of employment, freedom was violated and lost for six (6) months [sic] [,] [and because he is] unable to provide for [his] son and daughter.”(Id.)
Plaintiff does not, however, specify what the “wrongdoers” have done.
Plaintiff may be also indicating that he owes $50,000 in child-support arrears. (See ECF 1, at 5.)
DISCUSSION
A. Claims under the False Claims Act
To the extent that, by mentioning 31 U.S.C. § 3729 in his complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the Court must dismiss those claims. The FCA imposes civil liability on any person who, among other things, knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the federal government, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The federal government, or a private person (known as a “relator”), may bring suit for the United States of America in a qui tam action where there has been fraud on the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(1); see United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009).
In qui tam actions under the FCA, “relators have standing to sue not as agents of the United States, but as partial-assignees of the United States' claim to recovery.” United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000)). The United States of America “remains the real party in interest.” United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although a qui tam action is litigated by the relator, it “is not the relator's ‘own' case as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, nor one in which he has ‘an interest personal to him.'” Id. (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998)).
In order to proceed pro se, “[a] person must be litigating an interest personal to him.” Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558; see § 1654. Because a litigant can proceed pro se only when bringing his own case, and because a qui tam action under the FCA is brought for and in the name of the United States of America, which remains the real party in interest, a litigant cannot pursue such an action pro se. See Flaherty, 540 F.3d at 93 (“Because relators lack a personal interest in False Claims Act qui tam actions, we conclude that they are not entitled to proceed pro se.” (citing § 1654 and Iannaccone, 142 F.3d at 558)). Accordingly, because Plaintiff cannot proceed pro se with his claims under the FCA, the Court dismisses those claims without prejudice.
B. Claims against the ACF under the Federal Tort Claims Act
As the Court understands that Plaintiff's complaint is asserting claims for damages against the ACF, a federal agency, the Court construes such claims as brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the federal government, including suits against any agency of the federal government, such as the ACF, except where sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Robinson v. Overseas Mil. Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency . . . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). An example of a waiver of sovereign immunity is the FTCA. As explained below, however, sovereign immunity has not been waived with respect to Plaintiff's claims against the ACF.
The FTCA provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims for damages arising from the tortious conduct of federal officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680. Generally speaking, “[t]he proper defendant in an FTCA claim is the United States, not individual federal employees or agencies.” Holliday v. Augustine, No. 3:14-CV-0855, 2015 WL 136545, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2015); see also 28 U.S.C. §2679(b)(1) (“The remedy against the United States provided by [the FTCA] . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee....” (emphasis added)). With respect to such claims, Plaintiff incorrectly names the ACF, instead of the United States of America, as the federal defendant. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims for damages against the ACF, brought under the FTCA, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, for seeking monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court construes such claims as brought against the proper federal defendant, the United States of America.
A plaintiff must comply with the FTCA's procedural requirements before a federal court can entertain an FTCA claim. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015). Thus, before bringing a damages claim in a federal district court under the FTCA, a claimant must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a claim for damages with the appropriate federal government entity and must receive a final written determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Such an administrative claim must be in writing and be filed within two years of the claim's accrual. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). A claimant may thereafter challenge the Government's final administrative denial of his FTCA claim in a federal district court by filing an action within six months after the date of the mailing of the notice of final administrative denial by the federal entity. See § 2401(b). If no written final administrative determination is made by the appropriate federal entity within six months of the date of the claimant's filing of the administrative claim, the claimant may then bring an FTCA action in a federal district court. See § 2675(a). While this exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, see Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005), “the FTCA's time bars are non jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling,” Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. at 420.
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims for damages under the FTCA against the United States of America, such claims cannot go forward because he has not alleged facts demonstrating that he filed an administrative claim under the FTCA with a federal governmental entity (the ACF) for damages and received a final written administrative determination before bringing this action, nor has he alleged facts showing that it has been more than six months since he has filed such an administrative claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims for damages against the United States of America under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see § 1915(e)(2)(iii), and consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Celestine, 403 F.3d at 82.
C. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law against the NYSDCSS
The Court understands Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims of federal constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under state law, against the NYSDCSS. The Court must dismiss those claims under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogate[d] the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration in original). “[T]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This immunity shields States from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). It also precludes a plaintiff from seeking, in federal court, relief under state law against a State or one its agencies. See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540-42 (2002); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 120-21; In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Although the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, it has been construed more broadly to render states and their agencies immune from suits brought by private parties in federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Bertoldi v. State, 275 A.D.2d 227, 228 (1st Dep't 2000) (“It is well settled that the [New York] Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for money damages against the State [of New York], [New York] State agencies, or [New York] State officials acting in their official capacities in the exercise of governmental functions.”).
Congress has not abrogated the States' immunity for claims under Section 1983, see Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990), and the State of New York has not waived its immunity to suit in federal court, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977); Bertoldi, 275 A.D.2d at 228. The NYSDCSS is an agency of the State of New York; it is, thus, an arm of that State and enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Dixon v. Jordan, No. 1:23-CV-9227 (LTS), 2024 WL 37096, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024). Any claims under state law that Plaintiff asserts against the NYSDCSS may only be considered by the appropriate state courts. Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 357 n.2; Bertoldi, 275 A.D.2d at 228. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction of those claims.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the NYSDCSS under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because Plaintiff appears to seek monetary relief from a defendant that is immune from such relief. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New York waived its immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”); Atl. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although the parties do not address the Eleventh Amendment in their briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject matter jurisdiction.”).
D. Claims under Section 1983 against Support Magistrate Carol Ann Jordan
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims for damages under Section 1983 against Support Magistrate Carol Ann Jordan. Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. at 209. This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action outside his or her judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
New York Family Court Support Magistrates, as New York State judicial officers, enjoy this judicial immunity when presiding over child-support proceedings. See Arce v. Turnbull, No. 21-642, 2021 WL 5816687 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (summary order); Chris H. v. New York, 764 Fed.Appx. 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); Legister v. Radowitz, No. 20-CV-9330 (LLS), 2020 WL 7405672, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2020); Charles v. Lopez, No. 19-CV-8706 (CM), 2019 WL 5261154, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019); Roger of the Fam. Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting other district court cases within the Second Circuit).
Plaintiff seems to assert claims for damages under Section 1983, against Support Magistrate Jordan, arising from her alleged actions and/or rulings during Plaintiff's New York Family Court proceedings before her with regard Plaintiff's child-support arrears. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege any facts showing that, in taking those actions and/or making such rulings, Support Magistrate Jordan acted beyond the scope of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Because Plaintiff sues Support Magistrate Jordan for “acts arising out of, or related to, [an] individual case[] before [her],” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210, the doctrine of judicial immunity applies to Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against her. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 for damages against Support Magistrate Jordan, under the doctrine of judicial immunity, because such claims seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, are frivolous, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous' for purposes of [the IFP statute].”).
E. Claims under Section 1983 against Acting Commissioner Molly Wasow Park
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims under Section 1983 against Acting Commissioner Molly Wasow Park, the Court must dismiss those claims. To state a claim under Section 1983 against an individual state actor, such as Acting Commissioner Park, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that such an individual was directly and personally involved in an alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). An individual state actor defendant may not be held liable under Section 1983 solely because that individual employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff's rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing how Acting Commissioner Park has been directly and personally involved with any alleged violations of Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Acting Commissioner Park for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to name as defendants those individual state actors who were directly and personally involved in the alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights and to allege facts showing how those individuals were each directly and personally involved in those alleged violations.
F. Claims under Section 1983 against Verdella Brown
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Verdella Brown. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant . . . exercise[ ] power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, [with respect to a claim brought under Section 1983,] a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Private parties generally are not state actors and, therefore, are not usually liable under Section 1983. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)).
