Summary
In Mathews, the defendant said during interrogation "I'm not going to say anything else" and "I'm not going to answer anything.
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Case No. 03-40074-01-RDR
October 23, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant is charged with unlawful transportation of a stolen motor vehicle and with a false representation of a social security number. Defendant has filed two motions to suppress. The parties have stipulated to the record to be reviewed by the court. Having made that review, the court is prepared to rule.
Motion to suppress statements
Defendant's motion to suppress statements as amended contends that defendant invoked her right to remain silent some time after being advised of her Miranda rights, but that the interrogation continued.
The government denies that there was a Miranda violation. The government contends that after defendant was given the Miranda warning, she answered questions and then only selectively refused to answer certain questions while answering others. Eventually, she fully invoked her right to refuse to answer all questions. The government contends that at that time the interrogation stopped.
It is well-established that during interrogation if a person indicates in any manner that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must stop. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). There is "no ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase [which] is essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination." Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955). An "objective inquiry" is employed to determine whether an accused has actually invoked his rights under Miranda. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (with reference to invoking the right to counsel);U.S. v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476 (11th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1181 (1997) (applying standard to the invocation of the right to remain silent). A suspect's refusal to answer selected questions "is not tantamount to the invocation, either equivocal or unequivocal, of the constitutional right to remain silent."Mikell, 102 F.3d at 477. A person under interrogation must make his wish to terminate interrogation clear to a reasonable police officer, otherwise questions may continue. Id. at 476-77.
In the instant case, the court has carefully reviewed the videotape of the interrogation of defendant. Defendant was asked questions regarding prior arrests, identity theft, false identification, cars stolen with the use of false identification, and defendant's true identity and background. Defendant received the Miranda warning before questions were asked. Her interrogator told her that if she did not want to answer a question she should just say so and the officer would move on to "something else."
At approximately 2:59 p.m., as registered on the tape, defendant was asked how she got "your names." She responded that she was not going to answer that question in two or three different ways before her interrogator said that he would move to a different subject at 3:00:29.
The subject shifted to a name defendant allegedly used in Las Vegas. Defendant was asked how she came upon that name. At 3:01:48, defendant answered, "I don't want to answer that either." At 3:03, defendant was asked about whether she used a Nevada identification number. Defendant replied, "I'm not going to answer that" and "I don't want to say anything when you have everything in black and white."
The subject then shifted to locating a car allegedly stolen from Little Apple Toyota in Manhattan, Kansas. Defendant was asked where she left the car. At 3:04:25, defendant said: "I don't want to answer that either" and "I don't want to answer that" and "I'm not going to say anything that's going to hurt me in the long run" and "I'm not going to say anything else." Defendant said that she knew the interrogator knew certain information and wanted her to tell the rest. But, "I can't do that," defendant said.
The interrogator then mentioned certain bank accounts and asked whether Jasmine's Interior Design existed somewhere. At 3:05:55, defendant said "I'm not going to answer that either." Then, at 3:06:20, defendant said "basically" that "I'm not going to answer anything." Nevertheless, she was asked to identify Jasmine Bingham. At 3:07, defendant said that she did not want to answer that either.
The interrogation continued for more than twenty minutes. At 3:15, defendant refused to answer a question about a tax return. But, her interrogator still asked another such question. At 3:28, defendant said, "I don't want to answer any more questions." Her interrogator said "OK" but still asked a few more questions. At 3:29, defendant said, "I'm not answering any more questions." But, the interrogator persisted a little longer.
The court believes it should have been clear to a reasonable police officer that defendant wished to invoke her right of silence to the selected topics her interrogator raised between 2:59 and 3:05, and that about that time, defendant invoked her right to terminate the interrogation when she said "I'm not going to say anything else" and "I'm not going to answer anything."
Accordingly, the court shall grant defendant's motion to suppress with regard to any statements made by defendant after 2:59 on the videotape.
Motion to suppress search of storage shed
This motion to suppress seeks to suppress evidence obtained after a search warrant was executed upon a storage shed in Manhattan, Kansas. The court bases our ruling in this case upon the briefs submitted by the parties.
The application for the warrant was made by Detective Ryan Runyon of the Riley County, Kansas Police Department. Detective Runyon stated that a gold 2003 Jaguar Sovereign passenger car was not returned to Hertz Rental Corporation in Las Vegas, Nevada when it was due on November 1, 2002. It was considered stolen. A global positioning system (GPS) device in the car indicated that the car was at the Amherst Self Storage address in Riley County. Hertz contacted a repossession company in Wichita to check on the location of the car. Two weeks prior to the issuance of the warrant, Troy Manzi of the repossession company went to the address of the storage shed. He lifted the door of the shed a little and saw that it contained "a Jaguar." The management of the storage company would not let him enter the shed without a warrant.
The warrant application further states: "On 12-03-02, Julie Wilkerson [of Hertz Corporation] left a phone message on my voice mail at the Riley County Police and stated that the tracking system sent out a signal at 0500 hrs, on 11-03-02, and the locate is still coming back to Amherst Self Storage." (Emphasis added). The application also stated that the person who rented the car, "Chinyavu Mvoyi", is the same name listed as renting the storage shed. This person gave an address in nearby Junction City.
Defendant asserts that the information supplied as a basis for the search warrant was stale and therefore that probable cause did not support the issuance of the warrant. The court disagrees for two reasons. First, it appears from the warrant application that the GPS device was still signaling from the storage shed as of the date of the application. Obviously, this would not be stale information.
Second, even without that information, the warrant application was not stale based on information that the Jaguar was seen in the storage shed both two weeks and one month prior to the application. See U.S. v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 554 (8th Cir. 1996) (report of stolen property in a trailer two weeks before search warrant proceeding is not stale); U.S. v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1314 (5th Cir. 1993) (passage of two months time after robbery does not make warrant application for home of robbery suspect stale); U.S. v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 397 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1984) (25-day delay between sighting of stolen truck and trailer and execution of search warrant did not render information stale); U.S. v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (10th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978) (11-month interval between observation of evidence in motor home and application for warrant does not render information stale — items could be expected to be kept in the motor home for extended period of time); U.S. v. Golay, 502 F.2d 182, 187 n. 10 (8th Cir. 1974) (observation of stolen diamonds in hotel room 16 days before issuance of warrant is not stale).
For the above-stated reasons, the court shall deny the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the storage shed.
In summary, the court shall grant the motion to suppress statements in accordance with this memorandum and order. The court shall deny the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the storage shed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.