Opinion
No. C 97-3043-MWB.
March 1, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
On February 5, 1997, plaintiff Mike Van Hooser filed this age and sex discrimination lawsuit against his current employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"), in Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County. On April 28, 1997, defendant UPS filed a notice of removal in this court.
Van Hooser has been employed by UPS since September 21, 1976. At the time he commenced this lawsuit, Van Hooser was employed as a tractor-trailer ("feeder") driver for UPS based out of the UPS's Eagan, Minnesota, center. Van Hooser had previously been a UPS feeder driver based out of UPS's Mason City, Iowa, center. Van Hooser alleges in his petition that he was subjected to age and sex discrimination when UPS refused his request to be transferred back to the UPS center in Mason City. Specifically, Van Hooser alleges in his petition that: "the defendant violated the plaintiff's human rights by discriminating against him based on his age or sex or both his age and sex." Petition at ¶ 10. Van Hooser did not plead a specific statute alleged to have been violated by UPS's actions.
UPS has moved for summary judgment on Van Hooser's sex and age discrimination claims. In its motion, UPS asserts that Van Hooser's state law discrimination claims are preempted by federal labor law. In the alternative, UPS asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and argues that Van Hooser cannot establish various elements of his claims for sex and age discrimination. Van Hooser filed a timely resistance to UPS's motion. He contends that his state petition contained both state and federal age and sex discrimination claims. He further contends that his state law discrimination claims are not preempted by federal labor law. Finally, Van Hooser asserts that he can establish each and every element of his discrimination claims.
The court heard telephonic oral arguments on UPS's Motion For Summary Judgment on February 19, 1999. At the oral arguments, plaintiff Van Hooser was represented by counsel Michael J. Carroll of Coppola, Sandre McConville, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa. Defendant UPS was represented by counsel Gary R. Fischer of Dreher, Simpson Jensen, P.C., Des Moines, Iowa.
The court turns first to a discussion of the undisputed facts as shown by the record and the parties' submissions. The court next will outline the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment and then turn to a legal analysis of whether UPS is entitled to summary judgment on Van Hooser's sex and age discrimination claims.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
The record reveals that the following facts are undisputed. Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc. is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio, with its principal place of business in the State of Illinois. UPS provides a package delivery service. Plaintiff Van Hooser is a full-time employee of UPS who presently is working out of UPS's center in Eagan, Minnesota. Van Hooser started his employment with UPS on September 21, 1976, working out of UPS's center in Mason City, Iowa. Van Hooser eventually became a UPS feeder driver based out UPS's Mason City center.
Van Hooser has at all times during his employment with UPS been a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and affiliated Local Teamster unions (collectively "the Teamsters Union"). The terms and conditions of Van Hooser's employment with UPS is governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("the CBA") between UPS and the Teamsters Union. The CBA consists of the National Master United Parcel Service Agreement and the Central Conference of Teamsters United Parcel Service Supplemental Agreement. Local Teamsters Union 828 is the bargaining unit for UPS employees at UPS's Mason City center while Local Teamsters Union 638 is the bargaining unit responsible for UPS employees at UPS's Eagan, Minnesota, center. Both Local Teamsters Union 828 and Local Teamsters Union 638 are part of the Central Conference of Teamsters and are covered by the Central Conference of Teamsters United Parcel Service Supplemental Agreement.
UPS eliminated and transferred feeder driver work from its Mason City facility commencing in late 1990 and continuing into 1991. Out of the eight feeder driver runs then operating out of UPS's Mason City center, only two were kept there. Of the nine feeder drivers who worked on the eight feeder runs out of the Mason City center, Van Hooser was next to last in seniority. As a result of the changes in the feeder driver work at UPS's Mason City facility, on January 14, 1991, Van Hooser elected to exercise his seniority rights under the CBA and follow feeder driver work to UPS's facility at Eagan, Minnesota. Van Hooser was not required to follow the feeder work to UPS's Eagan facility in order to remain employed by UPS. Van Hooser's other options included exercising his seniority and displacing a full-time package car driver, or displacing one or two part-time employees at UPS's Mason City center. On February 1, 1991, Van Hooser began working out of UPS's Eagan facility as a full-time feeder driver.
