Opinion
No. CV06 5003257
April 15, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR CONTEMPT
In the original lawsuit between the parties, the plaintiff Utzler sought damages against the defendants, John A. Braca, Jr., his wife, Patricia Braca and John A. Braca, Jr's alter ego entities, Homes of Westport, LLC, Homes of Fairfield, LLC and the Braca Family Trust, LLC, for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, statutory theft and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"). On April 25, 2008, the court (Tyma, J.) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff as against John A. Braca, Jr. for fraud, intentional misrepresentation, violation of CUTPA, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. The court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $500,000 plus $140,000 in punitive damages and attorneys fees. Utzler v. Braca, 115 Conn.App. 261, 271-72, 972 A.2d 743, 752 (2009). Braca appealed the trial court's decision and a subsequent postjudgment decision by the court (Cocco, J.T.R.), allowing the plaintiff's attachment to remain on the assets of Braca's alter ego, Homes of Westport, LLC, while Braca's appeal was pending. Subsequently, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and the postjudgment decision of Cocco, J., and affirming that the various business entities were the alter egos of Braca, Jr. Utzler v. Braca, supra, 115 Conn.App. 264.
On July 29, 2009, Utzler obtained a property execution against Braca, Jr. d/b/a Homes of Westport. The execution was delivered to state marshal Foldy, who was directed to seize several items in Braca, Jr.'s name or Homes of Westport, including a 1970 Chevrolet Corvette automobile bearing VIN number 194370S401258. The Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicle's records listed the Corvette as being registered to Braca, Jr., with the registration lapsing in May 2008. There was no records that the vehicle ownership had been transferred and there was no records of any liens on the subject automobile. Marshal Fold visited Braca, Jr.'s residence at 7 Crossbow Lane, Easton, Connecticut, in an attempt to levy on the Corvette. Fold inspected the garage at the premises and viewed what appeared to be a Corvette vehicle parked in the garage, covered by a tarpaulin. Fold made several attempts to seize the vehicle in the garage, but was unable to gain access to the residence.
On September 11, 2009, the plaintiff Utzler applied for and obtained a turnover order for the 1970 Chevrolet Corvette. The order contained a notice to Braca, Jr., that failure to comply with said order may subject Braca, Jr. to being held in contempt by the court. On September 11, 2009, state marshal Sastram served Braca, Jr. with the turnover order and made a demand for the subject Corvette. Braca, Jr. claimed that his son, John A. Braca, III owned the vehicle and it was no longer at Braca's residence in Easton, Connecticut. Braca, Jr. claimed, therefore, that he was not obligated to turn over the vehicle to the state marshal and nor could he do so.
On September 14, 2009, the plaintiff filed an application for an Order to Show Cause, as to why Braca, Jr., should not be held in contempt for his failure to turn over the Corvette automobile. Evidentiary hearings, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-400b, were held on September 29, 2009, November 16, 2009 and November 17, 2009. Thereafter, the plaintiff and defendant each filed a memorandum of law.
I Facts
The defendant Braca, Jr. purchased the subject Chevrolet Corvette automobile in 1972 and titled and registered the car with the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicle. Braca, Jr. testified that he gave the certificate of title for the auto to his son Braca, III on July 8, 1998. However Braca, Jr. testified that he did not sign the title over to his son until September 29, 2003. However this testimony was contradicted by Braca, Jr., himself in sworn testimony that occurred on September 26, 2006, in court proceedings conducted pursuant to General Statutes § 52-278n, which were held after the plaintiff secured a prejudgment remedy. At that hearing Braca, Jr., while under oath, testified that he "signed" the certificate of title to the Corvette to his son Braca, III on July 7, 1998.
Despite Braca, Jr.'s claim that he signed the title over to his son on July 8, 1998 or September 29, 2003, Braca, Jr. never delivered possession of the vehicle to his son, Braca, III. Braca, Jr. retained possession of the Corvette vehicle at his residence in Easton, Connecticut. Despite Braca, Jr.'s testimony that he signed the title over to his son, Braca, III, never applied for a title or registration in Connecticut or any state where he was attending school until September 17, 2009.
