U.S. v. Taylor

Full title: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MODESTAS TAYLOR, Defendant

Court: United States District Court, D. Minnesota

Date published: Aug 17, 2004

Criminal No. 04-219 (JRT/FLN) (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2004)

Opinion

Criminal No. 04-219 (JRT/FLN).

August 17, 2004

Thomas M. Hollenhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.

Ellis Olkon, OLKON OLKON, Medina, MN, for defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOHN TUNHEIM, District Judge

In a Report and Recommendation ("RR") dated July 2, 2004, United States Magistrate Judge Franklin L. Noel recommended that defendant Modestas Taylor's motion to suppress evidence and his oral motion to suppress statements be granted. The prosecution timely objected to the RR. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the prosecution's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court adopts the RR, and grants defendant's motions.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following findings of fact reflect the Magistrate Judge's credibility determinations and this Court's independent review of the record.

On April 24, 2004, the Bloomington Police Department received a call from the manager of the Super 8 Hotel at 7800 Second Avenue South in Bloomington, Minnesota. The manager reported that the hotel had been receiving a large number of calls for a particular room — Room 301. Callers would not know the name of the occupant, only the room number. Room 301 had been rented to Richard Glenn Ivey on April 23, 2004. Ivey paid for the room with cash. The Super 8 is a modestly priced hotel, with small rooms. (Transcript of the June 16, 2004 Motion Hearing ("Tr.") at 16.)

At about 7:30 p.m. on April 24, the same day police received the complaint, three officers, including Officer Matthew Heinzmann of the Bloomington Police Department, responded to the call. Prior to going to the Super 8, routine police checks on Ivey revealed two non-extraditable warrants from different states. The officers proceeded to Room 301 and knocked on the door. Defendant answered the door. Officer Heinzmann testified that the officers asked to enter the room and did not enter until defendant acquiesced to the request. (Tr. at 5, 7.) Defendant testified that the officers just walked into the room. (Tr. at 24-25, 31-32, 37-38.) Defendant recalled that the officers walked straight in, and "walked [defendant] back to the bed." (Tr. at 32, 35.) In response to questioning from the Court, defendant indicated that the officers did not ask if they could come in. He testified that the officers immediately asked defendant whether he had drugs or weapons in the room. (Tr. at 37-38.) Defendant remained sitting on the bed during the questioning and search. (Tr. at 32-33.)

Officer Heinzmann testified that one of his preliminary questions was whether Ivey was there, and defendant said no. ( Id.) Officer Heinzmann also testified that defendant indicated Ivey rented the room for defendant and defendant's girlfriend because defendant had no identification. Officer Heinzmann also testified that he asked defendant about the calls, and defendant said he did not know anything about them. (Tr. at 6.) Heinzmann reported that he asked defendant if the officers could look around, and defendant agreed. (Tr. at 8-9.) Defendant testified that he consented to the search in part because he did not feel he could say no, and in part because the officers had already begun looking around the room. (Tr. at 25.) During the search, which Heinzmann testified lasted only a few minutes, officers found what they suspected was crack cocaine in the pocket of a pair of khaki pants. (Tr. at 11-12.) Officers then arrested defendant. After the handcuffs were placed on defendant, Officer Heinzmann asked defendant what size pants defendant wore. (Tr. at 14.)

Officer Heinzmann testified that he did not inform defendant of any rights; specifically, he did not explain to defendant that defendant could refuse a search of the room. (Tr. at 8.) Similarly, he did not tell defendant that defendant could refuse to talk to the officers. (Tr. at 12.) Even after arresting defendant, the officers did not inform defendant of his rights. (Tr. at 15.)

II. Procedural Background

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack), in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).

After the motions hearing detailed above, the Magistrate Judge issued the RR, in which he determined that defendant's statement should be suppressed because defendant was in custody when the statements were made, and defendant was not informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. The Magistrate Judge also determined that despite this Miranda violation, there was not evidence that defendant's will was overborne, and therefore the Magistrate Judge concluded that his statements were voluntary and could be used as rebuttal or impeachment evidence.¹ In addition, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the evidence found as a result of the search and seizure must be suppressed because defendant's consent was the product of unlawful detention.

1 Neither party objects to the recommendation that the statements were voluntary and may be used as rebuttal or impeachment evidence should defendant testify.

