Opinion
2:03-CR-186W
November 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress. On August 4, 2003, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion, Defendant Juan Jose Sanatana ("Santana") was present with his counsel, Stephen R. McCaughey, Defendant Ruben Murillo-Lara ("Murillo-Lara") was present with his counsel, G. Fred Metos. The government was represented by Clark A. Harms, Following the hearing, the court ordered a transcript as well as supplemental briefing from the parties. After thorough review and consideration of the pleadings submitted by the parties and the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the court enters the following memorandum decision and order.
BACKGROUND
The court finds the relevant facts as follows. Sergeant Jeffery Chugg is employed with the Utah Highway Patrol. (Tr. at 5.) Sgt. Chugg is a "K-9 sergeant" who is currently assigned to the criminal interdiction team which patrols Utah's highways looking for criminal activity. (Tr. at 5-6.) Sgt. Chugg was assigned to this unit during March of 2003, when the events at issue in this case occurred.
Reference to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing conducted on August 4, 2003, will be cited as "Tr. at___."
At approximately 12:00 p.m. on Sunday, March 2, 2003, Sgt. Chugg received a call from his lieutenant, directing him to contact one of the agents on the narcotics task force. (Tr. at 42.) The task force agent told Sgt. Chugg that they had information from a confidential informant that there was a vehicle that may be transporting drugs into Salt Lake City. (Tr. at 42.) The agent requested Sgt. Chugg's assistance, and asked him to meet them at an area near 7200 South, just east of 1-15. (Tr. at 42.) Upon arriving at the designated location, Sgt. Chugg met with approximately three officers. The officers told Sgt. Chugg that they had been expecting the vehicle later in the week, but it had come earlier than anticipated and they were not prepared for it. (Tr. at 43, 54.) The officers told Sgt. Chugg that they had the vehicle under surveillance and wanted Sgt. Chugg to make a "wall stop" of the vehicle. (Tr. at 43.) According to Sgt. Chugg, to conduct a wall stop, "I have to go as if I don't have any information from them just like I would any other vehicle stop I make." (Tr. at 43.) Trooper Sgt. testified: "If there was [a violation] I was to stop, I was encouraged to stop them." (Tr. at 46.) Sgt. Chugg agreed to assist the officers.
Sgt. Chugg asked the officers what action he should take if he did not observe a traffic violation. Specifically, he asked the task force officers if they wanted him to pull over the vehicle based on the information they had even if he did not observe a traffic violation. (Tr. at 58.) Sgt. Chugg was told that if he did not observe a traffic violation he should contact the task force officers by phone for further instruction. (Tr. at 58.)
The vehicle in question was, at that time, parked at a Motel 6, near 1-15, located on the frontage readjust south of 7200 South. Sgt. Chugg waited at a nearby location while task force officers watched the vehicle. (Tr. at 43-44.) The surveillance team observed the vehicle leave the Motel 6 and advised Sgt. Chugg of its location. The vehicle entered 1-15 at the 7200 South entrance and began traveling north on 1-15. Sgt. Chugg followed, also entering 1-15 at the 7200 South on-ramp. (Tr. at 7, 44-45.)
Shortly after entering 1-15, at approximately 6500 South, Sgt. Chugg saw the suspect vehicle; a white Toyota Camry with California license plates, traveling northbound on 1-15. (Tr. at 7, 10.) As Sgt. Chugg approached the vehicle, he noticed that the vehicle was following too closely to the vehicle in front of it. (Tr. at 8.) Following too closely is a violation of Utah law. (Tr. at 7.)
Sgt. Chugg testified that there are a couple of different standards used by officers to determine whether a vehicle is following too closely. One standard provides that for every ten miles per hour being driven there should be the equivalent of one car length between the vehicles. A more current standard, according to Sgt. Chugg, is the two second rule. Pursuant to the two second rule, when the rear bumper of the vehicle in front passes a particular object a person should be able to count 1001, 1002, before the front bumper of the following car passes the object. (Tr. at 7.)
Sgt. Chugg testified that the violation in this case was "obvious." (Tr. at 8.) According to Sgt. Chugg there was "about a car length" between the suspect vehicle and the vehicle in front, it was "very close" and "well within a second." (Tr. at 8, 50.) The suspect vehicle was traveling at the normal highway speed, between 60 and 65 miles an hour. According to Sgt. Chugg, given the speed and conditions at that time, the suspect vehicle should have been roughly 200 feet behind the vehicle in front of it. (Tr. at 8.)
