Opinion
No. 1:01-cv-147.
September 13, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Rachael Vanderpool ("Rachael"), and her parents, plaintiffs Jack and Phyllis Vanderpool, bring this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) invoking this Court's admiralty jurisdiction. On May 20, 2000, Rachael and various other persons were passengers on a pontoon boat owned by defendant Jimmy Edmondson and operated by his son, defendant Ritchey L. Edmondson ("Ritchey"), on the Tennessee River in Rhea County, Tennessee. The boat was manufactured by defendant Tracker Marine Corporation ("Tracker Marine"). The boat had a 115 horsepower outboard engine manufactured by Mercury Marine, a division of defendant Brunswick Corporation ("Brunswick").
The complaint names Tracker Marine Corporation; Tracker Marine, L.L.C.; and Tracker Marine, L.P. as defendants. These defendants are collectively referred to as "Tracker Marine."
The pontoon boat was anchored in the river. Rachael and other persons went swimming in the area around the boat. Rachael and Sean Holloway swam together underneath the front deck of the boat. While Rachael was in the water under the boat's front deck, Ritchey pulled up the anchors and started the boat engine. The engine throttle was engaged and the boat began moving forward. Rachael held onto the boat with her hands in an effort to avoid being swept underneath it. Rachael lost her grip and the boat passed over her body. The propeller on the outboard engine struck Rachael and she suffered physical injuries. The boat and the outboard motor did not have a propeller guard.
Plaintiffs assert tort claims against Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson for common law negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, and negligence per se in violating TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-10-216 and 69-10-217, and 33 U.S.C. § 2055. Plaintiffs claim the boat owner, Jimmy Edmondson, is liable pursuant to TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-215 for the negligence of Ritchey in operating the boat. The complaint further claims that Jimmy Edmondson is liable for his own negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness by entrusting the boat to his son, Ritchey, when Jimmy Edmondson knew that Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol and that Ritchey was not otherwise competent to safely operate the boat.
The complaint also asserts products liability claims against Tracker Marine and Brunswick predicated on theories of negligence, breach of implied warranties, and strict liability. Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed all of their claims against Tracker Marine and Brunswick pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). At this juncture, the only claims that remain for adjudication are the plaintiffs' claims against Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson.
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. [Court File No. 183]. After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the motion is not well taken and it is DENIED. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute that must be resolved at trial.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum Co., 338 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2003); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). "Evidence suggesting a mere possibility" of a factual dispute is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; National Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. While the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it may grant summary judgment if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational, objective jury to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; McKinnie v. Roadway Express, Inc., 341 F.3d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2003).
II. Analysis
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson raise the following arguments.
A. Operating Boat Under Influence of Alcohol
They argue that the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and negligence per se predicated on the contention that Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol should be dismissed. Defendants contend the plaintiffs cannot prove that Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol when Rachael was injured.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(a) provides it is unlawful for any person to operate any vessel (boat) subject to registration on the public waters of the State of Tennessee "while under the influence of any intoxicant [alcohol], marijuana, narcotic drug, or drug producing stimulating effects on the central nervous system." TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(h) provides: "It is the duty of the enforcement agency investigating boating accidents in which fatalities or serious injuries occur to obtain blood alcohol content from all operators involved and submit the results thereof to the district attorney general." TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(i) provides in relevant part that upon the trial of any person charged with a violation of § 69-10-217, "the results of any test made of the person so charged are admissible in evidence in a criminal proceeding."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(j)(1)provides that for purposes of Section 69-10-217, evidence that there was, at the time alleged, .05% or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant boat operator's blood shall create no presumption that he was under the influence of alcohol. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(j)(2) provides that evidence that there was, at the time alleged, .10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant boat operator's blood, shall create the presumption that he was under the influence of alcohol.
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson say the boating accident involving Rachael occurred at approximately 6:30 p.m. on May 20, 2000. After the accident, Ritchey returned the boat to shore and called for emergency medical assistance. Pursuant to TENN. CODEANN. § 69-10-217(h), Bernie Swiney, the investigating officer for the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, transported Ritchey to the Rhea County Medical Center where a blood test was performed at 8:00 p.m., approximately 90 minutes after Rachael was injured. The results of the toxicology screen show that as of 8:00 p.m., Ritchey had a blood alcohol level of .04%. The toxicology screen came back negative for all other intoxicants and drugs.
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson argue that because Ritchey's blood alcohol level was below .05% at 8:00 p.m., there is no evidentiary presumption under TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(j)(1) that Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol at 6:30 p.m. when Rachael was injured. This argument fails. The Court cannot grant summary judgment to the Edmondsons on this basis. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute whether Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol in violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(a) when Rachael was injured at 6:30 p.m.
It is undisputed that Ritchey had been drinking beverages containing alcohol at the time of the boating accident. If Ritchey's blood alcohol level was .04% at 8:00 p.m., approximately 90 minutes after the accident, it can reasonably be inferred that his blood alcohol level had decreased with the passage of time and may well have been .05% or greater when the accident occurred at 6:30 p.m. Moreover, the plaintiffs' allegation that Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of intoxicants may be proved by circumstantial evidence regardless of the scientific results of the blood alcohol test.