The prosecution raises three objections to the RR. First, though the prosecution concedes that the RR accurately recites the facts as solicited during the hearing, the prosecution argues that the Magistrate Judge failed to resolve conflicting testimony of the defendant and the prosecution's witness. Next, the prosecution claims that the RR incorrectly determined that defendant was in custody during the interrogation. Finally, the prosecution argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the evidence found during the search should be suppressed.

ANALYSIS

I. Custody

"The basic rule of Miranda is that an individual must be advised of the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination, and the right to the assistance of an attorney, any time a person is taken into custody for questioning." United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8^th Cir. 1990) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). " Miranda accordingly requires that a warning as to the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination and to the assistance of counsel be issued prior to questioning whenever a suspect is (1) interrogated (2) while in custody." Id. (emphasis in original).

An individual need not be arrested formally to be "in custody." To determine whether an individual is "in custody" within the meaning of the Miranda decision, the "relevant factors . . . include an accused's freedom to leave the scene, and the purpose, place, and length of the interrogation." Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1347 (citations omitted). As the Griffin Court explained:

Custody occurs either upon formal arrest or under any other circumstances where the suspect is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. In determining whether a suspect is "in custody" at a particular time we examine the extent of the physical or psychological restraints placed on the suspect during interrogation in light of whether a "reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation" to be one of custody. If [a defendant] believed his freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest, and that belief was reasonable from an objective viewpoint, then [the defendant] was being held in custody during the interrogation. The determination of custody arises from an examination of the totality of the circumstances.

922 F.2d at 1347 (emphasis original) (citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has articulated a six-element test for this determination of custody. Id. at 1348.

The non-exhaustive factors, as set out by the Eighth Circuit, include:

(1) Whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest;

(2) Whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;

(3) Whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions;

(4) Whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning;

(5) Whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or,

(6) Whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.

Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1349. The first three indicia are "mitigating factors," the presence of one or more of which "would tend to mitigate the existence of custody at the time of the questioning." Id. The final three indicia comprise "coercive factors," the presence of one or more of which would tend to compel a finding of custody. Id.

Although all factors can be relevant, a finding of custody does not require the factual circumstances of a case to present all six indicia; and a particularly strong showing of one factor may compensate for a lesser or non-existent showing of another factor. United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 501 (8^th Cir. 2002). For example, the Eighth Circuit has emphasized the importance of advising a suspect that he is not in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Czichray, No. 03-3336, slip op. at 4 (August 11, 2004). The Court is also mindful that "the ultimate inquiry must always be whether the defendant was restrained as though he were under formal arrest." Id. at 6.

An examination of the historical facts in this case lead to a conclusion that defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogation. First, it is not disputed that defendant was not informed of his rights at any time during the interrogation. He was not told he was free to leave, and he was not informed that he did not have to answer questions. Even after defendant was placed in handcuffs to be taken to the police station, he was not informed of his rights.²

2 The prosecution suggests that the officers, "although not expressly stating so, made it clear to the defendant that he was free to leave or could stop the interview at any time." The prosecutor provides no citation to the motions hearing transcript, or explanation of how this "implicit" message was passed on by officers to the defendant. Of course, an important rationale for notifying suspects of their rights is to avoid, or at least lessen the burden, of an inquiry into subjective, or "implicit" warnings.

The second indicia of custody is disputed. Under this indicia, the less restricted the suspect's ability to move about, the more likely is the court to find that he was not in custody. This factor incorporates a subjective test which requires the court to inquire into the effect of the law enforcement officers' actions on the suspect himself. A suspect who has been placed under guard or who must remain at all times where law enforcement officers can see him is likely to be deemed to be in custody. See United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372 (8^th Cir. 1989) (finding suspect was in custody where officers told him to "just stay here"); South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65, 68 (8^th Cir. 1972) (finding suspect was in custody where police continually escorted suspect from the moment they first stopped him); cf. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 343 (1976) (finding suspect was not in custody where IRS agents permitted the suspect to move about within his home without any escort); United States v. Brown, 990 F.2d 397 (8^th Cir. 1993) (finding suspect not in custody where suspect was specifically advised he was not under arrest, and suspect initiated contact with police, and even though interview occurred in suspect's bedroom, suspect chose the location of the interview and was free to move about during the interview); United States v. Jorgensen, 871 F.2d 725, 729 (8^th Cir. 1989) (finding suspect was not in custody where agents interviewing suspect at FBI offices permitted him to go speak with his brother in an unlocked, unguarded area, unaccompanied by agents).

