Summary
concluding that totality of circumstances, including defendant "exhibiting excessive nervousness for a routine traffic stop," provided officer "with reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and call the canine unit"
Summary of this case from Oden v. StateOpinion
No. 04-16-00397-CR
05-10-2017
Christopher Sean VALENTINE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 2nd 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas
Trial Court No. 15-1927-CR-A
Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Christopher Valentine appeals his conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver. His sole issue is that the trial court erred by not suppressing evidence obtained during a traffic stop. He contends the detaining officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of his traffic stop by calling and waiting for a canine unit to arrive. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Valentine filed a post-submission letter conceding the other issue he raised in his brief.
BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2013, Valentine was driving eastbound on Interstate 10 from San Antonio toward Houston. Valentine's wife was in the backseat with their infant. Lee Castillo, a State Trooper with the Texas Department of Public Safety, stopped Valentine for driving eighteen miles per hour over the speed limit.
The record is unclear whether the passenger in the backseat was Valentine's wife or girlfriend, and Valentine does not clarify this matter in his brief. For clarity and brevity, we refer to her as Valentine's wife.
Valentine did not have his driver's license, proof of insurance, or proof of ownership of the car. He told Castillo the car was a rental vehicle he borrowed from his cousin. Valentine also told Castillo he was visiting his grandmother in San Antonio, and he was traveling back home to Houston because his mother had recently been diagnosed with cancer. Castillo verified Valentine's identity and that the car had not been reported stolen.
Valentine and his wife gave Castillo conflicting accounts about how they had traveled from Houston to San Antonio and how long they had planned to stay in San Antonio. Castillo observed Valentine was excessively nervous for a routine traffic stop and testified he saw Valentine's wife try to hide or wrap something when she thought he was not looking.
Castillo asked for consent to search the car, but Valentine refused. Castillo testified he then called the Guadalupe County Sheriff's Office and requested the assistance of a canine unit. Deputy Rudy Guerra arrived with his duly certified canine partner, Loorby. After Loorby gave a positive alert, Castillo searched the trunk of Valentine's car and found marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin. Castillo also found a stolen nine millimeter pistol in Valentine's wife's possession.
A grand jury indicted Valentine for knowingly possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Valentine filed a motion to suppress, arguing the State illegally obtained the evidence. The trial court held a hearing on the motion, and Valentine argued "the stop was unlawfully prolonged when the drug dog was called without any sort of reasonable suspicion." Castillo and Guerra testified at the hearing.
The trial court signed an order denying Valentine's motion and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court concluded Castillo did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop because he developed reasonable suspicion that justified further detaining Valentine. The trial court stated in its findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Here the trooper was very experienced in drug detection and was working a known drug corridor. The defendant had no ID and was driving a rental car, which the trooper testified was common among drug couriers. The defendant exhibited excessive nervousness for the situation. The passenger in the back seat made repeated furtive gestures toward her purse. Later her purse was found to contain a stolen 9mm pistol. The defendant and passenger gave different stories about their travels which, taken alone, may not have raised suspicions, but when coupled with the other factors listed created reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop until the drug dog arrived.Valentine appeals, arguing that on these facts, Castillo lacked reasonable suspicion to continue to detain him until the canine unit arrived.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Id. at 328. If a trial court's fact findings are supported by the record or are based on the evaluation of witness credibility and demeanor, we should afford them almost total deference. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). "The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "If the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the evidence supports these factual findings." Id.
REASONABLE SUSPICION
"An officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the 'reasonable suspicion' standard is satisfied." Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Valentine does not contest the fact that Castillo lawfully stopped him for speeding. His sole argument is that Castillo lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the traffic stop to call the canine unit because, as the trial court found, Castillo had completed his investigation into the traffic offense before he called the canine unit. Valentine also does not contend Castillo's subsequent search of his trunk, where Castillo found the drugs, was illegal.
A traffic stop, as an investigatory detention, generally may not exceed the time needed to handle the matter for which the seizure was made. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). However, the Fourth Amendment tolerates unrelated investigations—such as checking the driver's license, checking for outstanding warrants, and inspecting the car's registration and proof of insurance—that do not lengthen the duration of the traffic stop. Id. at 1614-15. An officer may develop reasonable suspicion of a separate offense during a traffic stop that justifies further detaining the driver after the officer completes the investigation of the initial traffic offense. See id. at 1616-17.
In determining whether an officer has developed reasonable suspicion to justify further detaining a driver after the officer completes the investigation for the initial traffic offense, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See Fisher v. State, 481 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref'd). "[C]ircumstances may all seem innocent enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified." Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Circumstances relevant to determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop include conduct associated with drug trafficking, excessive nervousness, furtive gestures, and inconsistencies between the driver's and the passenger's stories regarding their travels. Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Willis v. State, 192 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. ref'd); Haas v. State, 172 S.W.3d 42, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. ref'd); see Martinez v. State, No. 02-13-00610-CR, 2015 WL 392729, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2015, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The trial court found Castillo was experienced in drug detection and knew I-10 is a "known drug corridor." The trial court also found Valentine had no identification and was driving a rental car, which Castillo testified were indicating factors associated with drug couriers. The trial court further found Valentine exhibited excessive nervousness for a routine traffic stop; his wife made furtive gestures; and they gave inconsistent stories about their travel. These findings are supported by Castillo's testimony at the suppression hearing.
Valentine argues there are other, non-criminal explanations for his and his wife's conduct, but "[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the [detaining] officer of the capacity to entertain reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal." See Leming v. State, 493 S.W.3d 552, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Valentine also argues, as he did at the suppression hearing, Castillo testified about facts he omitted from his police report. While inconsistencies between Castillo's testimony at the suppression hearing and his police report might undermine his credibility, we defer to the trial court's evaluation of Castillo's credibility as a witness. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
He argues the record supports an inference that it was cold outside and Valentine appeared excessively nervous because he was cold, and his wife's furtive movements could have been to tend to their infant.
The facts known to Castillo, when combined with rational inferences therefrom, would lead an officer to reasonably suspect Valentine or his wife had engaged in, were engaging in, or would soon be engaging in criminal activity. See Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Castillo had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and call the canine unit. See Willis, 192 S.W.3d at 591 (holding nervousness, rental car traveling known drug corridor, heavy scent of air freshener, and inconsistent stories regarding travel supported reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop); Haas, 172 S.W.3d at 54 (holding excessive nervousness, volunteering of information, and an implausible and inconsistent story about the travel supported reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop). We therefore hold the trial court did not err by denying Valentine's motion to suppress.
See also United States v. Hipolito-Ramirez, 657 Fed. Appx. 271, 273 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding officer had reasonable suspicion to extend duration of stop based on driver's implausible story, his nervousness, and presence on a known trafficking corridor); United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 362 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding extreme nervousness, irreconcilable stories, and travelling along drug corridor supported reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop); Savedra v. State, No. 13-15-00089-CR, 2015 WL 6375876, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding excessive nervousness, lack of eye contact, and inconsistent stories regarding the trip supported reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop); Guy v. State, No. 05-07-00733-CR, 2008 WL 3984051, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (holding driving a loaned rental car along a drug corridor and nervousness supported reasonable suspicion to extend traffic stop).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH