Opinion
Case No. 1:03CR0052
September 23, 2003
S. Randall Ramseyer, Abingdon, Virginia, for United States of America
David L. Scyphers, Scyphers Austin, P.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for Defendant George Taffico Pope
OPINION AND ORDER
This criminal case is before me on a motion to suppress the evidence taken from the defendant's hotel room and from the vehicle in which he was riding at the time of his arrest and any statements made by him at those times. The defendant contends that police did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search his vehicle because the information for the stop was unlawfully obtained by means of a previous search that violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. Finding that the initial search of the hotel room was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the government has not demonstrated an independent source of information to create probable cause for the traffic stop and the seizure of drugs from the vehicle, I grant the motion and suppress any evidence taken from the hotel room and the vehicle and any corresponding statements.
I
The defendant George Taffico Pope is charged with manufacturing, distributing, and possessing with intent to manufacture and distribute various quantities of cocaine. In connection with these charges, the defendant filed the present Motion to Suppress, requesting that all evidence taken from his hotel room and from the vehicle in which he was riding at the time of his arrest be suppressed. A hearing was held on the motion, at which the parties agreed that all of the evidence relevant to the motion was contained in certain exhibits introduced consisting of reports prepared and statements taken by law enforcement officers. The motion is now ripe for decision.
The evidence in the record suggests the following chronology of events. On the morning of December 18, 2002, Becky Keen, a housekeeper employed at the Comfort Inn hotel in Abingdon, Virginia, was performing her normal housekeeping duties. Seeing that there was no "Do Not Disturb" sign on the door and hearing no response upon knocking, Keen entered Room 131, which had been rented out to the defendant for two nights, in order to clean it. Upon entering, Keen saw various items in the room that she interpreted to be drug paraphernalia. She reported her observations to the hotel's housekeeping manager, Gertraud Turner. Mrs. Turner followed Keen to the room, where she saw various items, including a box of Glad sandwich bags, white powder, a white plastic tube, razor blades, a hair band, packages of Sweet'N Low sugar, salt, ketchup, napkins, ash trays, an empty twenty-ounce bottle, and a pack of matches. In addition, she saw a metal container containing a scale and a black plate containing white powder, a piece of paper and perhaps a razor blade. Mrs. Turner instructed Keen to replace everything in the room just as she had found it upon entering. Keen did so, and the two departed. Mrs. Turner then informed her husband Jim Turner, a maintenance worker at the hotel, of the discovery, and he asked her to show him. Mr. and Mrs. Turner returned to Room 131, where Mr. Turner observed the various items lying around. They decided to leave the room as soon as possible and went to the front desk and had the manager call the police.
At this point, the chronology of events becomes somewhat unclear. The evidence does not provide any clues as to the substance of the telephone conversation between the motel and the police. Nevertheless, it appears that Sargent Wolfe and Patrol Officer Camper of the Abingdon Police Department responded to the call and arrived at the Comfort Inn. Mr. Turner's "Voluntary Statement" indicates that he remained at the front desk waiting for the officers and, upon their arrival, "took [an officer] to the room and let her in the room." (Gov. Ex. 4.) There, the officers observed firsthand what they considered to be drug paraphernalia lying about. Upon Wolfe and Camper's request, Abingdon police lieutenants Kevin Christie and Bill Snodgrass subsequently arrived at the scene and also observed the items in the room.
Apparently, both officers observed the room. The "Report of Investigation" prepared by DEA Special Agent Brian Snedeker on April 16, 2003 similarly states, "APD Sgt. Wolfe and Patrol Officer Camper responded to the call. Mr. Turner took the officers to Room 131 and showed them the drug residue/paraphernalia." (Gov. Ex. 1.)
The officers obtained from the Turners the registration form for Room 131, which showed that the room had been rented to the defendant and contained the defendant's signature. Although the Turners did inform the officers that Pope was scheduled to remain in the room for another night, the evidence does not indicate that the officers attempted first to speak with the Turners or to conduct any investigation prior to going to and entering the room. There is no evidence that the officers at the scene acquired any information from the witnesses present as to their observations of the contents of the room. The officers left the hotel, instructing the Turners to contact them again if anyone returned to the room. (Gov. Ex. 1, 4.) They also decided to notify Special Agent Joe Boone of the State Police about their observations. (Gov. Ex. 2.)
A few minutes after the officers' departure, Keen noticed a woman, later identified as Margaret Arnold, entering Room 131 and notified Mrs. Turner, who in turn informed Mr. Turner. Mr. Turner then went out to the parking lot and saw Arnold driving away in a dark green Chevy Blazer. He was unable to obtain the license plate number. As previously instructed, Mr. Turner once again called the police department and informed them of Arnold's return and departure and provided them with a description of both her and her automobile. He and Mrs. Turner also checked the room once again and saw that the previously observed items had all been cleaned up and removed. Lieutenant Christie then returned to the hotel at nine-thirty the same morning and interviewed Keen about her sighting of Arnold. He also learned that the defendant was no longer staying another night and had completed the necessary paperwork to check out. Lieutenant Christie once again left the hotel. In the meantime, the defendant returned to the hotel. After running into Mrs. Turner and asking her whether anyone had cleaned his room yet, to which Mrs. Turner responded no, the defendant spent approximately five minutes in his room and then departed in the green Chevy Blazer being driven by Arnold.