In this case, the Magistrate Judge determined that defendant's freedom of movement was significantly restricted. The Magistrate Judge found that immediately upon entering the room, police officers began looking around and asking questions. (RR at 9.)³ The Magistrate Judge also noted that defendant was sitting on the bed during the entire encounter, and three uniformed, armed police officers hastened into the small room. The prosecutor argues that the officers did not direct defendant to sit on the bed, however, defendant testified that officers rushed into the hotel room and backed defendant onto the bed, where he remained for the length of the interview. (Tr. at 35.) The prosecution argues that there was at all times a path to the door, and that defendant was at all times free to leave. However, the testimony adduced at the motions hearings was not so clear. Officer Heinzmann explained that a small hallway led into the room; to the right was a bed; to the left was a dresser, with a walking path between the bed and dresser. (Tr. at 9.) All officers were standing, and defendant was sitting. (Tr. at 10.) Officer Heinzmann later noted that he made more room for defendant to leave when he stepped to his left as another officer handed him the pants containing the drugs. (Tr. at 13.) This implies that he was blocking the hall to the door, at least partially, during the earlier part of the interrogation. He did not step left, and out of the path to the door, until after drugs had been found. At that point, it is clear that defendant was not free to go. (Tr. at 13-14.) Defendant testified that it was his subjective belief that he was not free to go. Given the number of officers, the size of the hotel room, the officers' conduct, and defendant's behavior, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's sound conclusion that defendant's belief that he was not free to go was objectively reasonable.

3 The prosecution complains that the Magistrate Judge did not resolve crucial conflicts in the testimony. In this particular factual dispute, the Magistrate Judge could not have been more plain in discrediting the testimony of the police officer. (RR at 9 (noting that "While the police dispute defendant's testimony that the search of the room began before they asked his consent, Officer Heinzmann acknowledged that as soon as the police entered the room, they began looking about the room for things in plain view.").)

The third factor inquires into whether the police or the defendant initiated contact. There is no dispute that the police initiated contact in this instance. Although defendant answered questions, he did so only after the police rushed in and "walked [him] back to the bed." (Tr. at 31.)⁴ The facts in this case are unlike those in cases in which acquiescence to questioning can substitute for the suspect initiating custody. For example, the testimony elicited at the hearing showed that defendant did not provide a great deal of information, and there is no indication that defendant answered questions believing that doing so would be in his best interest. In contrast, in United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496 (8^th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit determined that this factor was a mitigating one, even though the defendant had not arranged for or initiated custody. The Axsom Court noted that "Axsom testified that he would have answered any questions asked by the interrogating agents because he believed it was in his own best interest to appear friendly to the agents and to cooperate with their investigation." Id. at 501. In the instant case, defendant did not testify that he thought it would be in his best interests to cooperate, rather he testified that he believed, regardless of his responses, that the police weren't going away, and he would have been arrested if he refused to answer questions. (Tr. at 34.) As another example, in Axsom, the court noted that "Axsom was extremely friendly and cooperative during the interview. He offered to show agents which of his two computers contained child pornography, the target he shot to obtain his concealed handgun license, and his Samurai sword collection." Axsom, 289 F.3d at 501-02. In the instant case, there was no indication that defendant was "extremely friendly" or cooperative. In conclusion, this factor does not mitigate.

4 The prosecution characterizes the record as reflecting that defendant "chose" to sit on the bed. A closer reading of the transcript reveals that defendant felt forced onto the bed by advancing police officers. (Tr. at 32-33, 35.)

Defendant was not advised of his rights, did not initiate the interrogation, and his freedom of movement was curtailed. Thus, the first three factors have no mitigating effect on the custody determination. See, e.g., Griffin, 922 F.2d at 1350.