In November 1994, the retirement of one of the two remaining feeder drivers at UPS's Mason City facility created an opening for a feeder driver at that facility. Van Hooser learned of the opening and notified UPS of his desire to return to UPS's Mason City center. The CBA grants an employee the right to return to their original place of employment following a transfer resulting from a change of operations for up to twelve months following the transfer. In this regard, the CBA provides in relevant part:
In the event that a permanent job opportunity develops in the classification of work at the original center from which an employee moved as a result of the change of operation, the employee shall be allowed to return at his/her expense on a one (1)-time basis to the original center. This opportunity must take place within twelve (12) months of the original move. This section shall supercede the four-for-one provision elsewhere in this Agreement.
National Master United Parcel Service Agreement at p. 109. UPS informed Van Hooser that he would not be allowed to return to UPS's Mason City facility.
On November 1, 1994, pursuant to the terms of the CBA, the feeder driver position at UPS's Mason City facility was put up for bids by employees of the Mason City facility. No bids were received from employees of the Mason City center. On January 3, 1995, UPS management personnel in the UPS Iowa District human resources department selected a woman, Julie Mosher, for the position. Ms. Mosher was younger than Van Hooser. Mosher was a peak season feeder driver from Davenport, Iowa. Van Hooser never filed a grievance under the CBA related to the decision not to allow him to return to UPS's Mason City facility.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS (including some further findings of fact) A. Standards For Summary Judgment
This court has considered in some detail the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 in a number of recent decisions. See, e.g., Swanson v. Van Otterloo, 993 F. Supp. 1224, 1230-31 (N.D. Iowa 1998); Dirks v. J.C. Robinson Seed Co., 980 F. Supp. 1303, 1305-07 (N.D. 1997); Laird v. Stilwill, 969 F. Supp. 1167, 1172-74 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Rural Water Sys. #1 v. City of Sioux Ctr., 967 F. Supp. 1483, 1499-1501 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Tralon Corp. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 812, 817-18 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Security State Bank v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, N.A., 965 F. Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Iowa 1997). Thus, the court will not consider those standards in detail here. Suffice it to say that Rule 56 itself provides, in pertinent part, as follows:Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim . . . is asserted . . . may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)-(c) (emphasis added). Applying these standards, the trial judge's function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Enron Corp., 906 F.2d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1990). An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). As to whether a factual dispute is "material," the Supreme Court has explained, "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir. 1995); Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 394.
Because this is an employment discrimination case, it is well to remember that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases." Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989)); see also Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Crawford); Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Crawford); Chock v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 113 F.3d 861, 862 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We must also keep in mind, as our court has previously cautioned, that summary judgment should be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases," citing Crawford); Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Crawford); Hardin v. Hussmann Corp., 45 F.3d 262 (8th Cir. 1995) ("summary judgments should only be used sparingly in employment discrimination cases," citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir. 1990); Hillebrand, 827 F.2d at 364). Summary judgment is appropriate in employment discrimination cases only in "those rare instances where there is no dispute of fact and where there exists only one conclusion." Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244; see also Webb v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 51 F.3d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244). To put it another way, "[b]ecause discrimination cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant." Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment); accord Snow, 128 F.3d at 1205 ("Because discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence, we are particularly deferential to the nonmovant," citing Crawford); Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341); Johnson, 931 F.2d at 1244.
However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also observed that, "[a]lthough summary judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment discrimination cases, Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff's evidence must go beyond the establishment of a prima facie case to support a reasonable inference regarding the alleged illicit reason for the defendant's action." Landon v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 72 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, "[s]ummary judgment is proper when a plaintiff fails to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of her [or his] claim." Snow, 128 F.3d at 1205; accord Helfter, 115 F.3d at 615; Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1995). With these standards in mind, the court turns to consideration of UPS's motion for summary judgment.