Sgt. Chugg testified that when he observes a vehicle following too closely, he typically provides the vehicle with some time to "make up the distance" or adjust the distance "[b]ecause sometimes vehicles will pull in front of cars that I don't notice." (Tr. at 9.) Sgt. Chugg testified that in his experience, and under such circumstances, vehicles usually adjust the distance "within a quarter or half mile or so." (Tr. at 9.) Sgt. Chugg testified that in this case he observed the suspect vehicle following too closely for nearly one mile, and that the violation was continuous and ongoing. (Tr. at 8.)
Based on this traffic violation, Sgt. Chugg activated his overhead lights and pulled the vehicle over as it was exiting 1-15 at the 5300 South off ramp. (Tr. at 9.) Sgt. Chugg approached the vehicle from the passenger side and informed the occupants, the defendants, that he stopped them "for following too close to the car on the freeway." (Tr. at 9-10.) Sgt. Chugg spoke in English and the driver appeared to understand. (Tr. at 9-10.) Sgt. Chugg asked the driver for his license and vehicle registration. (Tr. at 10.) The driver provided a valid California driver's license which appeared valid, appeared to match the driver, and identified the driver as defendant Murillo-Lara. (Tr. at 11.) Sgt. Chugg noted that the California driver's license was consistent with the California license plates on the vehicle. (Tr. at 10.) The driver also provided the vehicle's registration, which appeared valid but was in the name of a car dealership. (Tr. at 11, 36.) The driver told Sgt. Chugg that although the car was registered to a dealership, it belonged to a friend of his named Jose. The driver did not provide Jose's last name. (Tr. at 11.)
Sgt. Chugg found the vehicle's registration unusual and asked if there was a bill of sale or other sale paperwork. Sgt. Chugg believed that if the driver's friend had purchased the vehicle from the dealership there should at least be some kind of paperwork documenting the purchase or the new owner. (Tr. at 12.) Sgt. Chugg requested this additional paperwork in an attempt to ascertain whether the occupants "had the right to be in that vehicle." (Tr. at 12.) The occupants did not respond to Sgt. Chugg's request for a bill of sale or other indicia of proper possession of the vehicle. Rather, the driver responded by stating that they were looking for his mother on Main Street. (Tr. at 12.)
In addition, the occupants of the vehicle were unable to provide proof of insurance, which is also a violation of Utah law. (Tr. at 12-13.)
Pursuant to what he testified was his "normal" procedure, Sgt. Chugg asked the driver to come back to his patrol car and sit in the front passenger seat while he worked on the citation. (Tr. at 13.) As Sgt. Chugg was logging information into the computer in his patrol car he engaged in further conversation with the driver. (Tr. at 16.)
Sgt. Chugg was concerned about the ownership of the vehicle and asked the driver additional questions on this subject. (Tr. at 16.) The driver stated that his friend bought the car about a week ago for his wife. (Tr. at 16.) Sgt. Chugg thought the driver's comment about the recent purchase was "strange" because the registration-still in the dealership's name-indicated that the last transaction occurred six months prior, in September of 2002. In addition, Sgt. Chugg testified that in his experience, recently purchased California vehicles are similar to recently purchased Utah vehicles in that there is a bill of sale or other paperwork showing that the registration is underway. (Tr. at 17.) Sgt. Chugg further testified that in California, recently purchased vehicles usually have a small sticker taped in the lower left-hand corner of the front windshield, and that this vehicle had no such sticker. (Tr. at 17, 39.)
At some point during the traffic stop Sgt. Chugg ran a "check" on the vehicle and it was not listed as stolen. (Tr. at 39.)
The driver indicated, once again, that he was here with his mother and was looking for her on Main Street. Sgt. Chugg asked if he knew the address and the driver said he did not. (Tr. at 17.) Sgt. Chugg then asked additional questions regarding the driver's travel plans. In response to Sgt. Chugg's questions, the driver said that they had driven from California and arrived in Salt Lake at approximately 7:00 p.m. the previous night. (Tr. at 17.) The driver said he came to Salt Lake to visit a sick or injured relative who was in the hospital. (Tr. at 18.) The driver did not know the name of the hospital and did not know how the relative had become sick or injured. (Tr. at 19.) The driver told Sgt. Chugg they were going back to California that same day. (Tr. at 19.)