In an effort to secure a construction loan, Braca, Jr. listed the Corvette automobile as a personal asset in a letter to The Ridgefield Bank dated August 23, 2003. Braca, Jr. made no mention in the letter to the bank that he had given the title to the vehicle to his son, Braca, III, or that he had pledged the vehicle as collateral for a loan secured from his wife, Patricia Braca, as he would have the court believe. Braca, Jr., in fact, renewed the registration for the vehicle in his own name on a continuous basis from 1998 through May 2006, and continued to drive the vehicle. Braca, Jr. never returned any license plates or the registration to the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, and never advised the Department of Motor Vehicles of any transfer of title to his son, Braca, III. In May 2006, the defendant, Braca, Jr. re-registered and insured the vehicle in his own name. He also paid the property tax due on the vehicle to the Town of Easton.
In June 2006, the plaintiff, Utzler, commenced the underlying lawsuit. On April 25, 2008, Judge Tyma entered the judgment in favor of Utzler, as against Braca for fraud in the amount of $500,000 compensatory damages and $140,000 punitive damages. In May 2008, following the judgment Braca, Jr. did not renew the registration for the Corvette, causing the registration to lapse. Braca, however, did pay the property taxes due to the Town of Easton in November 2008 for taxes on the 2007 Grand List. On June 23, 2009, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment against Braca, Jr. See Utzler v. Braca, supra, 115 Conn.App. 261. On July 29, 2009, the plaintiff obtained a property execution against Braca, Jr. During the week of September 7, 2009, state marshal Fold visited Braca, Jr.'s residence and viewed what he believed was the subject Corvette vehicle covered by a tarp in Braca, Jr.'s garage. Several days later Fold conversed with Braca, Jr. and Braca, Jr. admitted that the vehicle had been stored at his house, but was no longer there, as he had given it to his son.
On September 11, 2009, State Marshal Sastram served the court-issued turnover order on Braca, Jr. Braca, Jr. refused to turn over the vehicle to the state marshal, claiming that his son Braca, III owned the vehicle and it was no longer stored or garaged at Braca, Jr.'s Easton, Connecticut residence. He later repeated this same claim to state marshal Fold on the same date, September 11, 2009. Braca, Jr., testified that the Corvette was last at his Easton residence in early May 2009, and that the covered vehicle seen by the state marshal in his garage was a different vehicle and not the subject Corvette. Braca, Jr. testified that he did not know who removed the Corvette from his residence in early May 2009, and did not know the location of the vehicle. He also testified that he did not know who had possession of the vehicle on September 11, 2009 and did not know who had possession of the vehicle as of the date of the court hearing on November 17, 2009. The court finds that the testimony of John A. Braca, Jr., under oath, before this court on the various hearing dates is totally lacking and replete with contradictions.
The original Chevrolet Corvette Certificate of Title for Connecticut, which was obtained from the Department of Motor Vehicles for the State of Illinois, bears the date of September 23, 2009. John A. Braca, III is listed as residing in Easton, Connecticut. Following Braca, III's September 17, 2009, application for a Certificate of Title from the State of Illinois, Illinois did issue a Certificate of Title for the vehicle to Braca, III on September 29, 2009. The defendant Braca, Jr., meanwhile, never returned any license plates or the registration to the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles, and never advised the Department of Motor Vehicle advising it of any transfer of title to his son, Braca, III. By letter, dated October 6, 2009, Braca, Jr. advised the Easton Tax Collector that the 1970 Corvette was no longer owned by him. He requested that the Easton Tax Collector remove the vehicle from the town's Grand List. Enclosed with this letter to the Tax Collector was a copy of the Illinois Certificate of Title issued to Braca, III on September 29, 2009.
II Standard of Law
"The interests of orderly government demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by courts possessed of jurisdiction [over] persons and subject matter. One who defies the public authority and willfully refuses his obedience, does so at his peril. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed.2d 884 (1947). [A]n order issued by a court with jurisdiction . . . must be obeyed by the parties . . ."(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocque v. Design Land Developers of Milford, Inc., 82 Conn.App. 361, 366, 844 A.2d 882 (2004).
"Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense." (Citations omitted) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edmond v. Foisey, 111 Conn.App. 760, 769, 961 A.2d 441 (2008). "In order to constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful. The contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court . . . One cannot be placed in contempt for failure to read the court's mind." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 529, 710 A.2d 757 (1998). "Contempts of court may also be classified as either direct or indirect, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 197 Conn. 141, 150, 496 A.2d 476 (1985). The plaintiff alleged in his motion that the contemptuous behavior was the failure of the defendant to comply with the court's orders to turn over the Chevrolet Corvette to the plaintiff. "As this occurred outside of the court's presence, it is properly classified as indirect contempt." Edmond v. Foisey, supra, 111 Conn.App. 769; see also, e.g., Duve v. Duve, 25 Conn.App. 262, 269, 594 A.2d 473, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 911, 597 A.2d 332 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114, 112 S.Ct. 1224, 117 L.Ed.2d 460 (1992).
Criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court, while civil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party. Board of Education v. Shelton Education Assn., 173 Conn. 81, 85, 376 A.2d 1080 (1977). "A contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public . . . Sanctions for civil contempt may be either a fine or imprisonment; the fine may be remedial or it may be the means of coercing compliance with the court's order and compensating the complainant for losses sustained." Id.; see also DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 278, 471 A.2d 638 (1984). As the purpose of the sanctions in the present case was to compensate the plaintiff, the court concludes that the contempt in the present case is properly classified as civil, rather than criminal. Edmond v. Foisey, supra, 111 Conn.App. 769-70; see, also, e.g., Ullmann v. State, 230 Conn. 698, 709, 647 A.2d 324 (1994) ("it is the nature of the relief itself that is instructive in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal").
Practice Book Sec. 23-20 titled "Review of Civil Contempt" reads as follows:
CT Page 8970
"No person shall continue to be detained in a correctional facility pursuant to an order of civil contempt for longer than thirty days, unless at the expiration of such thirty days such person is presented to the judicial authority. On each such presentment, the contemnor shall be given an opportunity to purge himself or herself of the contempt by compliance with the order of the judicial authority. If the contemnor does not so act, the judicial authority may direct that the contemnor remain in custody under the terms of the order of the judicial authority then in effect, or may modify the order if the interests of justice so dictate."
"A finding of indirect civil contempt must be established by sufficient proof that is premised on competent evidence presented to the trial court and based on sworn testimony . . . A trial-like hearing should be held if issues of fact are disputed . . . Due process of law requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or explanation . . . Because the inability of [a party] to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to a charge of contempt . . . the [party] had the right to demonstrate that his failure to comply with the order of the court was excusable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Edmond v. Foisey, supra, 111 Conn.App. 770. "[T]he inability of a party to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt . . . The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do so." Id., 772; Keeney v. Buccino, 92 Conn.App. 496, 513-14, 885 A.2d 1239 (2005); National Loan Investors, L.P. v. World Properties, LLC, 79 Conn.App. 725, 738 n. 13, 830 A.2d 1178 (2003), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 910, 840 A.2d 1173 (2004); Berglass v. Berglass, 71 Conn.App. 771, 777, 804 A.2d 889 (2002).
"[S]anctions for civil contempt may be either a fine or imprisonment; the fine may be remedial or it may be the means of coercing compliance with the court's orders and compensating the complainant for losses sustained . . . In civil contempt the [punishment] must be conditional and coercive and may not be absolute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468, 482, 464 A.2d 837 (1983). "When a fine is compensatory, the contemnor need not be offered the opportunity to purge herself of the contemptuous behavior." Edmond v. Foisey, supra, 111 Conn.App. 773. "Punitive sanctions are not permissible for civil contempt." Id., 775.
Practice Book § 1-21A provides as follows:
"The violation of any court order qualifies for criminal contempt sanctions. Where, however, the dispute is between private litigants and the purpose for judicial intervention is remedial, then the contempt is civil, and any sanctions imposed by the judicial authority shall be coercive and non-punitive, including fines, to ensure compliance and compensate the complainant for losses. Where the violation of a court order renders the order unenforceable, the judicial authority should consider referral for non-summary criminal contempt proceedings in relevant part:"
III Discussion
The court finds that the testimony of John A. Braca, Jr., under oath, before this court on the various hearing dates, totally lacks any credibility and is replete with contradictions. Braca, Jr. testified that he did not know who removed the Corvette from his residence in early May 2009, and did not know the location of the vehicle. He also testified that he did not know who had possession of the vehicle on September 11, 2009 and did not know who had possession of the vehicle as of the date of the court hearing on November 17, 2009. He states that his son was the owner of the vehicle when the state marshal appeared at his residence on September 11, 2009. Despite this lack of alleged lack of knowledge as to who removed the vehicle or who had possession of the vehicle Braca, Jr. never reported the vehicle as missing or stolen, and never testified as to whether he inquired of his son as to the location of the vehicle.