It appears that Verdella Brown is a private citizen, and the complaint seems to suggest that she may be the mother of Plaintiff's children. Plaintiff does not allege anything that would suggest, however, that Brown has acted as a state actor when she has supposedly violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Brown for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
G. Remaining claims under state law
While the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's claims under federal law (those under the FCA, the FTCA, and Section 1983) against all of the defendants, as well as his claims under state law against the NYSDCSS, it also understands Plaintiff's complaint as asserting additional claims under state law against Support Magistrate Jordan, Acting Commissioner Park, and Verdella Brown. Accordingly, the Court will examine whether it can consider those claims under state law under its diversity jurisdiction or under its supplemental jurisdiction.
1. Diversity jurisdiction
The original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, a federal district court has original subject matter jurisdiction only when a “federal question” is presented or, if the plaintiff is asserting claims under state law under the court's diversity jurisdiction, when the plaintiff and the defendants are citizens of different States and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.'” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG, 526 U.S. at 583 (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative.”).
To establish the court's diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must first show that he and the defendants are citizens of different States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court's ‘original' diversity ‘jurisdiction' only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the State where he or she is domiciled, which is defined as the place where the individual “has his [or her] true fixed home . . . and to which, whenever he [or she] is absent, he [or she] has the intention of returning.” Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An individual “has but one domicile.” Id. With respect to an action brought under the court's diversity jurisdiction, the parties' state citizenships are established at the time of the commencement of the action. See, e.g., Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Generally, in a diversity action, if jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied when the suit is begun, subsequent events will not work an ouster of jurisdiction.”). The plaintiff must also allege to a “reasonable probability” that his or her claims under state law are in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount. See § 1332(a); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff seems to allege that he is a citizen of the State of New York, and it would appear that both Support Magistrate Jordan and Acting Commissioner Park are also citizens of that same State, while Verdella Brown is a citizen of the State of North Carolina. (ECF. 1, at 1-3.) Because Plaintiff and at least one of the individual defendants seem to both be citizens of the State of New York, the parties are not diverse. In addition, Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to show that his claims under state law are in excess of the sum or value of $75,000, the statutory jurisdictional amount to invoke this court's diversity jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts any claims under state law against Support Magistrate Jordan, Acting Commissioner Park, and Verdella Brown, under the court's diversity jurisdiction, the Court dismisses those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). The Court, however, grants Plaintiff leave to replead any claims that he may assert under state law in an amended complaint in which he alleges facts sufficient to show that the court has diversity jurisdiction as to those claims; Plaintiff must allege: (1) facts showing that all of the defendants named in his amended complaint were not, at the time of the filing of his original complaint, citizens of the same State as Plaintiff; and (2) facts showing that his claims under state law exceed the sum or value of $75,000.
2. Supplemental jurisdiction
Plaintiff appears to alternatively assert claims under state law under the court's supplemental jurisdiction to consider them. A federal district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as to claims under state law when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). In addition, “[i]n the absence of diversity jurisdiction, because the Court has dismissed the federal claims brought in this action, it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to . . . [Section] 1367(c)(3).” Golub v. Berdon LLP, No. 19-CV-10309 (JGK), 2021 WL 637974, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2021). Having dismissed those of Plaintiff's claims of which the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction as to any of his claims under state law. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint asserting claims under federal law, including claims under Section 1983, under the court's original federal question jurisdiction, as well as claims under state law, under the court's supplemental jurisdiction, and if the Court subsequently dismisses all of his claims under federal law, the Court will then decline to consider, under its supplemental jurisdiction, his claims under state law. See § 1367(c)(3). The Court cannot, however, decline to consider claims under state law if it has original diversity jurisdiction to consider those claims. See § 1332(a).
LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim under Section 1983 and/or under state law, as specified above, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail those claims.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in this order.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his clams in an amended complaint, as specified above.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in this order. Specifically, the judgment will: (1) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under the FCA without prejudice; (2) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under the FTCA against the ACF and against the United States of America under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); (3) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law against the NYSDCSS under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); (4) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Support Magistrate Jordan under the doctrine of judicial immunity, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and as frivolous, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); (5) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Acting Commissioner Park for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); (6) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 against Verdella Brown for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see id.; and (7) dismiss Plaintiff's claims under state law against the individual defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), and, alternatively, the Court will decline to consider such claims under its supplemental jurisdiction, see § 1367(c)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.