Opinion
No. 3-544 / 02-2015
Filed August 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forJohnsonCounty, Amanda Potterfield, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal on summary judgment of their claims of false imprisonment against all defendants and their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendant City. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
James Weston, II of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C., Iowa City, for appellants.
Terry Abernathy and Thad Collins of Pickens, Barnes Abernathy, Cedar Rapids, for appellees City of Coralville, Barkhoff, Sutton, and Wright.
Rene Lapierre of Klass, Stoik, Mugan, Villone, Phillips, Orzechowski, Clausen Lapierre, L.L.P, Sioux City, for appellee Wal-Mart Stores.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Plaintiffs-appellants Brittany Van Zante and Angie Jacobson, after shopping at the Coralville, Iowa, store of defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., were stopped by defendants Jeffrey Barkhoff and Michael Wright, police officers employed by defendant City of Coralville, Iowa, and returned to the Coralville store on a suspicion that the two had taken merchandise from the store without paying for it. No arrest was made or criminal charges filed, and after some two to two and one half hours at the store, plaintiffs ultimately were released.
Plaintiffs sued, contending they were falsely imprisoned and that they had claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 2003). Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court dismissed the claims. Plaintiffs appeal, contending there are fact questions generated as to (1) the reasonableness of defendant Wal-Mart's search and detention of plaintiffs, (2) whether the detention by officers from the City of Coralville was for a reasonable time and their search in a reasonable manner, and (3) whether Coralville officers violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. We reverse and remand.
I. SCOPE OF REVIEW
We review a district court's ruling on summary judgment for the correction of errors at law. Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Iowa 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.Civ.P. 1.981(3). In determining whether the moving party has met this burden, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Kelly, 620 N.W.2d at 641. The nonmoving party is entitled to every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record. Falada v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 2002); Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 822-23 (Iowa 2001).
II. BACKGROUND FACTS
In reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we are mindful that certain facts shown by the plaintiffs are disputed by the defendants. At about 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 2001, plaintiff Jacobson dropped plaintiff Van Zante off at the Wal-Mart store in Coralville where Van Zante shopped. Van Zante bought, paid for, and received a receipt for the purchase of items totaling $79.77. The receipt showed her time of purchase as 2:21 a.m. Items purchased included a number of cosmetics and a planner. The receipt showed that she tendered $100 in payment and received $20.23 in change. Jacobson returned to the store about 3:30 a.m. to pick Van Zante up. Jacobson wanted to shop. Van Zante was told by a Wal-Mart cashier that if she had her receipt she could take the items she had purchased back in the store while she accompanied Jacobson.
During this time Alan Reines was also shopping in the store. Reines had worked for Wal-Mart but was not employed by Wal-Mart at the time. He testified he worked in loss prevention in his present and several previous jobs. He said he had testified in many shoplifting cases. Reines reported that he saw the plaintiffs shopping when he heard a package being ripped open and saw Van Zante remove merchandise from the package and put it in her purse. Van Zante admitted that while shopping with Jacobson, she had opened items she purchased earlier. Reines did not identify what merchandise he claimed was removed from the package. Reines additionally said he saw Van Zante cutting a price tag off a planner and also taking an item in the cosmetics section, opening it, concealing the merchandise, and discarding the package on the shelf. Again, he did not identify the specific merchandise he claimed was concealed. An employee of the store also saw one of the plaintiffs writing in the planner but knew that it had been paid for at check-out and relayed that information to her manager. At 3:55 a.m. Van Zante paid for ten items totaling $22.51. At 3:56 a.m. Jacobson paid for ten items totaling $26.52. The plaintiffs then left the store and smoked cigarettes outside. Reines called 911 from his own telephone. He then left the store and followed plaintiffs in his car as they drove off in a Jeep. Five or ten minutes after they left the store, plaintiffs were stopped by defendant Barkhoff. Reines stopped too, and he had a short conversation with the officer, telling him he had made the call. Plaintiffs were told they were stopped to investigate a recent theft from Wal-Mart. Defendant Sutton arrived soon thereafter. Van Zante said they had receipts for their purchases. The officers asked to search their Jeep and were given permission to do so. The officers found items that appeared to be purchased from or property of Wal-Mart in Wal-Mart bags and loose in the Jeep. The officers attempted to match receipts to merchandise. They did a thorough search of the Jeep and collected everything they felt could have been merchandise from Wal-Mart. They matched the items Jacobson had with her receipts. While still checking items, the officers received a call from the store saying witnesses had seen plaintiffs taking items out of their packages and placing them on their person. Van Zante got out of the car and was patted down by Officer Barkhoff. Barkhoff assumed Jacobson was searched by Sutton. Jacobson testified she was never searched. Both women were at some time put in a police car. The officers told the women they must return to the store. The officers allowed Van Zante to drive the Jeep back to the store. Jacobson rode in a police car. The women were cooperative.
