Summary
rejecting claims by an illegal re-entry defendant that his sentence was unreasonable when compared with fast-track programs and that the disparity violates due process and equal protection
Summary of this case from U.S. v. Escobar-RicoOpinion
No. 06-11262 Summary Calendar.
June 7, 2007.
Bret E. Helmer, U.S. Attorney's Office Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Peter Michael Fleury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, No. 4:06-CR-102-ALL.
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
Baldemar Navarro appeals his guilty-plea conviction of and sentence for illegal reentry into the United States following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that his sentence is unreasonable and, additionally, a denial of due process and equal protection because it is longer than similarly situated defendants who are sentenced in districts with "fast-track" sentencing programs. His contention that sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs rendered his sentence unreasonable is foreclosed by United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681, 682 (5th Cir. 2006), pet. for cert. filed (Nov. 13, 2006) (No. 06-7792). Moreover, he has not established under plain error review that restricting the fast-track program to only certain geographic locations results in due process and equal protection violations. See United States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 309, 166 L.Ed.2d 232 (2006).
Navarro challenges the constitutionality of § 1326(b)'s treatment of prior felony and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of the offense that must be found by a jury. That constitutional issue is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although Navarro contends that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court would overrule it in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2005). See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2873, 165 L.Ed.2d 910 (2006). Navarro properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.
Navarro contends that the district court violated FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(b)(1) by failing to inform him of the "aggravated felony" provision of 1326(b)(2). He concedes that this issue is also foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres.
AFFIRMED.