Opinion
Argued February 1, 2000
September 25, 2000.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, etc., the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Polizzi, J.), dated December 10, 1998, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Yonkers Contracting Company which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended verified complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Schneider, Kleinick, Weitz, Damashek Shoot, New York, N Y (Brian J. Shoot, Diane Welch Bando, James M. Lane, and Dan Johnston of counsel), for appellant.
Vincent D. McNamara, East Norwich, N.Y. (James P. Haggerty of counsel), for respondent.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, LEO F. McGINITY, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion is denied.
On December 30, 1992, the plaintiff's decedent, Rafael Iskhakov, was struck and killed by a motor vehicle as he crossed Van Dam Street at its intersection with Bradley Avenue in Queens. The plaintiff alleges that the accident occurred due to a malfunctioning temporary traffic light at this intersection. The defendant Yonkers Contracting Company (hereinafter Yonkers) was retained by the New York State Department of Transportation (hereinafter the DOT) for a roadway rehabilitation project. As part of the project, Yonkers was to install a temporary traffic light at this intersection.
Yonkers moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the contract with the DOT imposed no duty to the plaintiff's decedent. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and we reverse.
The duties imposed upon Yonkers under its contract with the DOT were comprehensive and included all responsibility for the temporary traffic signals installed at the site as well as the responsibility to "[p]rovide adequate protection for pedestrian traffic during all phases of construction ". Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Yonkers's responsibilities were not only for compliance with the contractual undertakings, but also for the broader purpose of ensuring the safety of the public (see, Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579). The reasonable expectation of pedestrians that the temporary traffic signal would be maintained so as to permit safe passage is consonant with the expectation of Yonkers regarding its duty under the contract (see, Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., supra).
In my opinion the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to Yonkers Contracting Company (hereinafter Yonkers) dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. It is well settled that a defendant may be held liable in negligence only when it breaches a duty owed to the plaintiff (see, Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399). Thus, a duty of reasonable care owed by a tortfeasor to an injured party is elemental to any recovery in negligence (see, Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 584, citing Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 187; Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437; Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781).
As noted by the majority, the plaintiff alleges that the accident in which the plaintiff's decedent was fatally injured occurred as a result of an alleged malfunctioning temporary traffic light signal located at an intersection which was being reconstructed. However, although Yonkers was responsible for the installation of the traffic light in accordance with its contract with the State, it did not owe any duty to the decedent, a member of the general public (see, Daddio v. American Golf Corp., 238 A.D.2d 301; Pizzaro v. City of New York, 188 A.D.2d 591; Francois v. New York City, 161 A.D.2d 319). Nor was such a duty created solely because the contract stated that Yonkers was to "[p]rovide adequate protection for pedestrian traffic during all phases of construction". The functions to be performed by Yonkers in connection with the roadway rehabilitation involved contractual duties owed directly to the State, and only indirectly benefited an unlimited universe of persons — i.e., the general public, be they pedestrians or motorists. Here, the plaintiff's decedent was a member of the general public and not part of a known and identifiable group to whom a duty of care was owed (see, Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., supra, at 589).
Accordingly, I vote to affirm the order insofar as appealed from.