Opinion
No. 1:01-cv-147
August 23, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs bring suit against the defendants for personal injury that occurred when Rachael Vanderpool was struck by a boat motor. Subject matter jurisdiction is premised on Title 28, United States Code, Section 1333, which grants district courts "original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Defendants Jimmy Edmondson and Ritchey Edmondson ("the Edmondsons") move the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' suit for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs oppose this motion. For the reasons expressed below, the motion to dismiss [Court File No. 27] will be DENIED.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint may be dismissed upon motion if the district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); Michigan Southern R.R. Co. v. Branch St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). To survive the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs must show that the complaint alleges a claim under federal law and that the claim is substantial. See Michigan Southern R.R. Co., 287 F.3d at 573 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs will survive the motion to dismiss by showing any arguable basis in law for the claims set forth in the complaint. Id.
II. FACTS
The Vanderpools allege the following facts. On May 20, 2000, Rachael Vanderpool was a passenger on a pontoon boat owned by Jimmy Edmondson and operated by his son, Ritchey Emondson. At approximately 6:30 p.m., while the boat was anchored in the Tennessee River, Rachael Vanderpool was holding onto the front of the deck of the pontoon boat with her hand and treading water. Ritchey Edmondson suddenly started the motor, moving the boat forward. Rachael Vanderpool eventually lost her grip on the boat; the boat passed over her body; and the boat's motor struck her causing bodily damage.
III. ANALYSIS
To invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) over a tort claim, two conditions must be met: location and connection. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). To satisfy the location condition, the Court must determine that the tort occurred on navigable water. Id. The connection condition requires the Court to "assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court must also determine whether "the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The Edmondsons argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the accident described in the complaint occurred not on the Tennessee River but rather on a slough off of the Tennessee River near a point where Richland Creek enters the Tennessee River. The Edmondsons assert that the slough is separated from the main channel of the Tennessee River by a strip of dry land and is never used for anything other than the occasional pleasure craft. They further contend that the slough is a very narrow and shallow waterway. The Edmondsons argue that because the injury occurred on this slough, the injury did not occur in navigable water and could not impede maritime commerce as is required for maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. To support their argument, the Edmondsons provide sworn statements regarding the slough from Jimmy Edmondson, Ritchey Edmondson, and Bernie R. Swiney, an officer with the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency. Their testimony is similar to that detailed above. The Edmondsons' affidavits are accompanied by what they identified as an United States Tennessee Authority Big Spring quadrangle map. The Edmondsons marked the location of the accident on the map.
Although the accident occurred on the slough rather than the main channel of the Tennessee River, the Court finds that the tort occurred on navigable waters, and, thus, the location condition for admiralty jurisdiction is satisfied.
The parties do not dispute that the Tennessee River is navigable water for the purpose of establishing admiralty jurisdiction.
Even if the slough upon which the accident occurred is a separate body of water, distinguishable from the Tennessee River due to its separation by a strip of land, as the Edmondsons contend, the affidavits and map in support of the motion to dismiss show that the slough is accessible from the Tennessee River in several locations. That the slough may be used only by pleasure craft, or that it may be a narrow or shallow waterway, is irrelevant where the slough is clearly navigable in fact, as evidenced by the boat's activities on the day in question. The slough is susceptible of being used as a highway of commerce, even if it is not used as such on a regular basis. Accordingly, the tort occurred on navigable waters.
The Supreme Court defined "navigable waters" for purposes of establishing admiralty jurisdiction:
Those rivers must be regarded a public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel, are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the states, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871); Finneseth v. Carter, 712 F.2d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1983).
The Court also finds that the connection condition for admiralty jurisdiction has been met. Regarding the first prong of the connection condition, the Edmondsons argue that the accident on the slough had no actual or potential impact on maritime commerce. Although it is true the accident did not affect maritime commerce on the date in question, the Court must inquire whether the accident had the potential of disrupting maritime commerce, not just on the slough or on the Tennessee River, but on "the busiest of maritime thoroughfares." In the Matter of Bird, 794 F. Supp. 575, 580 (D.S.C. 1992) (analyzing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982) (holding collision between pleasure craft on navigable waters posed potential hazard to maritime commerce) and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363 (1990) (holding a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters satisfied the requirement of potential disruption to commercial maritime activity)). The accident that injured Rachael Vanderpool had the potential of disrupting maritime commerce.
The Court also finds that the second prong of the connection condition has been met despite the Edmondsons' argument that this accident-involving young people having a party on a pleasure craft-had no relation to commercial maritime activity.
The Edmondsons' argument is flawed in two ways. First, to sustain admiralty jurisdiction, there is no requirement that traditional maritime activity be commercial in nature. See Foremost, 457 U.S.at 674. Second, the Edmondsons' characterization of the activity giving rise to the accident is too particularized. See, e.g., Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364-65. The activity giving rise to the accident is not "young people having a party on a pleasure craft" but rather the general navigation of a vessel. See id. at 365 (defining relevant activity as "the storage and maintenance of a vessel at a marina on navigable waters."); Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675-77 (defining relevant activity as the collision of two vessels on navigable waters); Bird, 794 F. Supp. at 581 (defining relevant activity as the anchoring of a vessel in the tributary of navigable waters). Because the negligent operation of a vessel on navigable waters has a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity, admiralty jurisdiction is proper here.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs have alleged a substantial claim under federal law. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss [Court File No. 27] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.