Opinion
NNHCV155036025S
04-29-2016
Christopher Vasas v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Matthew E. Frechette, J.
This is a statutory appeal concerning unemployment compensation. The Administrator granted the plaintiff's initial application for benefits. The employer appealed the decision of the Administrator. An Appeals Referee then conducted a de novo hearing, made findings of fact and reversed the decision of the Administrator. As a result, the plaintiff was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(B). The plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the referee's decision, which was denied. The plaintiff then appealed that decision to the Board of Review, and it rendered a decision adopting the referee's findings of fact with modification, and affirmed the referee's decision. The plaintiff then filed this appeal.
" The power of the trial court in appeals of this kind is very limited: 'the Superior Court does not try the matter de novo; it is not its function to adjudicate questions of fact, nor may it substitute its own conclusions for those of the [Appeals Referee or] board . . ." Johnson v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 3 Conn.App. 264, 266, 487 A.2d 565 (1985). " Its function is to determine only if the board acted rationally and logically or illegally and in abuse of its discretion." Kaplan v. Administrator, 4 Conn.App. 152, 153, 493 A.2d 248 (1985). " To the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the Board of Review." Latina v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 54 Conn.App. 154, 159, 733 A.2d 885 (1999). The plaintiff in the case at bar did not file a motion to correct any of the referee or board's factual findings per Practice Book § 22-4. As a result, this " prevents further review of [the] facts found by the board." JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422-23, 828 A.2d 609 (2003); Belica v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 126 Conn.App. 779, 786-87, 12 A.3d 1067 (2011); " In the absence of a motion to correct the finding of the board, the court is bound by the board's finding." (Citation omitted.) Warner v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 135 Conn.App. 84, 89, 41 A.3d 348 (2012).
General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A) provides that an individual shall be ineligible for benefits " if, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual left suitable employment without good cause attributable to the employer . . ." Additionally, Regs., Conn. State Agencies, D.O.L., § 31-236-22 (1997) provides, in relevant part that:
(A) To determine that an individual voluntarily left suitable work for good cause attributable to the employer, the Administrator must find, with respect to working conditions, that . . . during the course of employment, the individual's employer substantially changed a working condition established in the employment agreement and such change had a significantly adverse effect upon the individual . . . and the individual expressed his dissatisfaction regarding the working condition to his employer and unsuccessfully sought a remedy through those means reasonably availalable to him before leaving his employment . . . (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, the record and findings of fact are clear that in November of 2014, the plaintiff complained to the Culinary Director and Head Chef about the increase in his hours. Those two individuals replied that there was nothing that they could do. The plaintiff thereafter left work in December 2014 because he experienced dizziness, chest pain and shortness of breath. Significantly, the plaintiff returned to work on January 9, 2015 with a note from his own doctor dated January 6, 2015 that he could return to work without limitation. The very next day, the plaintiff resigned his position, without even attempting to seek a remedy with the available human resources department of the employer. Moreover, the plaintiff admits that when he complained to the Culinary Director and Head Chef about the increased hours, that his health was not being affected by the increased work load. It was only after the plaintiff returned to work on January 9, 2015, with a doctor's note that he could return to work without limitation, that he informed the employer of his alleged medical condition. By immediately resigning the very next day, the plaintiff simply did not seek an available remedy with human resources to adjust his duties to accommodate the plaintiff's health concerns. Indeed, the plaintiff gave the employer virtually no time to remedy the situation, and there was a finding that reasonable alternatives were indeed available. These were the findings of fact, and no motion to correct was filed.
Based upon the foregoing record and findings of fact, the board ruled that the plaintiff left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer.
The board is free to weigh the opposing testimony and to accept or reject the competing arguments. Based upon the record before the court, the board's ruling is reasonable and consistent with the applicable statutes, regulations and case law. The record supports its finding that the plaintiff left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer. There was ample evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. Accordingly, there is no basis for this court to conclude that the board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or otherwise abused its discretion in reaching its decision.
The decision of the board is affirmed and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.