Assuming arguendo that Ritchey's blood alcohol level at the time of the boating accident was .04%, this does not mean that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-10-217(j)(1) merely provides that evidence that the boat operator has less than .05% by weight of alcohol in his blood "shall create no presumption" of being under the influence of alcohol. The absence of this evidentiary presumption does not preclude the plaintiffs from proving, and the trier of fact from finding, that Ritchey was acting under the influence of alcohol in violation of § 69-10-217. Even without the benefit of the statutory presumption, it is possible for the plaintiffs to prove Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol.
B. Duties to Safeguard Well-Being of Passengers and Maintain Proper Lookout
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson acknowledge that under general seamanship principles and general maritime law, Ritchey had a duty to safeguard the well-being of his boat passengers, including Rachael, and also a duty to maintain a proper lookout. Plaintiff's also claim that Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson are liable for negligence per se on the theory that Ritchey violated 33 U.S.C. § 2005. 33 U.S.C. § 2005 provides: "Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision."
Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson argue they are entitled to partial summary judgment to dismiss the complaint to the extent the plaintiffs claim that Ritchey breached the duties of safeguarding the well-being of his passengers and maintaining a proper lookout. This argument fails. The Court cannot grant summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute whether Ritchey breached these two duties of care owed to Rachael.
C. Superseding Cause: Rachael's Own Negligence
Defendants next argue that even if Ritchey did breach his duty to maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing and the breach of this duty in fact caused an injury to Rachael, then Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson are relieved of liability because Rachael's own negligence constitutes a superseding cause and is the sole proximate cause of her injury.
The motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of superseding cause is DENIED. There are genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning the nature and extent of Rachael's own negligence. Whether Rachael was negligent and, if so, whether her negligence rises to the level of a superseding cause and is the sole proximate cause of her injury are issues to be decided at trial.
With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law. Admiralty and maritime law in the United States is an amalgam of federal statutes covering special topics, traditional common law rules developed by the federal judiciary, and supplementarystate law. Admiralty law is drawn from federal and state sources. The exercise of admiralty jurisdiction does not result in the automatic displacement of state law. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 206 (1996); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 545 (1995). Absent a relevant federal statute, this Court follows and applies general maritime law as developed by the federal courts. East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986); Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 171 F. Supp.2d 241, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Powers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 855 F. Supp. 199, 202-03 (W.D. Mich. 1994); aff'd, 83 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 992 (1996); In re Morehead Marine, 844 F. Supp. 1193, 1194-95 (S.D Ohio 1994); 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 5-23 (4th ed. 2004) ("SCHOENBAUM").
Although admiralty courts frequently employ and partially draw from state law in formulating general maritime law, a federal court sitting in admiralty is not bound by state law. The Court is obligated to follow and apply admiralty and general maritime law as developed by the federal courts. To the extent that Tennessee state law is in conflict with general maritime law, the conflicting state law must be disregarded. Relevant Tennessee state law may be utilized to fill in gaps in substantive maritime law. In sum, this Court will follow and apply Tennessee state law but only to the extent that it is consistent with and does not violate established principles of general maritime law. TAG/ICIB Services v. Pan American Grain Co., 215 F.3d 172, 177 (1st Cir. 2000) (Admiralty court must apply the federal maritime rules that directly address the issue at hand and only resort to state law when no federal maritime law applies); Powers, 855 F. Supp. at 203-04; 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D § 3671, pp. 260-66 (1998).
The doctrine of pure comparative fault applies in admiralty and maritime tort cases. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 832, 836-37 (1996); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994); United States v. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975); see also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979); Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1459-63 (6th Cir. 1993). When two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause an injury or damage, liability is allocated among the parties in proportion to the comparative degree of their fault.
Under the comparative fault system, liability is allocated only among parties whose actions were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury or damage. See Exxon, 517 U.S. at 837-38, 842. Defendants argue that they cannot be held liable because their actions were not a proximate cause of Rachael's injuries. Defendants contend that the chain of proximate causation between their alleged tortious conduct and Rachael's injuries was broken and severed by an intervening, superseding cause, namely Rachael's own extraordinary negligence.
In Exxon, 517 U.S. 830, the Supreme Court holds that the requirement of legal or proximate causation and the related superseding cause doctrine apply in admiralty cases. A plaintiff in admiralty who is the superseding cause and the sole proximate cause of her own injury cannot recover part of her damages from a defendant tortfeasor whose blameworthy actions were a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury. A plaintiff's extraordinary negligence can constitute an intervening force that supersedes a defendant's prior negligence and breaks the chain of proximate causation (legal causation) required to impose liability upon the defendant even though the defendant's negligent acts or omissions were a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury. Id.; See also White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tenn. 1998); McLung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 905 (Tenn. 1996).
For the superseding cause doctrine to apply, the plaintiff's injury must actually be "brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable." Exxon, 517 U.S. at 837 (quoting 1 SCHOENBAUM § 5-3, pp. 165-66). A intervening act will not exculpate the original wrongdoer as a superseding cause unless it is shown that the intervening act could not have been reasonably anticipated. White, 975 S.W.2d at 529; McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991).
