Opinion
HHDCV146053845S
07-20-2018
David VAICUNAS et al. v. Regina R. GAYLORD et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MATTHEW D. GORDON, J.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The present action involves a dispute over two trusts created by Helen Rachel, now deceased. In the original trust, which was executed on March 24, 1999, Ms. Rachel left one of four parcels of land located in Windsor Locks, Connecticut to her nephew, plaintiff David Vaicunas. Ms. Rachel left the other three parcels to her other nephew, plaintiff Joseph Kobos. On February 11, 2010, Ms. Rachel amended the original trust by leaving the contested parcels to the defendants. The amended trust made no provision for either plaintiff. The plaintiffs filed a multi-count complaint against the defendants claiming, among other things, that Ms. Rachel was subjected to undue influence when she amended her trust.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Probate Court had previously addressed the issue of undue influence when Vaicunas filed an application for conservatorship regarding Ms. Rachel in December of 2009. The defendants argue that any challenges to the revocation of the first trust and the creation of the second trust in 2010 are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Vaicunas raised the issue of undue influence in his conservatorship application, and because the Probate Court ultimately determined that Vaicunas failed to put forth sufficient evidence to support the creation and imposition of a conservatorship. The defendants also rely heavily on the fact that the plaintiffs appealed the Probate Court’s decision to the Superior Court and that in upholding the Probate Court’s decision, the court, Rittenband, J., stated the following: "Judge Purnell clearly relied on the opinion of the only medical professional to testify, Dr. Richard Cagna who stated inter alia : ‘Based on my professional medical opinion, Helen Rachel is competent and without need of conservatorship.’ He also testified that Helen Rachel had not been subject to undue influence. This alone is sufficient justification for Judge Purnell’s decision." The defendants contend that because the issue of undue influence was addressed by both the Probate Court and the Superior Court on appeal, Vaicunas is barred from litigating that issue in the present proceedings.
II. DISCUSSION
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "[S]ince litigants ordinarily have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury ... the moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard ... of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 535, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).
i. Whether Res Judicata Bars the Plaintiffs’ Undue Influence Claim
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs are estopped from asserting a claim for undue influence against them because the Probate Court has already determined that no undue influence was present. The issue of whether res judicata operates to bar a claim asserting undue influence in connection with a trust that was created by the respondent to a conservatorship application where undue influence was alleged is one of first impression. Neither party has provided the court with a fact pattern similar to the one currently before the court, and the court has been unable to find one. This court is of the view that res judicata does not apply because the issues in the two proceedings were not identical. "The doctrine of res judicata provides that a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action [between the same parties] on the same claim ... To determine whether two claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we compare the pleadings and judgment in the first action with the complaint in the subsequent action ... This court has previously distilled the following essential elements of res judicata from our case law: (1) the initial judgment was rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the identities of the parties to the actions are the same, (3) the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter fully and (4) the same claim, demand or cause of action is at issue." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barton v. Norwalk, 131 Conn.App. 719, 726-27, 27 A.3d 513, cert. denied, 303 Conn. 906, 31 A.3d 1181 (2011).
In the present case, the issue in the Probate Court proceeding was whether Ms. Rachel’s interests were being adequately protected and whether a conservatorship was warranted. The issue presently before the court, however, is whether the defendant Gaylord exercised undue influence over Ms. Rachel in connection with the creation of the second trust. The Probate Court never addressed that issue specifically, and the parties therefore did not have an adequate opportunity to fully litigate the issue of undue influence. Because the issues and claims in the two proceedings are different, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
The defendants also seek to bar Kobos from asserting a claim of undue influence. Even though Kobos was not a party to the underlying Probate Court proceedings, the defendants argue that his claims are also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because his interests are "in privity" with those of Vaicunas. "[C]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is that aspect of res judicata that prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim ... An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined ... An issue is necessarily determined if, in the absence of a determination of the issue, the judgment could not have been validly rendered." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Efthimiou v. Smith, 268 Conn. 499, 506-07, 846 A.2d 222 (2004). The court concludes that the Probate Court did not in fact determine the issue of whether Ms. Rachel was subject to undue influence. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to prevent Kobos from bringing his claim.
