Opinion
TH 02-19-CR-01 T/L
August 15, 2002
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This Entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication of the Entry or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
Defendant, Michael Brown, filed this Motion to Dismiss based on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Commerce Clause. The Government opposes the Motion. For the foregoing reasons, this court now DENIES Defendant's Motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In January 2002, a search was performed of Brown's residence in Hymera, Indiana. A fully automatic assault rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, a pistol-grip shotgun, and other weapons were found. A thirty-eight pistol was retrieved from a woman who claimed that Brown gave it to her as a Christmas gift. Brown was then charged with two counts: one for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which prohibits making false written statements in connection with the sale of firearms, and one for possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Section 922(g)(9) prohibits those who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing any firearm or ammunition.
Nine years earlier, on June 7, 1993, Brown pled guilty to battery as a Class A misdemeanor, for which he served thirty days in jail. During his sentencing hearing, Brown testified that he was living with Sheila Griffin and her son Tyler and that on January 4, 1993, Tyler was in his care. Brown was drinking whiskey and spanked Tyler too hard, resulting in bruising on Tyler's rear end.
II. Discussion
Defendant raise two issues in this Motion to Dismiss: (1) that both counts of the indictment must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33), which defines "domestic violence," is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that count two of the indictment must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is a violation of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
A. Vagueness
Defendant first contends that the indictment must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) is unconstitutionally vague. Section 921(a)(33) provides that:
the term of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" means an offense that-(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person, similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian.
Specifically, Defendant contends that the phrase "similarly situated" to a parent or guardian is so vague that people of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what is prohibited. In support of his position, the Defendant cites to a variety of definitions of parent through the United States Code and then goes through a parade of horribles on all of the possible interpretations of the phrase "similarly situated" to a parent or guardian.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). Facial challenges to the constitutionality of statues must be denied if there is any way to uphold a statute. Fuller ex rel. Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. 61, 251 F.3d 662, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2001) ("A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as unduly vague, in violation of due process. To succeed, however, the complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.") (citations omitted). In this case, the statute uses clear language that is generally understood by people. The terms parent, guardian, and similarly situated are not complex legal terms that are incapable of being defined. These are everyday phrases, that although subject to slightly differing definitions, give people notice of what they are prohibited from doing. Therefore, the language of the statute is sufficiently clear that a person of reasonable intelligence would know if they fell under its parameters. See United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1999) (Section 922(g)(9) "contains no ambiguity either as to the persons to whom the prohibitions apply or as to what conduct is proscribed[;] [i]t is, after all, fair to presume that a misdemeanant will know his relationship with his victim."); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 623 (8th Cir. 1999) ("We would be hard pressed to find an individual who could not determine whether he was in one of the enumerated relationships when he committed a misdemeanor crime including an element of physical force."); United States v. Thomson, 134 F. Supp.2d 1227, 1229 (D.Utah 2001) ("[T]his court concludes that a person of ordinary intelligence would easily understand what conduct is prohibited by this statute and to whom it applies.").
Furthermore, the language is not unconstitutionally vague in the current case. As other courts have discussed, Congress intended 921(a)(33) "to reach domestic relations of all sorts-legal, common law or otherwise." United States v. Costigan, No. CRIM. 00-9-B-H, 2000 WL 898455, *3 (D.Me. June 16, 2000). In this case, the Defendant was living with the victim's mother and the victim, had been left alone to watch the victim, and was apparently free to discipline the victim. These are all factors that lead to the conclusion that Defendant was "similarly situated" to a parent or guardian and knew that his relationship with the victim fell within the parameters of § 921(a)(33). Thus, the Defendant's vagueness challenge fails.
B. Commerce Clause
Defendant also claims that count two must be dismissed because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause authority in that the statute does not require a substantial relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Specifically, Defendant claims that the Commerce Clause requires the regulated activity (firearms) to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce and that the Seventh Circuit has only required a "de minimis jurisdictional nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce." (Mot. at 4.) Section 922(g) specifically contains a jurisdictional requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Seventh Circuit has recently rejected a challenge based on the main case cited by Defendant: "Nothing in United States v. Morrison, or in Jones v. United States, causes us to think that a different result is now required for 922(g). . . . Nothing in either case casts doubt on the validity of § 922(g), which is a law that specifically requires a link to interstate commerce." United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The Defendant has not presented any change of circumstance or legal reasoning that leads this court to deviate from this Seventh Circuit precedent; therefore, his challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) fails.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED this 15th day of August 2002.