U.S. v. Monteiro

Full title: UNITED STATES, v. AMANDO MONTEIRO and BRIMA WURIE, Defendants

Court: United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

Date published: Jan 19, 2005

Criminal 03-10329-PBS (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 2005)

Opinion

Criminal 03-10329-PBS.

January 19, 2005

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PATTI SARIS, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Amando Monteiro and Brima Wurie move for reconsideration of the Court's severance order that they and four co-defendants be tried in April 2005 and that seven remaining co-defendants be tried at the end of January. Monteiro seeks to consolidate the two trials while Wurie wants to be tried alone. The motions for reconsideration are DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court starts with a presumption that "those who are indicted together should be tried together." United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted); see United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 75-76 (1st Cir. 2001) ("without a `serious risk that a joinder would compromise a specific trial right . . . or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence,' defendants charged in the same indictment should be tried together.") (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). However, "[t]he power to order separate trials `rests within the broad discretion of the District Court as an aspect of its inherent right and duty to manage its own calendar.'" United States v. Leichter, 160 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (quotingUnited States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1978)). The Court's "case management authority" is independent of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, Leichter, 160 F.3d at 36, which also gives a district judge "wide authority to sever defendants, counts, or both, upon a showing of prejudice." United States v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2004); see Houle, 237 F.3d at 75; see also United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990) ("whether to grant or deny a severance is a matter committed to the trial court's sound discretion").

This Court's severance order attempted a balance between the presumption of a single trial for all thirteen defendants, see Houle, 237 F.3d at 75-76, and a number of other concerns. A trial of thirteen defendants on a thirty-three count indictment, which includes a RICO count that alleges twenty-one racketeering acts, presents a serious potential for jury confusion. See DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 25 (suggesting severance of co-defendants in RICO case with six defendants, twenty-three counts, and thirty-eight racketeering acts to address district judge's concerns regarding jury confusion). But see id. at 24 (recognizing that "indictments of comparable or greater complexity are regularly tried"). Moreover, four defendants scheduled for the April trial are subject to murder allegations.See United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1125 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[S]everance is required under Zafiro where one defendant is being charged with a crime that, while somehow related to the other defendants or their overall criminal scheme, is significantly different from those of the other defendants."). The inclusion of Wurie in the April trial is appropriate because he, like Monteiro, is one of those four defendants.

Additionally, trial of thirteen defendants would be a practical impossibility due to the physical limitations of the courtroom.See Leichter, 160 F.3d 35. Beyond practicality, the number of defendants could create complicated Confrontation Clause choreography. See Oken v. Warden, MSP, 233 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2000) ("A defendant's right of confrontation . . . includes the right to confront one's accusers face-to-face."); see also United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 887 (1st Cir. 1984) ("absent reasons of security or . . . practicality, a defendant has the right to be seated at the same table as his attorney").

Defendant Monteiro's reliance on DeCologero in opposition to any severance in this case is misplaced. In DeCologero, the First Circuit reversed the district court's deferral of certain racketeering acts in a RICO case to a second trial, not the severance of co-defendants, because deferral undermined the government's ability to prove a RICO violation. 364 F.3d at 22-25. Moreover, the First Circuit suggested severance of co-defendants as a more "conventional" and appropriate alternative for managing the case. Id. at 25.

Monteiro has demonstrated no prejudice from the severance other than the likelihood that some defendants in the first trial may decide to cooperate in the second, and the probability that the Court will make some legal rulings in the first trial that will affect the second trial. Neither reason is persuasive.

Based on the factors outlined above I find that severance in this case as previously ordered is appropriate. See Leichter, 160 F.3d 35; see also United States v. Green, 324 F. Supp. 2d 311, 327-28 (D. Mass. 2004) (severing trials of five RICO defendants for reasons of "case management, juror comprehension, judicial economy, not to mention fairness").

V. ORDER

The motions for reconsideration by defendants Monteiro (Docket No. 399) and Wurie (Docket No. 404) are DENIED. The denial with respect to Wurie is without prejudice.