U.S. v. Poole

Full title: United States v. Poole

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois

Date published: Dec 22, 2004

No. 04 CR 50003 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 22, 2004)

Opinion

No. 04 CR 50003.

December 22, 2004

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP REINHARD, District JudgePage 2

Defendant, Joseph H. Poole, filed a motion to sever Counts One and Two from Counts Three and Four of the indictment. Count I is a charge of aggravated bank robbery, and Count Two is a charge of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, both arising out of an armed bank robbery that occurred in Rockford, Illinois, on September 13, 2002. Count Three is a charge of aggravated bank robbery, and Count IV is a charge of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence, both arising out of an armed bank robbery that occurred in Rockford on November 21, 2003.

Because the charges in Counts One and Two are identical to those in Counts Three and Four, respectively, there is no issue regarding joinder under Rule 8. See United States v. Jamal, 87 F.3d 913, 914 (7tth Cir. 1996).

The issue raised by the motion to sever is governed by Rule 14. Under Rule 14, this court has the discretion to order separate trials if it appears that a defendant will be prejudiced by trying the offenses together. United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 736 (7^th Cir. 2002). In the interest of preserving judicial resources, a motion to sever should be granted only when there is a serious risk of unfair prejudice that deprives the defendant of a fair trial. Smith, 308 F.3d at 736. A single trial is appropriate if it is within the jury's capacity, given the complexity of the case, to follow admonitory instructions and to keep separate, collate, and appraise the evidence. United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1361 (7^th Cir. 1997). Jury confusion may be minimized where the trial is short, the evidence is not complex, and the evidence is presented separately as to each crime. Jamal, 87 F.3d at 914-15.

In this case, defendant has failed to identify any serious risk of unfair prejudice. Nor is there any likelihood of jury confusion as the trial is expected to be fairly short (four to five days), there is nothing unusually complex about the anticipated evidence, and the government has asserted it will present the evidence separately and chronologically as to each offense. Further, there should be little, if any, overlap in the evidence. Under these circumstances, there is no identified basis to sever under Rule 14.

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies defendant's motion to sever.