B. Types Of Claims Pleaded
Initially, the court is called upon to determine the type of discrimination claims pleaded. UPS asserts that Van Hooser has only pleaded Iowa state law claims. Van Hooser, on the other hand, contends that he has pleaded both state and federal claims for sex and age discrimination. Van Hooser's petition itself does not specify whether state and/or federal claims are being brought. Indeed, no specific discrimination statutes are alleged to have been violated. Rather, Van Hooser alleges in his petition that:
"the defendant violated the plaintiff's human rights by discriminating against him based on his age or sex or both his age and sex." Petition at ¶ 10.
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) does not require the identification of a specific theory of recovery. Peterson v. Bottomly, 582 N.W.2d 187, 188 (Iowa 1998); Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1998); Lake v. Schaffnit, 406 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1987); Pendergast v. Davenport, 375 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Iowa 1985); Soike v. Evan Matthews Co., 302 N.W.2d 841, 842 (Iowa 1981); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 159, 165 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Under Iowa law, "`the petition need only apprise the opposing parties of the incident giving rise to the claim and of the general nature of the action.'" Wendland, 574 N.W.2d at 329 (quoting Pendergast, 375 N.W.2d at 689). Van Hooser's petition clearly apprises UPS of the incident giving rise to the claims and of the general nature of his action against it. Although there may be more than one interpretation of Van Hooser's pleadings, his pleadings must be liberally construed. See A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Our court construes civil rights pleadings liberally."); see also Burnett v. Gratton, 468 U.S. 42, 51 n. 13 (1984); Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 1999); Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 510 (10th Cir. 1998); Riemer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 1998); Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 147 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998); Jacobsen v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized, a "pleading is a vehicle `to facilitate a proper decision on the merits' and not `a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive.'" LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 407 F.2d 671, 673 (3d Cir. 1969) (quoting United States v. Houghman, 364 U.S. 310, 317 (1960)). Here, construing Van Hooser's civil rights pleadings liberally, the court concludes that his petition gives fair warning of an intent to rely on either state or federal anti-discrimination statutes. Therefore, the court concludes that Van Hooser is pursuing federal claims in this case for sex discrimination, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., age discrimination, pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq, as well as state law claims for sex and age discrimination, pursuant to the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code Ch. 216. Having determined the scope of Van Hooser's pleadings, the court next turns to an analysis of the viability of each of these claims.
This rule is now found, in substantially the same form, in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 70(a), which become effective January 24, 1998.
C. Van Hooser's Federal Law Discrimination Claims 1. The federal age discrimination claim
The goal of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Thus, the ADEA forbids employment discrimination against employees aged forty and older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Michigan Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 451 (8th Cir. 1997); Madel v. FCI Mktg., Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1997); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1993). The act provides that it is unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1); Schlitz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1411 (8th Cir. 1997).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "[t]he core issue in an ADEA disparate-treatment claim is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based upon the plaintiff's age." Kneibert, 129 F.3d at 451. Plaintiffs seeking to establish intentional employment discrimination on the basis of age may, of course, present direct evidence to support their claim. Rivers-Frison v. Southeast Mo. Com. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring); Buchholz v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 120 F.3d 146, 149 (8th Cir. 1997); Schlitz, 115 F.3d at 1411. They may also establish their claim by presenting circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Id. Here, Van Hooser relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence of age discrimination.
It is axiomatic that employment discrimination need not be proved by direct evidence, and indeed, that doing so is often impossible, because, as the Supreme Court has said, "There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 946 (1994); accord Widoe v. District #111 Otoe County Sch., 147 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1998); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995). Thus, in employment discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence, courts apply the analytical framework of shifting burdens developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and refined in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981), and most recently in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). See Widoe, 147 F.3d at 729; Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir.) ( en banc decision), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2510 (1997); Hutson, 63 F.3d at 776.
The allocation of the burden of proof in ADEA cases has been held to be the same as in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1993); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 nn. 6 7 (8th Cir. 1991). Similarly, the burdens of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination are the same under the ADEA, Title VII, and § 1983. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 490-91 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Richmond v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992) (burden of showing prima facie case of discrimination is the same under Title VII, § 1981, § 1983, or the ADEA).