At the store the women were placed in separate areas. Jacobson was put in a room with a Wal-Mart assistant manager and was told by him that she could not leave until it was figured out. About an hour later she was walked to the Vision Center of the store, and an employee sat there with her. She asked a police officer at various times if she could leave the store and was not allowed to do so.
On deposition she was asked:
Q. Did you ever ask [the police officer] if you're free to go?
A. A million times that night.
Van Zante was put in a room with an open door. An officer visited with her in the room and told her to wait. No Wal-Mart employees were in the room. Permission was sought to search the Jeep again, and Van Zante, who owned the vehicle, gave it. Wal-Mart employees checked her packages.
The items taken from the women, as well as packaging discovered at the store, were checked against the women's receipts. A clerk testified that within ten minutes after the women arrived back at the store, the clerk was given two receipts to match with items. The clerk's testimony was it took her about ten minutes to find the receipts matched with the purchases, and she was asked to do it again. The clerk reported to the police that all items were on the receipts. Van Zante was told by an officer the items didn't match the receipts, and she was going to be arrested for shoplifting. Van Zante asked for a chance to match the items. She was allowed to go to the customer service center where she matched the items in the officer's presence. Van Zante never made a request to leave. The women were not told they could leave the store until some time between 6:15 a.m. and 6:47 a.m. that morning, at which time they left.
III. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Plaintiffs contend they were falsely imprisoned. False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion. Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 196, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1952); Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). The essential elements of this tort are (1) detention and restraint against one's will and (2) the unlawfulness of this detention or restraint. Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 326 (citing Valadez v. City of Des Moines, 324 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Iowa 1982)).
Defendants contend they were justified in detaining the women and that Iowa Code section 808.12 (2001) exonerates them from a false imprisonment claim. That section provides:
1. Persons concealing property as set forth in section 714.5, may be detained and searched by a peace officer, . . . merchant, or merchant's employee, provided that the detention is for a reasonable length of time and that the search is conducted in a reasonable manner . . . .
. . .
3. The detention or search under this section by a peace officer, . . . merchant, or merchant's employee does not render the person liable, in a criminal or civil action, for false arrest or false imprisonment provided the person conducting the search or detention had reasonable grounds to believe the person detained or searched had concealed or was attempting to conceal property as set forth in section 714.5.
(Emphasis added.)
Before section 808.12 comes into play there must be a showing under Iowa Code section 714.5 which provides in pertinent part:
The fact that a person has concealed . . . unpurchased property of a store or other mercantile establishment, either on the premises or outside the premises, is material evidence of intent to deprive the owner, and the finding of . . . unpurchased property concealed upon the person or among the belongings of the person, is material evidence of intent to deprive and, if the person conceals or causes to be concealed . . . unpurchased property, upon the person or among the belongings of another, the finding of the concealed . . . property is also material evidence of intent to deprive on the part of the person concealing the . . . goods.
