Opinion
April 1, 1975.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Hill & Hill, Alden T. Hill, Fort Collins, for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant.
Harden & Napheys, P.C., Charles S. Bloom, Fort Collins, for defendant-appellant and cross-appellee.
Page 321
STERNBERG, Judge.
This appeal concerns an order of the district court reducing the amount of alimony previously awarded, and it also raises issues concerning attorney's fees and the effective date of the order of reduction. We find no abuse of discretion, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Following a trial on all issues, a decree of divorce was entered in this case on January 1, 1966. At that time, the court awarded $750 per month alimony to the defendant. On April 23, 1973, based upon an alleged change of circumstances, plaintiff filed a motion to reduce alimony to $300 per month. After a two-day trial, the court denied the motion on July 13, 1973, but following a hearing on a motion for new trial, the court reconsidered and partially granted the motion, ordering a reduction of alimony to $475 per month. This order, however, was not made effective until January 1, 1974. The court also awarded defendant attorney's fees in the amount of $500, rather than the $1,217 requested.
Both parties appeal. Defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing alimony, and also that the court erred in not awarding the full amount of the attorney's fees sought. The plaintiff, on the other hand, urges that the reduction in alimony should have been to $300 per month, that it should have been made effective at a date earlier than January 1, 1974, and that no attorney's fee should have been awarded.
Just as a trial court has broad discretion in regard to an award of alimony, so does it have similar discretion in reference to modification thereof. See Elmer v. Elmer, 163 Colo. 430, 431 P.2d 470. Here, the court found 'that there has been a material change in Dr. Van Der Schouw's ability to maintain his standard of income that existed at the time the original decree was entered,' that his income 'is going down,' and 'that his ability to pay has diminished because of his physical disabilities and circumstances beyond his control.' Since there is evidence in the record to serve as the basis for such findings, the court was justified in reducing the alimony. Similarly, since the plaintiff was still earning sufficient money to enable him to pay the reduced amount of alimony, the trial court's failure to lower it to the $300 figure urged by plaintiff was not error. See Elmer v. Elmer, Supra.
The defendant contests the financial figures upon which plaintiff relied stating that 'in attempting to determine the meaning of the income figures one may finally turn to an accountant for significant announcements.' She then purports to analyze them as might such an accountant, yet neither party presented testimony of such an expert, nor does her argument show that the court erred in its basic conclusions regarding such figures. In 1966, when it awarded alimony of $750 per month, the court found that the plaintiff's net income was approximately $40,000 per year, and the evidence presented at the reduction hearing justified the court in finding that in 1972 and 1973 plaintiff's income was considerably less than that amount. Considering the evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to support the court's order, as we must (Dorsey v. Dorsey, 28 Colo.App. 63, 470 P.2d 581), we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the order.
Both parties appeal the court's award of $500 attorney's fees to defendant. The defendant had presented testimony that the value of the legal services was $1,217, and urges that the court should have awarded that amount, while the plaintiff objects to the award of any attorney's fees.
As stated in Stovall v. Crosby, 171 Colo. 70, 464 P.2d 868:
'The allowance of attorney's fees and suit money is within the second discretion of the trial court, and unless that discretion has been abused, the allowance made or denied will not be disturbed.'
We find no such abuse of discretion here. The defendant had other assets from which she could pay attorney's fees, but these were not liquid in nature. This justified ordering the plaintiff, who had the ability to make such payments, to pay them. On the other hand, the court was not bound to award the $1,217 testified to by the defendant as being reasonable. The court properly considered the plaintiff's ability to pay and its own broad experience in this regard.
The final contention is the plaintiff's argument that the court erred in making its order of reduction effective on January 1, 1974, some five months after the date of the hearing. Choice of the effective date for its order of reduction was clearly and strictly a matter of discretion in the trial court. For the same reasons that we have found the order of a reduction, and the amount thereof, to be within the trial court's discretion, we cannot invade that discretion regarding the time for the order to take effect.
Judgment affirmed.
ENOCH and PIERCE, JJ., concur.