Sgt. Chugg asked the driver for the name of his passenger and the driver said "Carlos," Sgt. Chugg asked if he knew the passenger's last name and the driver said he did not. (Tr. at 19.) Sgt. Chugg thought this was suspicious, and sought to clarify the driver's relationship with the passenger. (Tr. at 20.) The driver said that he did not know the passenger's address, but did know that the passenger lived in Avalon, California. The driver said that he had picked up the passenger at his home and that the passenger had come along to help with the driving. (Tr. at 20.) Approximately ten minutes elapsed from the time of the initial stop until the end of this conversation with the driver. (Tr. at 21.)
Sgt. Chugg decided to speak with the passenger and try to verify the driver's story. (Tr. at 20.) Sgt. Chugg approached the passenger, who was still sitting in the vehicle, and engaged in conversation in Spanish. (Tr. at 21.)
Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger if he spoke English and asked if he would feel more comfortable talking in Spanish. The passenger indicated he wanted to speak Spanish. (Tr. at 21.) Sgt. Chugg is fluent in Spanish. (Tr. at 22.)
Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger for his name and the passenger replied "Juan Jose Valdez." (Tr. at 23.) Thinking that "Carlos" might be a nickname, and wanting to clarify the situation, Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger if the driver knew him by any other names. The passenger responded, "no." (Tr. at 24.) Sgt. Chugg said, "so he knows you as Juan," and the passenger said "yes." (Tr. at 24.) Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger how long he had known the driver and the passenger responded, "for a long time". (Tr. at 24.) Sgt. Chugg then asked the passenger why they were in Salt Lake, The passenger said they were visiting the driver's family and had come with the driver's mother and another relative. (Tr. at 25-26.) Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger if he knew the owner of the car and the passenger said he did not. (Tr. at 26.)
The passenger was later identified as Juan Jose Santana.
Sgt. Chugg asked the passenger if there were any large amounts of money, any weapons, marijuana, cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine in the vehicle. The passenger responded, "no." Sgt. Chugg then asked if he could search the vehicle and the passenger said he could. (Tr. at 26.)
Sgt. Chugg returned to his vehicle and engaged in further conversation with the driver, Murillo-Lara. (Tr. at 29.) To make certain he had not misunderstood, Sgt. Chugg once again asked the driver for the name of the passenger. The driver responded, "Carlos." (Tr. at 30.) The driver indicated that he and his passenger visit quite often, and that he had telephoned the passenger to come on the trip and help drive. (Tr. at 30.)
Sgt. Chugg then asked the driver the same questions he asked of the passenger; whether he had money, weapons, marijuana, cocaine, heroin or methamphetamine in the vehicle and the driver said, "no." (Tr. at 30.) Sgt. Chugg asked for consent to search the vehicle and the driver said "go ahead and search." (Tr. at 30.)
Based on this consent, officers searched the vehicle and discovered a large amount of methamphetamine concealed in the gas tank of the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
A routine traffic stop is considered a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1007 (1996). Because traffic stops are more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, such stops are analyzed under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In determining the reasonableness of the detention, the court must make a dual inquiry asking first "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002).
I. The Stop.
A traffic stop is justified at its inception "if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787. It is irrelevant whether the particular officer would have stopped the vehicle under the general practice of the police department or whether the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping the vehicle. United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996),
In this case, Sgt, Chugg stopped the defendants' vehicle because of an observed traffic violation. Section 41-6-62 of the Utah Code Annotated provides that it is unlawful for a vehicle to follow too closely behind another vehicle. The statute specifically provides:
(1) The operator of a vehicle:
(a) may not follow another vehicle more close than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the:
(i) speed of the vehicles;
(ii) traffic upon the highway; and
(iii) condition of the highway; and
(b) shall allow sufficient space in front of the vehicle to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space.