The Court now turns to the three "coercive" factors. On one of these factors, there is no dispute. Defendant was arrested at the end of the interrogation, and this factor therefore weighs in favor of a finding of custody. The Magistrate Judge also determined that the atmosphere was heavily police dominated, with three uniformed and armed police officers confronting defendant in a small hotel room.⁵ The hotel room was not rented to defendant, and the room had been rented the previous day. This is not a case in which the defendant was questioned "on his own turf," which has found to "soften the hard aspects of police interrogation." Czichray, No. 03-3336 at 5 (quotation omitted). Police need not brandish weapons for an interview to be "police dominated." The Magistrate Judge found that no strong arm tactics were used. Nonetheless, on the whole, these three factors favor a finding of custody, especially given the Magistrate Judge's fact-based determination that the interrogation was "heavily" police dominated.

5 Again, the prosecutor complains that the Magistrate Judge failed to determine whether the hotel was "small" or medium-sized. However, at page 9 of the RR, the Magistrate Judge clearly resolves this factual dispute in favor of defendant's characterization of the room as "small."

In sum, the absence of mitigating factors, coupled with the presence of two of the three coercive factors, provide ample support for the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that defendant was in custody and his statements were therefore taken in violation of the well-established Miranda rule. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980) ("[I]n providing for a ` de novo determination' rather than a de novo hearing Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendation."). It is clear that in critical factual disputes, the Magistrate Judge credited the testimony of the defendant rather than the version of events recited by the police officer. In response to this, the prosecutor suggests that the Court hold another evidentiary hearing. The Court declines the invitation. The Magistrate Judge conducted a thorough evidentiary hearing, which included questioning by the Magistrate Judge of each of the witnesses. The Court has no reason to revisit the Magistrate Judge's credibility determinations in this case. United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152, 155 (5^th Cir. 1980) (only in a "rare case" should a district judge resolve credibility choices in a manner contrary to recommendation of magistrate who heard witnesses' testimony); Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633, 641 (3d Cir. 1978) (district court should not displace magistrate's view of witnesses' credibility).

II. Suppression of Evidence Found During Search

The United States Constitution requires that searches conducted by law enforcement or government officials be reasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV. See United States v. Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 684 (8^th Cir. 2004) ("Under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, searches conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause are presumptively unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established exceptions."). Searches conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, however, "[a] warrantless search is valid if conducted pursuant to the knowing and voluntary consent of the person subject to a search." United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 987 (8^th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905 (1985); see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). Consent that is not voluntary, but was instead the product of threats or force, or was given in submission to a claim of lawful authority, invalidates the consent, and the resulting search is unreasonable. United States v. Morreno, 373 F.3d 905, 910 (8^th Cir. 2004) (consent is voluntary if the consent "is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, rather than the product of duress or coercion, express or implied"). Consent is invalid if the consent itself is the product of an illegal search or seizure before the consent was given. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-08.

The Magistrate Judge concluded that the evidence found as a result of the search and seizure should be suppressed because defendant's consent was the product of an unlawful detention. In particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that defendant was in custody when his consent was given, and that the officers had no probable cause for that custody. The prosecution argues that defendant was not in custody when the police entered the room and began their search. However, this argument is premised on a factual finding contrary to the Magistrate Judge's determination. Specifically, the prosecution argues that the defendant agreed that the officers could enter his hotel room and was not in custody until the end of the interrogation, after the drugs were found. The Magistrate Judge, however, did not credit that testimony, and rejected the conclusion. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that defendant was in custody from the early part of the confrontation with police.

To be valid, custody must be premised on probable cause, which is determined by a totality of the circumstances test. United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8^th Cir. 1982). When officers knocked on the door to Room 301, they did not have probable cause to detain defendant. As the Magistrate Judge accurately noted, police cannot attempt to confirm their suspicions of criminal activity by means that approach the conditions of arrest, and a police confinement that goes beyond the limited restraint of an investigatory stop must be justified by probable cause. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499. Tellingly, at the hearing, the government conceded that there was no probable cause to arrest defendant until after the drugs were found. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that based on the totality of the facts and circumstances, it was not reasonable for the police to believe that defendant had committed or was committing a crime. Therefore the police did not have probable cause to place defendant in custody. Because defendant's consent was the product of an illegal detention, the consent was invalid, and the evidence must be suppressed. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-08.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES the prosecution's objections [Docket No. 24] and ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 22]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant's motion to suppress fruits of an unlawful search and seizure [Docket No. 16] is GRANTED,

2. Defendant's oral motion to suppress statements is GRANTED.