ii. Whether the Defendants are Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Plaintiffs’ Undue Influence Claim
Having determined that the plaintiffs are not barred from bring their undue influence claim against the defendants, the court must examine whether the defendants have established the absence of any genuine issues of material fact that undue influence was not present and that they are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over a person, whose acts are brought into question, in an attempt to destroy his [or her] free agency and constrain him [or her] to do something other than he [or she] would do under normal control ... It is stated generally that there are four elements of undue influence: (1) a person who is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence ... Relevant factors include age and physical and mental condition of the one alleged to have been influenced, whether he [or she] had independent or disinterested advice in the transaction ... his [or her] predisposition to make the transfer in question ... active solicitations and persuasions by the other party, and the relationship of the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tyler v. Tyler, 151 Conn.App. 98, 105-06, 93 A.3d 1179 (2014). "[T]he elements of undue influence are typically questions for the jury." Id., 107.
In the present case, the plaintiffs submitted several pieces of evidence in support of their opposition to the defendants’ motion. According to Vaicunas’ deposition testimony, Ms. Rachel had been susceptible to undue influence in the past because she was easy to persuade. Moreover, before Ms. Rachel amended her original trust, she suffered a stroke that impacted her ability to verbally communicate, and Vaicunas has attested that the defendants began integrating themselves into her life after her stroke. This testimony demonstrates that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants exerted undue influence over Ms. Rachel in connection with the amendment of her original trust. As a result, the defendants have not met their burden of proving that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim for undue influence.
iii. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Count two of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges a breach of fiduciary duty claim against defendant Gaylord. "[A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other ... The superior position of the fiduciary or dominant party affords him great opportunity for abuse of the confidence reposed in him ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. D’Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 455, 844 A.2d 836 (2004). The burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove fair dealing "when the confidential relationship is shown together with suspicious circumstances, or where there is a transaction, contract, or transfer between persons in a confidential or fiduciary relationship, and where the dominant party is the beneficiary of the transaction, contract, or transfer ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 456-57. Here, there is evidence that Gaylord may have had a relationship with Ms. Rachel involving a degree of trust and confidence between them, and that the changes Ms. Rachel made to the original trust benefitted the defendants. Consequently, there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Gaylord breached her fiduciary duty to Ms. Rachel. Defendant Gaylord, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment on count two against her.
iv. Tortious Interference with an Expectancy of Inheritance Claim
The defendants also seek summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance. To have a viable cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance, a plaintiff must prove: "(1) the existence of an expected inheritance; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the expectancy; (3) tortious conduct by the defendant; and (4) actual damages to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s tortious conduct." Hart v. Hart, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV-146007918-S (May 11, 2015, Calmar, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 399, 406). In the present case, the plaintiffs expected to inherit real property under the original trust, and there is evidence to suggest that the defendants may have known of such expectancy and tortiously interfered with it by exerting undue influence over Ms. Rachel, resulting in damages to the plaintiffs. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs’ expectancy of inheritance. Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on this count.
v. Adverse Possession Claim
The defendants also move for summary judgment in connection with the adverse possession claim asserted by Vaicunas regarding the parcel of land that Ms. Rachel gave to him in the original trust. "Where title is claimed by adverse possession, the burden of proof is on the claimant ... The essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner ... The use is not exclusive if the adverse user merely shares dominion over the property with other users ... In the final analysis, whether possession is adverse is a question of fact for the trier ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Norwalk, 170 Conn.App. 1, 17-18, 153 A.3d 669 (2016). The court is of the view that summary judgment is inappropriate as to the adverse possession claim because there are numerous genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff’s use of the disputed property, including whether the plaintiff’s use of the property was exclusive.
III. CONCLUSION
The defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to all of the claims against them and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to all counts.