Plaintiffs correctly point out that issues of negligence, apportionment of fault, and proximate causation ordinarily are not susceptible of being adjudicated on motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. Daughenbaugh v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 891 F.2d 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1989); Case v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 712 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1983); McTavish v. Chesapeake Ohio Railway Co., 485 F.2d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 1973); Reidinger v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 463 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (6th Cir. 1972); Rogers v. Peabody Coal Co., 342 F.2d 749, 751 (6th Cir. 1965); Crumley v. Memorial Hospital, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 531, 533 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 647 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1981) (table).
The issue of foreseeability is generally an issue of fact to be determined at trial, unless objectively reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 157 (Tenn. 1995). Proximate cause and intervening, superseding cause are issues to be decided at trial and not on summary judgment, unless the uncontroverted facts and the inferences drawn from those facts permit objectively reasonable persons to reach only one conclusion. White, 975 S.W.2d at 529-30; McLung, 937 S.W.2d at 905; Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 612 (Tenn. 1994); McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 775; Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 588 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003); see also Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 905 (2nd Cir. 1991); Silivanch, 171 F. Supp.2d at 256.
This Court cannot grant summary judgment to Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson on the ground that Rachael's own negligence was so extraordinary that it constitutes an intervening force that was the superseding cause and the sole proximate cause of her injury. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute concerning the nature, degree, and extent of Rachael's own negligence or fault, if any, that caused her injury. Whether Rachael was negligent and, if so, whether Rachael's own negligence constitutes the superseding cause and the sole proximate cause of her injury are issues that will have to be decided at trial.
D. Jimmy Edmondson's Own Negligence
Jimmy Edmondson moves to dismiss the complaint to the extent the plaintiffs claim he is liable for his own negligence. Plaintiffs allege that Jimmy Edmondson knew Ritchey was operating the boat under the influence of alcohol and knew Ritchey was not otherwise competent to operate the boat safely. This is denied by Jimmy Edmondson who contends that although he gave Ritchey permission to use the boat on May 20, 2000, Jimmy Edmondson denies that he took any action to assist in preparing the boat for Ritchey's use. Jimmy Edmondson denies that he did anything to help place beer in coolers that were taken onto the boat. Jimmy Edmondson further denies he had any actual knowledge that any beer or other alcoholic beverages had been purchased for consumption by Ritchey and the passengers on the boat.
The motion for summary judgment on this basis must be denied because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute whether Jimmy Edmondson had knowledge that alcoholic beverages would be present on the boat. Plaintiffs contend there is proof that on May 19, 2000, the night before the accident, Jimmy Edmondson assisted in loading alcoholic beverages into ice chests for use on the boat on May 20.
Accordingly, the motion by defendants Ritchey and Jimmy Edmondson for summary judgment [Court File No. 183] is DENIED. III. Motions and Objections Denied as Moot
In the wake of the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of all their claims against Brunswick and the Tracker Marine defendants, numerous motions have been rendered moot.
Tracker Marine filed a motion for leave to amend its witness list to add Mark Suttie as a fact witness. [Court File No. 163]. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and Magistrate Judge Carter denied the motion. [Court File No. 181]. Tracker Marine filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's memorandum opinion and order. Tracker Marine's motion [Court File No. 163] and its objections [Court File No. 188] are DENIED as MOOT.
To clarify the record, the following motions are also DENIED as MOOT: Tracker Marine's summary judgment motion [Court File No. 87]; Brunswick's motion to dismiss claim for punitive damages [Court File No. 91]; Brunswick's motion to dismiss claims of Jack and Phyllis Vanderpool [Court File No. 93]; Brunswick's motion to dismiss claims of Jack and Phyllis Vanderpool [Court File No. 93]; Brunswick's summary judgment motion on superseding cause [Court File No. 159]; Brunswick's summary judgment motion on component parts doctrine [Court File No. 161]; Tracker Marine's summary judgment motion [Court File No. 182]; Plaintiffs' motion to exclude testimony of Richard Snyder, or alternative motion to compel discovery [Court File No. 175]; Plaintiffs' motion to strike affidavit and exclude testimony of Jim Rabe [Court File No. 196]; Plaintiffs' motions to exclude testimony of Tyler Kress [Court File Nos. 197, 213]; Tracker Marine's motion to exclude testimony of Robert Swint [Court File No. 208]; Tracker Marine's motion to exclude testimony of Robert Warren [Court File No. 210]; Brunswick's motion to exclude testimony of Mancil Milligan [Court File No. 214]; Brunswick's motion to exclude testimony of Robert Swint [Court File No. 217]; Plaintiffs' motion to exclude testimony of Richard Snyder, Don Kueny, and Robert MacNeill [Court File No. 216]; Plaintiffs' motion to exclude report of Propeller Guard Subcommittee and testimony of James Getz [Court File No. 219]; Brunswick's motion to exclude testimony of Robert Warren [Court File No. 221]; and Brunswick's motions to exclude testimony of Joseph Rudd [Court File Nos. 222, 232].
SO ORDERED.