Braca, Jr. contends that the plaintiff's argument that ownership is not transferred unless the title is conveyed and the vehicle is registered is erroneous. The defendant argues that General Statutes § 14-1(64) states, "Owner means any person holding title to a motor vehicle, or having the legal right to register same, including purchasers under a conditional bill of sale." The defendant Braca, Jr. interprets this to mean that since Braca, III had physical possession of the Certificate of Title document to the Corvette since September 23, 2003, and was able to register the vehicle at any lime, Braca, III was the owner. The court rejects this line of reasoning because there was no credible evidence that Braca, III held title legally or physically to the Corvette at any time prior to the state marshal's service of the Turn Over order on Braca, Jr., on September 11, 2009. The court received no testimony from Braca, III, the defendant's son, as to his ownership or physical possession of the vehicle and the Connecticut Certificate of Title. The court rejects Braca, Jr.'s testimony that he delivered possession of the Connecticut Certificate of Title to his son in September 2003. The court finds that exclusive possession of the vehicle, title to the vehicle and ownership of the vehicle at all times prior to September 11, 2009 remained in, and with, the defendant John Braca, Jr. The court also finds that ownership of the vehicle, if not actual possession, remained in John Braca, Jr. on September 11, 2009, and that Jon Braca, Jr. maintained control over the movements of the vehicle.
General Statutes § 14-1(64) defines owner as:
(64) "Owner" means any person holding title to a motor vehicle, or having the legal right to register the same, including purchasers under conditional bills of sale; . . .
The court additionally finds that the alleged conveyance of the vehicle from Braca, Jr. to Braca, III did not comport with either Connecticut or Illinois motor vehicle laws. See. Barron v. Benton Auto Body, Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, No. CV97-0573293-S (Dec. 21, 2000, Rubinow, J.); Bull v. Sullivan, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville No. CV 07 5001414 (Sep. 19, 2007, Sferrazza, J.). Thus, there was no valid, perfected transfer of title. Braca, Jr. had the ability as the record owner to turn the vehicle over to the state marshal on September 11, 2009 pursuant to the court's Turnover Order. Regardless of whether Braca, Jr. signed the title over to Braca, III on or before September 2003, as Braca, Jr. would have the court believe, there is no evidence and no public record of any such transfer or compliance with statutory requirements to perfect a valid transfer of title in Connecticut. The plaintiff as a third-party creditor had a right to rely on the Department of Motor Vehicle records to avoid undocumented transfers such as the one alleged by Braca, Jr. This was a scheme devised by Braca, Jr. to thwart the plaintiff's attempt to seize the Corvette and to apply the proceeds of its sale to the debt owed by Braca, Jr. to the plaintiff as a result of the underlying judgment.
The court has reviewed the following Connecticut and Illinois statutes in reaching its decision: Connecticut General Statutes § 14-12; § 14-16; § 14-179(a)(b)(c)(d)(e); Illinois, 625 ILCS 5/3-112 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-112); 625 ILCS 5/3-113 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-113); 625 ILCS 5/3-115 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-115). Copies of the Connecticut and Illinois statutes relied upon are shown in Appendix A and B.
"The inability of a party to obey an order of the court, without fault on his part, is a good defense to the charge of contempt." Mallory v. Mallory, 207 Conn. 48, 57, 539 A.2d 995 (1988). "The contemnor must establish that he cannot comply, or was unable to do so." Bunche v. Bunche, 36 Conn.App. 322, 325, 650 A.2d 917 (1994), citing Zivic v. Zivic, 26 Conn.App. 5, 10, 596 A.2d 475 (1991). This is not a case in which the defendant did not have the ability to comply. Rather, he chose not to. "It is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that for a complainant to show that he is entitled to the benefit of equity he must establish that he comes into court with `clean hands' . . . The clean hands doctrine is applied not for the protection of the parties but for the protection of the court . . . It is applied not by way of punishment but on considerations that make for the advancement of right and justice." (Citations omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, supra, 244 Conn. 53 quoting, Pappas v. Pappas, 164 Conn. 242, 245-46, 320 A.2d 809 (1973).
IV Conclusion and Orders
On September 11, 2009, the defendant, John Braca, Jr. was the record owner of the subject Chevrolet Corvette automobile and, thus, was subject to the Turn Over order issued by the court. Said Turn Over order was clear in its directive to Braca, Jr. to transfer the Corvette to the state marshal. By his repeated refusal to turn over this vehicle to the state marshal, John Braca, Jr. has placed himself in contempt of the court's order, and the court hereby finds that he is in contempt of the court's order. The defendant, John A. Braca, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the subject Chevrolet Corvette automobile to the state marshal in the condition it was in on September 11, 2009 within thirty days of today's date. It is furthered ordered that the vehicle be auctioned and that the proceeds after all costs of sale and state marshal fees be paid to the plaintiff in partial satisfaction of the judgment owed to him by the defendant, said judgment having been entered on April 25, 2008 by the court (Tyma, J.).