Sgt. Chugg testified that the violation in this case was "obvious" and that the defendants' vehicle was "very close" to the vehicle in front. Sgt. Chugg acknowledged that at the time of the violation the interstate was dry and traffic was moderate and typical of Sunday afternoon. However, Sgt, testified that even under these conditions given the highway speeds of 60-65 miles per hour there should have been approximately 200 feet between the defendants' vehicle and the vehicle in front. Sgt. Chugg further testified that he observed this violation for some distance and determined that the violation was continuous and ongoing.
Defendants suggest that the standards described by Sgt. Chugg for determining whether a vehicle is following too closely are improper as these standards are not listed in the statute. It is the opinion of this court that the standards identified by Sgt. Chugg-the 2-second rule and the car length for every 10 m.p.h.-are not independent of the statute, but rather are guidelines used to determine what is "reasonable" and "prudent" under the statute. Similarly, the court rejects defendants' claim that Sgt. Chugg's testimony that there was "about a car length" between defendants' vehicle and the vehicle in front is the equivalent of stating that defendants' vehicle was in compliance with subsection (b) of the statute which requires "sufficient space in front of the vehicle to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space." Even if it were, the plain language of the statute makes clear that the operator of a vehicle must comply with both subsections (a) (may not follow more closely than is "reasonable and prudent") and (b) (shall allow sufficient space in front for another vehicle to enter and occupy the space).
Based on these facts, the court concludes that Sgt. Chugg lawfully stopped defendants' vehicle after observing that it was following too closely to the vehicle in front of it, in violation of Utah law. Accordingly, the traffic stop was justified at its inception.
II. The Detention.
Having determined that the traffic stop of defendants' vehicle was justified at its inception, the court must ask "whether the officer's actions during the detention were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The Supreme Court has made clear that "an investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
During a routine traffic stop, "a police officer is permitted to ask such questions examine such documentation and run such computer verifications as necessary to determine that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to operate the vehicle." United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996). "When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1997). Any subsequent or concurrent detention for questioning must be supported by objective reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995).
An investigative detention may be expanded beyond its original purpose . . . if during the initial stop the detaining officer acquires "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity, that is to say the officer must acquire a "particularlized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." . . . We have noted that [o]ne recurring factor supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion . . . is the inability of a defendant to provide proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle he is driving.United States v. Villa-Chaparro, 115 F.3d 797, 801-02 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 926 (1997). Whether such subsequent detention is supported by "`reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any one factor but on the totality of the circumstances/" Jones, 44 F.3d at 872 (quoting United States v. Soto, 988 F.3d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Sgt. Chugg properly continued the detention of the vehicle and its occupants in light of the totality of the circumstances present in this case. Upon being stopped, the driver failed to produce evidence that he was legally entitled to operate the vehicle. Although the driver produced what appeared to be a valid driver's license and a registration, the registration was in the name of a third party-a car dealership. When Sgt. Chugg asked the driver who owned the car, the driver stated that the car belonged to his friend "Jose." The driver, however, failed to produce any information linking the vehicle to a person named "Jose." Even assuming the driver did obtain possession of the vehicle from a person named Juan, the driver failed to show that Juan's possession of the vehicle was lawful.
In addition, the driver's claim that the car had been recently purchased was not supported by the registration provided to Sgt. Chugg which showed the most recent purchase occurred six months prior. Similarly, the vehicle lacked documentation, stickers and other indicia which normally accompanies a recently purchased California vehicle, and the occupants were unable to provide proof of insurance. Although the vehicle did not list as stolen, the driver failed to produce any evidence that he was entitled to operate the vehicle and Trooper Chugg was unable to determine whether the occupants were lawfully in possession of the vehicle.
The defendants contend that it was improper for Sgt. Chugg to question them about their travel plans. However, the Tenth Circuit has "repeatedly held (as have other circuits) that questions relating to a driver's plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a traffic stop." United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019 (2002); United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that questions about travel plans are routine and "may be asked as a matter of course without exceeding the proper scope of a traffic stop"). Moreover, although such questions do typically fall within the scope of a traffic stop, the court notes that Sgt. Chugg did not question the defendants about their travel plans until the defendants failed to show that they were lawfully entitled to operate the vehicle.