Under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the employment discrimination plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by producing evidence that would entitle the plaintiff to prevail unless contradicted and overcome by evidence produced by the defendant. Madel, 116 F.3d at 1251; White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 985 F.2d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1993). To establish their prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, Van Hooser must establish that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position for which he applied; (3) he was not placed in the position applied for despite his being sufficiently qualified; and (4) the employer finally filled the position with a person sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age discrimination. See Schlitz, 115 F.3d at 1412; see also Helfter, 115 F.3d at 618. "Once established, the prima facie case entitles the plaintiff to a rebuttable presumption that intentional discrimination played a role in the adverse employment action." Hutson, 63 F.3d at 776; Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995); Kobrin v. University of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 702 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1046 (1998).
Here, UPS disputes whether Van Hooser can establish his prima facie case. Specifically, UPS asserts that Van Hooser was not "qualified" for the position of feeder driver because he had no right under the CBA to transfer back to UPS's Mason City facility. The flaw in this argument is that the CBA does not contain criterions for the position of feeder driver which Van Hooser is unable to meet. Thus, the CBA itself does not bar Van Hooser from occupying the position of feeder driver. Indeed, Van Hooser has been performing the duties of feeder driver for at least the past eight years. Therefore, the court finds that Van Hooser is qualified for the position of feeder driver, and Van Hooser has made out a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Here, having found that Van Hooser can establish his prima facie case, the burden shifts, under the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, to UPS to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the challenged employment decision was made for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Kneibert, 129 F.3d at 451; Helfter, 115 F.3d at 618; White, 985 F.2d at 435.
UPS's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision here is that the CBA only allows an employee, who has exercised their rights to follow their work to another facility, up to twelve months in which to return to their original UPS center. The court concludes that UPS has fulfilled its burden of production at this stage, and therefore the case moves to the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in which Van Hooser must generate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS's proffered reasons are pretext for discrimination.
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently emphasized, employment discrimination plaintiffs may only escape summary judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis if they "present evidence that, in its entirety, `(1) creates a fact issue as to whether the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the adverse employment decision.'" Madel, 116 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1996)). "`The second part of [the summary judgment] test sometimes may be satisfied without additional evidence where the overall strength of the prima facie case and the evidence of pretext "suffice[s] to show intentional discrimination."'" Widoe, 147 F.3d at 731 (quoting Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1337). Ultimately, the core question remains "`whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff[s] because of [their] age.'" Madel, 116 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1337). Notably, in Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, explained:
when the employer produces a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the prima facie case no longer creates a legal presumption of unlawful discrimination. The elements of the prima facie case remain, however, and if they are accompanied by evidence of pretext and disbelief of the defendant's proffered explanation, they may permit the jury to find for the plaintiff. This is not to say that, for the plaintiff to succeed, simply proving pretext is necessarily enough. We emphasize that evidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a submissible case if it is, standing alone, inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination.Id. at 837.
The court finds that Van Hooser has met these requirements by establishing a prima facie case and offering evidence from which a jury could conclude that the reasons offered by UPS for not permitting him to transfer back to UPS's Mason City facility are pretextual. While the CBA only guarantees employees the right to transfer back to their original centers if a permanent job opening occurs at the original center within twelve months of the original move, the CBA does not prevent or preclude voluntary transfers of personnel. UPS's unwillingness to consider transferring Van Hooser, a long-standing employee with significant experience performing the exact position to be filled, to the position of feeder driver for the Mason City center while awarding the position to a younger female employee with considerably less experience creates an inference that UPS's proffered reasons for not transferring Van Hooser were pretextual and would permit, but certainly not compel, a jury to infer intentional discrimination. Furthermore, the evidence Van Hooser presented is not inconsistent with the finding of age discrimination; rather, it tends to show that UPS's proffered reason was flimsy, and thus susceptible to disbelief. Indeed, the evidence of pretext in this case — the complete lack of any basis in the CBA for UPS's justification for its decision — is entirely consistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination. If the court were the trier of fact, on the evidence currently presented, it would not find that UPS had discriminated against Van Hooser on the basis of his age. However, resolution of that issue must be left for a jury. Once an age-discrimination plaintiff has done as much as Van Hooser, a jury may (but need not) find for him. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 ("[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and . . . `[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required.'" (footnote and citation omitted)). Therefore, the court finds that as the record stands now, there is an inference of pretext and intentional discrimination sufficient to preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of UPS on Van Hooser's ADEA claim.
