Opinion
Criminal No. 04-38 (JRT/RLE).
May 20, 2004
Joseph T. Dixon, III, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
George E. Rapaich, LAW OFFICE, St. Paul, MN, for defendant Legrand
David George DeSmidt, RAPOPORT WYLDE DESMIDT, Minneapolis, MN, for defendant Aguilar.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL and DEFENDANT AGUILAR'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Defendants Kelley Joseph Legrand and Jose Benigno Aguilar were convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. Both defendants move for a new trial, and defendant Aguilar moves for a judgment of acquittal. Defendant Legrand argues that a new trial is required because the Court allowed evidence seized after an invalid "no knock" search warrant which lacked probable cause. He also argues a new trial is required because the Court allowed evidence relating to kidnapping, tattooing, extortion and assault. Legrand challenges the allowance of testimony that he was required to provide his address to a community corrections officer. Defendant Aguilar does not raise specific objections, but argues that judgment of acquittal is necessary because the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. For the reasons discussed below, the motions are denied.
ANALYSIS
I. New Trial
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits the Court to grant a new trial "if the interests of justice so require." The Court has "broad discretion in ruling upon a motion for new trial." United States v. Bennett, 956 F.2d 1476, 1481 (8th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the authority to grant new trials "should be used sparingly and with caution." United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
A. Fourth Amendment
Defendant Legrand moves for a new trial on several grounds, the first two of which are that the Court improperly admitted evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit has previously found this to be a proper ground upon which to bring a motion for a new trial. United States v. Robbins, 21 F.3d 297 (8th Cir. 1994). In particular, Legrand argues that the affidavit to the "no knock" search warrant contained material misrepresentations, because the two parties responsible for providing information regarding the presence of guns at the residence denied that they in fact saw guns there. Legrand further argues that the affidavit on its face lacked probable cause for issuing the warrant.
The Court addressed the issuance of the warrant in its Order adopting the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson. Rather than repeat that extensive discussion, the Court incorporates the discussion by reference. Legrand has presented no additional evidence that would persuade the Court that the affidavit for the warrant lacked probable cause. The Court reiterates its conclusion that the warrant contained sufficient probable cause, on its face, to support the issuance of the warrant. The information provided by the confidential reliable informant was reliable and corroborated and the independent investigation conducted by law enforcement officials also satisfied the requirements of probable cause.
Legrand's alternate argument, that the affidavit contained a material misrepresentation, was not addressed prior to trial, as the testimony potentially supporting this argument was adduced during the trial. A search warrant may be invalid if the issuing judge based her probable cause determination on an affidavit containing false statements made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); United States v. Underwood, 364 F.3d 956, 961-64 (8th Cir. 2004). To prevail on such a claim, defendant must show by a preponderance of evidence that: (1) the affidavit contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1995). Franks does not require that every fact in the warrant affidavit be true, only that the affiant believe or appropriately accept the information to be true. Franks, 438 U.S. at 154. Finally, even if the affidavit contains a material misrepresentation, the warrant will not be invalid if the contents of the affidavit, without considering the false statements, contains other sufficient matter from a reliable informant to support its issuance. Clapp, 46 F.3d at 799.
Defendant Legrand states that "[t]estimony at trial revealed that the two parties responsible for providing information regarding the presence of the guns at the residence denied they saw guns at the residence." Legrand does not indicate with any specificity to what evidence (or even to which witnesses, for that matter) he is referring.
Legrand's conclusory argument fails for at least two reasons. First, this is the incorrect inquiry: it does not matter whether the informants actually saw guns at the residence. The proper inquiry is whether the informants told the averring officer that guns were present at the residence, and whether that officer reasonably believed the statements. The Court found no testimony, and defendant has pointed out none, indicating that the informants denied telling the law enforcement officials that guns were present at the trailer. Next, the Court has reviewed the testimony presented at trial, and although witness Jason Hechtel testified that he did not "literally" see firearms, he also testified that he had information that led him to believe that there were firearms in the residence. The Court was unable to find additional testimony that would support defendant Legrand's argument.
B. Other issues
Legrand also argues that the admission of testimony relating to kidnapping, tattooing, extortion and assault warrants a new trial. Similarly, he argues that the admission of testimony that he was required to report his address to his community corrections officer warrants a new trial. Both of these issues were addressed by the Court prior to the trial in the context of ruling on defendant's motions in limine. No new argument is presented on either of these issues. The admission of testimony regarding kidnapping, tattooing, extortion and assault is consistent with Eighth Circuit case law, and its admission does not warrant a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 357 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant threatened and beat women to silence potential witnesses and further drug conspiracy). The admission of evidence that defendant Legrand was legally required to report his address to his probation officer was not unduly prejudicial and does not require a new trial.
II. JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
Although authorized by Rule 29, "[j]ury verdicts are not lightly overturned." United States v. Hood, 51 F.3d 128, 129 (8th Cir. 1995). Judgment of acquittal should be granted only "if there is no interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Gomez, 165 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Perkins, 94 F.3d 429, 436 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[t]he standard of review of an appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is very strict, and the verdict of the jury should not be overturned lightly.") (internal quotation omitted)
"The jury's verdict must be upheld if there is an interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Moore, 108 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 1997); Perkins, 94 F.3d at 436 ("`The jury's verdict must be upheld if there is an interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable-minded jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'") (quoting United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1992)).
Aguilar argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. A challenge of insufficiency of the evidence must be rejected if " any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). In making this determination, the Court "examine[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences." United States v. Francis, ___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 1058934 at *7 (8th Cir. May 12, 2004) (citing United States v. Cruz, 285 F.3d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 2002)). See also United States v. Mansker, 240 F. Supp.2d 902, 913 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (discussing standard applied to motion for judgment of acquittal).
"To convict a defendant of a conspiracy charge, the government must show: `(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) [the defendant] knew of the conspiracy; and (3) he knowingly became a part of the conspiracy. To establish the existence of a conspiracy the government needed to prove that there was an agreement among individuals to achieve an illegal purpose.'" Francis, 2004 WL 1058934 at *7 (quoting United States v. Crossland, 301 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted in original)). Direct evidence is not required, and "`the government may prove the agreement wholly by circumstantial evidence or by inference from the actions of the parties.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1433 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted in original)). Finally, the conspiracy agreement "need not be express or formal," and "[t]he government must show no more than a tacit understanding among the participants." Id. To convict a defendant of possession of methamphetamine, the prosecution must establish that the defendant was in possession of methamphetamine; that the defendant knew that he was in possession of methamphetamine; and that the defendant intended to distribute some or all of the methamphetamine to another person. 21 U.S.C. § 841; United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1995) (articulating essential elements government must prove to establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
There is no basis on which to grant defendant Aguilar's motion for a judgment of acquittal. The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find each element of the government's case beyond a reasonable doubt.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. Defendant Legrand's motion for a new trial [Docket No. 93] is DENIED.
2. Defendant Aguilar's motion for a judgment of acquittal [Docket No. 94] is DENIED.
3. Defendant Aguilar's motion for a new trial [Docket No. 95] is DENIED.