As Lieutenant Christie returned to the hotel property with Agent Boone, the two officers saw a green Chevy Blazer and a driver outside the hotel, both matching the descriptions earlier provided to the police by the Turners. They also observed a front passenger in the vehicle who Lieutenant Christie identifies in the "Incident Report" as George Pope. (Gov. Ex. 2.) Christie and Boone observed the vehicles for approximately two minutes, until the vehicle left the hotel parking lot. Lieutenant Christie followed the vehicle, noting its license plate registration. Christie states in the "Incident Report" that "[b]ased on [his] personal observations of the motel room, the renter's name[,] and description of the driver," he stopped the vehicle. (Id.) He asked the defendant Pope to exit the vehicle and put his arms up against another adjacent car. As the defendant did so, a small plastic bag containing crack cocaine fell from his hand. Pope was then arrested. He was found to also have a small quantity of marijuana on his person and several hundred dollars in cash. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a rubber glove containing fifteen plastic bags of crack and powder cocaine.
II
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits warrantless searches of an individual's private space by government officials or by private individuals acting as agents or representatives of the government unless the individual provides consent or the search occurs pursuant to one of a number of exceptions to the requirement. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-55 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Warden v. Hoyden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003). For mobile areas such as automobiles, the Fourth Amendment sets aside the warrant requirement and instead demands that law enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion, based on intelligible facts, that criminal activity is ongoing within the vehicle. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
The determination as to whether a search conducted by a private party constitutes a government search triggering Fourth Amendment protection depends on a fact-specific inquiry based on traditional agency principles. The Fourth Circuit has held that the existence of an agency relationship between a private individual and the government for purposes of the Fourth Amendment turns on "(1) whether the [g]overnment knew of and acquiesced in the private search; and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement or had some other independent motivation." Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 344-45; see also United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003).
Evidence gained either directly or derivatively from an unlawful search is not admissible in a criminal prosecution at trial, unless the evidence is also derivable from an independent source distinct from the unlawful search and its yields. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804-05 (1984); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). A source is sufficiently independent if its connection to the unlawful search has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint" of unlawfulness from the evidence. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341; see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961). Although the government ought not to be advantaged by the availability and use of evidence that was attained in violation of constitutional guarantees, it also should not be placed in a more disadvantaged position than that in which it would have been had the illegal conduct not occurred. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542(1988). Thus, proposed evidence is to be inadmissible only if it meets a threshold "but for" test, under which suppression depends on whether the unlawful search was the "but for" cause of the discovery of the evidence. Segura, 468 U.S. at 815. Once an unlawful search occurs, the burden of proof rests with the government to show that the evidence whose admission is sought is not the fruit, either direct or indirect, of the unlawful search and instead derives from an independent source. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
It is established that, in renting a room at a hotel, guests provide permission, either implied or express, to maids, janitors, repairmen, and other similarly employed workers to enter their room in order to perform their routine duties, including tidying and replenishing the room and making requested repairs. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489; Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51. However, it is also further settled that a hotel proprietor and its representatives do not have the authority to provide consent to law enforcement officials to search a room rented out to a hotel guest unless the law enforcement officials have first secured a search warrant, assuming the exceptions authorizing a warrantless search do not apply. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488; see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961). Freedom from warrantless searches is a constitutional right belonging to hotel guests and may only be waived by them, either directly or indirectly by means of an agent. Absent evidence that the hotel proprietor or its employees have been authorized by a hotel guest to consent to a search of the guest's room by police, such consent provided by a hotel's employees is invalid and does not waive the guest's constitutional right to be secure from warrantless searches. See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489; Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51-52.
III
In the present case, the initial search of the defendant's hotel room by Officers Wolfe, Camper, Christie, and Snodgrass constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not have a warrant to enter the defendant's room or to search it, and no exceptional circumstances existed to legally justify a search without a warrant. Given that the events of interest occurred prior to check out time and that the understanding of all parties at the time the officers responded at the scene was that the defendant was planning to remain at the hotel for an additional night, the hotel room was properly characterized as the defendant's private space. The hotel employees did not have authority to provide consent to law enforcement to enter or search the room. The officers were not facing any exigent circumstances that demanded immediate entry of the hotel room for crime prevention purposes. Thus, any information acquired by the officers by their view of or search of the room was unlawfully acquired.
The officers were thereby also barred from using this information derivatively to acquire further evidence or information. In his "Incident Report," Officer Christie states that he executed the traffic stop of the vehicle in which Arnold and the defendant were riding based upon his "personal observations of the motel room, the rentor's name and description of the driver." (Gov. Ex. 2.) Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the traffic stop executed by Christie was also tainted, given that Christie's observations of the hotel room were obtained contrary to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-85; United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 477 (4th Cir. 2002). Because the traffic stop was fruit and thus contaminated with illegitimacy, the evidence subsequently secured as a result of the traffic stop was thus also unlawfully acquired and may not be used by the government.
The government's principal argument is that the traffic stop emanated from a source independent of the unlawful search of the defendant's hotel room. By themselves, the defendant's name and a description of Arnold were not sufficient alone to provide the reasonable suspicion or probable cause Officer Christie needed to stop the vehicle without a warrant. Both the name and the description demanded a context of the purported criminal activity engaged in by the defendant. Although Keen and the Turners were not acting as representatives of the government, I presume that they may have provided information regarding their discovery. However, the record contains no evidence of precisely what these persons may have told the officers who reported to the scene. There is no evidence that the hotel employees described verbally to the officers the various items they may have seen in the defendant's room, or that the employees had sufficient familiarity with drug paraphernalia so as to be able to reasonably identify the evidence.
In the absence of any such information in the record, I would be required to speculate on the specifics of the verbal information the officers acquired from the employees of the hotel. The government has thus failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the officers' traffic stop of the vehicle and the resulting discovery of drug evidence flowed from a source independent of the unlawful search of the hotel room.
IV
For these reasons, it is ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress [Doc. No. 15] is granted, and any evidence of drugs seized from the hotel room or from the vehicle in which the defendant was riding and all corresponding statements will not be admitted.