2. The federal sex discrimination claim
Because the same principles and analytical framework guide the court's consideration of Van Hooser's Title VII claim, the same genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment on Van Hooser's federal age discrimination claim also preclude summary judgment on his Title VII claim.
D. Van Hooser's State Law Claims
Due to Van Hooser's counsel's concession at oral argument that Van Hooser's state law discrimination claims are superfluous given his federal discrimination claims, the court will conduct a concise review of the viability of these claims. UPS argues that Van Hooser's state law claims are preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this [Act], or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). In the seminal decision Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that section 301 not only provides federal courts with jurisdiction over disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, but also authorizes "federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement" of collective-bargaining agreements. Id. at 451. Subsequently, the Court held in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), that section 301 mandates that all courts, whether state or federal, apply federal law to disputes arising from collective-bargaining agreements. Id. at 103-04. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), the Supreme Court held that when the resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the state law claim is preempted and federal labor law applies. Id. at 471. Section 301 does not, however, displace all state law governing the labor-management relationship. Three years after its decision in Luek, the Supreme Court clarified its position and held that a state law claim is preempted by section 301 only when resolution of the state-law claim requires the court to interpret a collective-bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988). Therefore, if the resolution of the state law claim cannot be made without an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is inextricably intertwined with the agreement and thus preempted by § 301. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407-10. However, state law claims that only tangentially involve provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are not preempted by § 301. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-11. Thus, the state law remedy must be "independent" of the collective bargaining agreement in order to avoid section 301 preemption. To be deemed "independent" of the collective bargaining agreement and thus not preempted under § 301, the resolution of the state law claim must turn on purely factual questions not touching upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407-10.
Under Iowa law, "a plaintiff may prove discrimination with direct evidence or by the indirect, burden shifting method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.2d 668 (1973)." Reiss v. ICI Seeds, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996); see Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa 1989). To establish a prima facie case of age or sex discrimination under the Iowa law, Van Hooser would have to prove that he (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) met the applicable job qualifications, and (4) it is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was based on an impermissible consideration, in this case Van Hooser's age or sex. See Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1995); Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1990); see also Iowa Code § 216.6. Here, if Van Hooser were to establish a prima facie case of either age or sex discrimination, UPS would then have the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the allegedly unequal treatment. See Reiss, 548 N.W.2d at 174; Ramirez v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 546 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Then the burden would shift back to Van Hooser to prove that the articulated reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Reiss, 548 N.W.2d at 174; Ramirez, 546 N.W.2d at 632. Van Hooser's discrimination claims turn on questions of assignment and transfers to other UPS centers, all of which are provided for in the CBA. Furthermore, UPS relies on the CBA as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Van Hooser's treatment. When Van Hooser then attempts to show that UPS's stated reason is pretextual, the CBA would have to be interpreted. Thus, the court concludes that the interpretation of the CBA appears inextricably intertwined in the determination of Van Hooser's discrimination claims and therefore these claims are preempted by § 301. Accordingly, the court grants UPS's motion for summary judgment as to Van Hooser's state law discrimination claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court concludes that UPS's motion must be denied as to Van Hooser's federal age and sex discrimination claims. Van Hooser has generated genuine issues of material fact at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis — specifically, that UPS's nondiscriminatory reasons for not transferring Van Hooser back to its Mason City facility are pretextual and that age or sex was a determinative factor in that decision. Therefore, UPS's motion for summary judgment is denied as to Van Hooser's Title VII and ADEA claims. However, the court does conclude that UPS's motion for summary judgment must be granted as to Van Hooser's state law age and sex discrimination claims because those state law claims are preempted by section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.