Opinion
21-15889
11-01-2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Argued and Submitted October 14, 2022 Honolulu, Hawaii
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 1:20-cv-00003 for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands Ramona V. Manglona, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Imperial Pacific International, LLC (IPI) appeals the district court's judgment granting U.S.A. Fanter Corporation, Ltd. (Fanter) a mechanic's lien for work completed on IPI's casino-hotel in Saipan.
We review the exclusion of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch Inc., 26 F.4th 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2022). "We . . . review de novo the district court's interpretation of contract provisions[.]" Ross Dress for Less, Inc. v. Makarios-Oregon, LLC, 39 F.4th 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court's factual determinations for clear error. See Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15 F.4th 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 2021).
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded IPI's expert, Tsai Tsung Lun (Tsai), and IPI's lay witness, Wang Wei Ching (Wang). An expert's testimony must be "the product of reliable principles and methods." Fed.R.Evid. 702. "The question of reliability probes whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid...." Murray v. S. Route Maritime SA, 870 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Because of the fluid and contextual nature of the inquiry, district courts are vested with broad latitude to decide how to test an expert's reliability and whether or not an expert's relevant testimony is reliable." Id. at 923 (citation, alterations, emphases, and internal quotation marks omitted). "A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered[.]" Elosu, 26 F.4th at 1026 (citation and alteration omitted).
Tsai's opinion of the percentage of work completed based on the volume of materials used or excavated failed to account for the full scope of the work specified in the contract, which included "supply[ing] material, equipment, and installation." The district court thus acted within its sound discretion in excluding Tsai's testimony as unreliable and in excluding Wang's related foundational testimony. The district court was not required to admit Tsai's opinion simply because his testimony was proffered for use in a bench trial. Nothing precluded the district court from excluding evidence it found irrelevant or unreliable. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 702.
2. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Wong was IPI's representative. The contract does not prescribe the manner in which IPI must identify its representative, providing only that IPI "shall appoint a representative" and that a representative "will be identified." The district court reasonably inferred that Wong was IPI's representative based on IPI holding Wong out as its representative and allowing Wong to approve the percentage of work completed.
IPI's argument that the district court clearly erred in concluding that Wong was its representative is unpersuasive in light of the evidence presented at trial supporting the district court's reasonable inference. For example, Jiang Zhou, IPI's designated witness under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, testified that Wong was in charge and responsible for monitoring Fanter's progress. Additionally, MK Lee, the only person besides Wong with authority to reject the completion percentages, did not object to the final completion percentage that Wong approved and IPI now challenges.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.