Van Zante admits that wrappings were removed in the store from an item or items she had earlier paid for, and the wrappings were left in her shopping cart. There was a report that the items from the cosmetics area were unwrapped and put in one of the plaintiffs' purses. We agree with defendants that these facts created a sufficient suspicion of shoplifting so as to grant to the defendants the protection of section 808.12 in initially detaining the plaintiffs. We disagree with the defendants and the trial court that the issue of whether the detention was for a reasonable period of time should have been decided against plaintiffs on summary judgment as a matter of law.
The reasonableness of a shopkeeper detention should generally be a question of fact for the jury. See Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 326; Lenstra v. Menard, Inc., 511 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). Detention or restraint against one's will does not need to be accomplished by physical force or threats of physical force. Hobbs v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 182 Iowa 316, 339, 165 N.W. 912, 918-19 (1917); Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 327. The requisite confinement can also result from submission to asserted legal authority. Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 327. We have rejected the notion that the brevity of a plaintiff's confinement is insufficient as a matter of law to establish false imprisonment. Fox v. McCurnin, 205 Iowa 752, 757, 218 N.W. 499, 501 (1928); Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 327; see32 Am. Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 17 at 58 (1995) (noting it is the fact of detention rather than its length that is relevant). Nor does the fact that the plaintiffs were cooperative and followed the directions of the store personnel and the officers absolve the defendants of false imprisonment claims. See Zohn, 598 N.W.2d at 327 (finding a customer's submission to an employee's asserted authority to search the customer's bag was held to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the involuntariness of his confinement).
There is evidence the plaintiffs were detained for two and one half hours. The plaintiffs were cooperative from the beginning of the investigation by voluntarily presenting their merchandise and receipts and agreeing twice to a search of the Jeep. Jacobson's receipts checked out at the time of the stop. A clerk at Wal-Mart indicated she was able to check two of the receipts in ten minutes and found all merchandise accounted for on the receipt. Van Zante was able to show quickly that she had receipts for all the merchandise once she was given the opportunity to do so. While the initial challenge was to the plaintiffs opening a package, investigating officers were immediately told that Van Zante had taken items she had already purchased back into the shopping area. The customer receipts the woman gave the officer would support the fact Van Zante entered the shopping area twice. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we find the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue.
IV. SECTION 1983 ACTION
Plaintiffs next claim that the officers of defendant City of Coralville violated their civil rights, and they have a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides, in pertinent part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
To support a claim derived from this statute, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant deprived him or her of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420, 428 (1981); Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142, 150 (1970); Christenson v. Ramaeker, 366 N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1985).
The second major element requires the plaintiffs to show that defendants acted under color of state law. The record is clear that the officers stopped and detained the plaintiffs while serving as police officers employed by the City of Coralville, Iowa. We therefore only need to determine if there is evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, supporting a claim that defendants violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs contend the officers violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
In Collins-Draine v. Knief, 617 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000), we said the following:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons from unreasonable government seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Traditionally, any deprivation of a person's liberty without a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate was considered presumptively unreasonable. State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999). With time, however, that ironclad presumption became riddled with exceptions whereby the courts found certain seizures did not run afoul of the Constitution, given the inherent reasonableness of the officer's actions under the circumstances. Id. Among those exceptions carved from the Fourth Amendment is the situation where an officer is permitted to briefly stop and detain an individual for investigatory purposes, if there exists a reasonable and articulable suspicion the person is intending to or just committed a criminal offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968). Such a detention, however, should generally be brief with the officer making diligent efforts to quickly confirm or refute the suspicion. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 615-16 (1985). If, however, the officer exceeds the bounds of the investigatory stop, the seizure transforms into a full-fledged arrest, which must then be supported by probable cause. Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 590 (6th Cir. 1994). The bounds of an investigatory stop are exceeded if the officer unnecessarily holds the suspect . . . . See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d at 615.
There is substantial evidence that could support a finding that the detention of plaintiffs was not for a reasonable time. We reverse on this issue.