APPENDIX A. Connecticut General Statutes
Connecticut General Statutes § 14-12 regarding motor vehicle registrations reads in relevant part:
(a) No motor vehicle shall be operated or towed on any highway, except as otherwise expressly provided, unless it is registered with the commissioner . . . and provided any motor vehicle which is validly registered in another state may, for a period of sixty days following establishment by the owner of residence in this state, be operated on any highway without first being registered with the commissioner.
(b) To obtain a motor vehicle registration, except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the owner shall file in the office of the commissioner an application signed by him and containing such information and proof of ownership as the commissioner may require. The application shall be made on blanks furnished by the commissioner. The blanks shall be in such form and contain such provisions and information as the commissioner may determine.
(d) A motor vehicle registration certificate issued upon an application containing any material false statement is void from the date of its issue and shall be surrendered, upon demand, with any number plate or plates, to the commissioner. Any money paid for the registration certificate shall be forfeited to the state. No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain any registration for another by misrepresentation or impersonation and any registration so obtained shall be void. The commissioner may require each applicant for a motor vehicle registration to furnish personal identification satisfactory to the commissioner and may require any applicant who has established residence in this state for more than thirty days to obtain a motor vehicle operator's license, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of section 14-36, or an identification card issued pursuant to section 1-1h . . .
Connecticut General Statutes § 14-16 regarding the transfer of ownership reads in relevant part:
(a) A motor vehicle registration expires upon transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle. The person in whose name the motor vehicle is registered shall return to the commissioner, within twenty-four hours of the motor vehicle's transfer, the certificate of registration, the number plate or plates issued for the vehicle together with a written notice, subject to the penalties of false statement, containing the date that ownership of the vehicle was transferred and the name, residence and post-office address of the owner. The following statement shall appear directly above the space provided for the signature of the person filing the form: I declare under the penalties of false statement that this notice has been examined by me and to the best of my knowledge and belief is complete, and the statements made herein are true and correct.
(e) A person who transfers ownership of a registered motor vehicle to another may have registered in his name, upon the filing of a new application and the payment of the fee required by subsection (I) of section 14-49, another motor vehicle for the remainder of the registration period if the gross weight of the other motor vehicle is the same or less than that of the transferred motor vehicle and the registration of the transferred motor vehicle has been surrendered.
(f) Any person may transfer an unexpired registration of a motor vehicle such person owns or leases for a period of one year or more, to another motor vehicle owned or so leased by such person upon payment of the fee required by subsection (i) of section 14-49. Any person transferring such a leased motor vehicle shall provide the commissioner with evidence that the lessor has granted permission for such transfer. If a transfer is made to a motor vehicle of greater gross weight or from one class of registration to another, credit shall be given toward the new registration in accordance with schedules established by the commissioner. The commissioner may adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, to implement the provisions of this subsection.
(g) Any person who sells any motor vehicle, other than a new motor vehicle, for which a certificate of title has not been issued and which is not registered under the provisions of subsections (e) or (g) of section 14-12, shall, within forty-eight hours of the sale, certify under oath to the commissioner, on blanks provided by him, such information as the commissioner may require. Until the commissioner receives the certification under oath required by this subsection, he shall not issue a registration other than for a new motor vehicle and shall not renew a registration other than for the same owner.
(h) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to the penalty provided for false statement. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (g) of this section shall, for a first offense, be deemed to have committed an infraction, and, for a subsequent offense, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both.
Connecticut General Statutes § 14-179 regarding the transfer of interest in vehicle reads in relevant part, as follows:
(a) If an owner transfers his interest in a vehicle, other than by the creation of a security interest, he shall, at the time of delivery of the vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee, showing the name and address of the transferee, in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the commissioner prescribes, and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the transferee or to the commissioner, provided no person, firm, corporation or business shall transfer any salvaged motor vehicle or any part of such vehicle unless such transferor has possession of the certificate of title or salvage vehicle certificate at the time of such transfer. The top of the certificate shall contain the following words in block letters,
NO SELLER SHALL ASSIGN TITLE OF A VEHICLE WITHOUT INSERTING THE BUYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS ON THE ASSIGNMENT AND WARRANTY OF TITLE.
(b) Upon request of the owner or transferee, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall, unless the transfer was a breach of his security agreement, either deliver the certificate to the transferee for delivery to the commissioner or, upon receipt from the transferee of the owner's assignment, the transferee's application for a new certificate and the required fee, mail or deliver them to the commissioner. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the lienholder under his security agreement.
(c) If a security interest is reserved or created at the time of the transfer, the certificate of title shall be retained by or delivered to the person who becomes the lienholder, and the parties shall comply with the provisions of section 14-186.
(d) Except as provided in section 14-180 and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this section and section 14-182 have been complied with; however, an owner who has delivered possession of the vehicle of the transferee and has complied with the provisions of this section and section 14-182 requiring action by him is not liable as owner for any damages thereafter resulting from operation of the vehicle.
(e) If a certificate of title issued by the commissioner identifies two or more persons as joint owners of a motor vehicle, any such person may, unless otherwise precluded by law, effect a transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle to such person individually, or to any other person or persons, in the manner provided by subsection (a) of this section. The commissioner may presume that a person is a joint owner empowered to transfer ownership of such motor vehicle if the person's name appears on the certificates of title and registration.
APPENDIX B. State of Illinois Statutes
625 ILCS 5/3-112 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-112)
Sec. 3-112. Transfer.
(a) If an owner transfers his interest in a vehicle, other than by the creation of a security interest, at the time of the delivery of the vehicle he shall execute to the transferee an assignment and warranty of title in the space provided on the certificate of title, or as the Secretary of State prescribes, and cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered to the transferee or to the Secretary of State . . .
(b) Except as provided in Section 3-113, the transferee shall, promptly and within 20 days after delivery to him of the vehicle and the assigned title, execute the application for a new certificate of title in the space provided therefor on the certificate or as the Secretary of State prescribes, and cause the certificate and application to be mailed or delivered to the Secretary of State.
(c) Upon request of the owner or transferee, a lienholder in possession of the certificate of title shall, unless the transfer was a breach of his security agreement, either deliver the certificate to the transferee for delivery to the Secretary of State or, upon receipt from the transferee of the owner's assignment, the transferee's application for a new certificate and the required fee, mail or deliver them to the Secretary of State. The delivery of the certificate does not affect the rights of the lienholder under his security agreement.
(d) if a security interest is reserved or created at the time of the transfer, the certificate of title shall be retained by or delivered to the person who becomes the lienholder, and the parties shall comply with the provisions of Section 3-203.
(e) Except as provided in Section 3-113 and as between the parties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of this Section and Section 3-115 have been complied with; however, an owner who has delivered possession of the vehicle to the transferee and has complied with the provisions of this Section and Section 3-115 requiring action by him as not liable as owner for any damages thereafter resulting from operation of the vehicle . . .625 ILCS 5/3-113 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-113)
Sec. 3-113. Transfer to or from dealer; records.
(a) After a dealer buys a vehicle and holds it for resale, the dealer must procure the certificate of title from the owner or the lienholder. The dealer may hold the certificate until he or she transfers the vehicle to another person. Upon transferring the vehicle to another person, the dealer shall promptly and within 20 days execute the assignment and warranty of title by a dealer, showing the names and addresses of the transferee and of any lienholder holding a security interest created or reserved at the time of the resale, in the spaces provided therefor on the certificate or as the Secretary of State prescribes, and mail or deliver the certificate to the Secretary of State with the transferee's application for a new certificate, except as provided in Section 3-117.2. A dealer has complied with this Section if the date of the mailing of the certificate, as indicated by the postmark, is within 20 days of the date on which the vehicle was transferred to another person.
(b) The Secretary of State may decline to process any application for a transfer of an interest in a vehicle if any fees or taxes due under this Code from the transferor or the transferee have not been paid upon reasonable notice and demand.
(c) Any person who violates this Section shall be guilty of a petty offense.
625 IILCS 5/3-115 (from Ch. 95 1/2, par. 3-115)
Sec. 3-115. Fees — Registration cards — License plates. (a) An application for a certificate of title shall be accompanied by an application for, or a transfer of, registration of the vehicle.
(b) An application for the naming of a lienholder or his assignee on a certificate of title shall be accompanied by the required fee when mailed or delivered to the Secretary of State.
(c) A transferor of a vehicle, other than a dealer transferring a new vehicle, shall deliver to the transferee at the time of the delivery of possession of the vehicle the properly assigned certificate of title of this vehicle.
(d) All applications shall be accompanied with the required fee or tax.