During the course of conversation, the driver was unable to recall or provide names and last names for close friends and relatives. The driver told Sgt. Chugg he was in town to visit a sick or injured relative, however, the driver could not provide a name for the relative. The driver told Sgt. Chugg that the passenger's name was Carlos, but said he did not know Carlos' last name. However, when Sgt. Chugg talked with the passenger, he identified himself as Juan Jose Valdez, and told Sgt. Chugg that the driver did not know him by any other names and that he had known the driver for a long time.
Given these facts and the totality of the circumstances, the court concludes that Sgt. Chugg had reasonable suspicion to support the continued detention of defendants.
III. Standing to Challenge the Search of the Vehicle.
In their motion to suppress defendants claim "there was not a voluntary consent to search of the vehicle at the time of the stop and detention." Def. Santana's Mot. to Suppress at 1; Def. Murillo-Lara's Mot. to Suppress at 1. Although the evidence presented at the hearing suggests that both defendants verbally consented to the search of the vehicle, before reaching the merits of defendants' claim, the court must resolve the threshold question of whether the defendants have standing to assert Fourth Amendment rights in the vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment right of privacy is a personal right and cannot be asserted vicariously. United States v. Alien, 235 F.3d 482, 489 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978)),cert. denied, 532 U.S. 989 (2001), Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether the "challenged action" violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the criminal defendants making the challenge, Alien, 235 F.3d at 489;United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989). "The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of adducing facts at the suppression hearing indicating that his own rights were violated by the challenged search." United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 142 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1998).
"Whether a defendant's own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a challenged search turns on the classic Fourth Amendment test: `whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.'" Alien, 235 F.3d at 489 (quoting Erwin, 875 F.2d at 270.)
The United States Supreme Court has held that a passenger who asserts neither a possessory nor a property interest in a vehicle would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Raskas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978). In accord, the Tenth Circuit has determined that passengers lack standing to challenge vehicle searches. United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 1991). Based on this precedent, defendant Santana, the passenger in the vehicle, does not have standing to challenge the subsequent search of the vehicle.
As for the standing of the driver of the vehicle, defendant Murillo-Lara, the Tenth Circuit has stated: "Where the proponent of a motion to suppress is the car's driver but not the registered owner, mere possession of the car and its keys does not suffice to establish a legitimate possessory interest." United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Alien, 235 F.3d at 489). Rather, "[t]o establish standing to challenge a car search, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he had a `legitimate possessory interest in or [a] lawful control over the car.'" Id. (quoting Alien, 235 F.3d at 489). "[A]t a minimum, the proponent bears the burden of establishing `that he gained possession from the owner or someone with authority to grant possession.'" Id. (quoting Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990)).
The defendant Murillo-Lara did not testify on the issue of standing or his expectation of privacy in the vehicle. In addition, he submitted no evidence of any relationship between the person he identified as the lender of the vehicle and the registered owner of the vehicle. Although the defendant produced what appeared to be a valid registration for the vehicle, the registration was in the name of a car dealership. The defendant Murillo-Lara claimed that he had borrowed the car from his friend Jose. However, he told Sgt. Chugg that he did not know Jose's last name and he claimed that Jose had purchased the vehicle the week before. In spite of these claims, defendant Murillo-Lara never produced any evidence or documentation linking Jose to the car dealership or the alleged recent purchase. In other words, defendant Murillo-Lara failed to submit any evidence suggesting that the person he identified as the lender of the vehicle had lawful possession of the vehicle from the registered owner. See United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 77 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the borrower of a car lacks standing where the car registration indicates it is owned by someone other than the alleged lender and the borrower fails to present any evidence of a linkage between the lender and registered owner); United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that defendant had no expectation of privacy in car even though the defendant testified that his friend Avita loaned him the car; the registration was in the name of Ortiz, Avita's brother-in-law, and there was a complete absence of evidence concerning Avita's possession of the car), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926 (1991); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445-46 (10th Cir. 1990) (denying standing to defendant who borrowed vehicle from a person whom he knew was not the registered owner, and who provided no evidence suggesting that the lender was in lawful possession of the vehicle), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991). Therefore, the court concludes that defendant Murillo-Lara failed to meet his burden to show a legitimate possessory interest in or lawful control over the vehicle.
Having concluded that neither defendant Murillo-Lara nor defendant Santana have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, the court does not examine the constitutionality of that search.
Therefore, based on the foregoing and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED.