Opinion
Cause No. IP 00-97-CR H/F; IP 01-774-C-H/F
October 26, 2001
ENTRY DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO § 2255 AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
This action is before the court on defendant Foster Jones, Jr.'s motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, on the United States' response to such motion, and on Jones' reply. For the reasons explained below, Jones' motion for relief must be denied and this action dismissed.
I. Background
Jones pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court accepted his guilty plea and imposed sentence. Jones took no direct appeal from this disposition.
II. Discussion
Jones asserts that his 1984 conviction in an Indiana state court for robbery is not a qualifying conviction for 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) purposes because Indiana law had restored his civil rights. He argues that his conviction is therefore infirm and that his attorney was ineffective for not spotting this infirmity.
Federal law prohibits anyone who has been convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The definition portion of the legislation provides an exception: "Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
Jones attempts to persuade the court that he falls within this exception because Indiana law restored his right to vote, his right to serve on a jury, and his right to hold public office. Jones has not shown, however, that Indiana restored his right to possess firearms. In fact, Indiana law is to the contrary. At all relevant times, Indiana law has prohibited convicted felons from carrying handguns. Ind. Code § 35-47-2-3(g) (2001). (The statutory section has been amended frequently in other respects, but the prohibition on felons extends back many years.)
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected arguments similar to Jones' argument in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Maher, 145 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55, 57 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. McKinley, 23 F.3d 181, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Supreme Court's decision in Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998), does not help Jones. The Court held in Caron that whether a state has restored a convicted felon's civil rights with or without restrictions on possession of firearms must be decided on an all-or-nothing basis. If state law prohibits a felon, because of his felony conviction, from possessing any type of firearm, the so-called "unless clause" applies, and the conviction counts for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Caron, 524 U.S. at 316 ("Permission to possess one gun cannot mean permission to possess all."). In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's approach to the problem in Maher, Lee, and McKinley.
Caron presented questions under Massachusetts law, which allowed the convicted felon to possess rifles and shotguns, and to possess handguns in his home or business, but prohibited him from possessing a handgun outside his home or business. 524 U.S. at 313. Indiana law is generally similar. See United States v. Maher, 145 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court held in Caron that, because Massachusetts law still barred the defendant from possessing handguns outside his home or business, the restoration of his civil rights still included a restriction on his possession of firearms, and the conviction still qualified as a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The same reasoning applies here. The restoration of Jones' civil rights did not include full restoration of his rights regarding firearms. His robbery conviction still stands as a conviction for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and his federal guilty plea and conviction are valid. His attorney was not ineffective for failing to raise this argument.
III. Conclusion
The purpose of § 922(g) is to prevent situations in which persons, who have by their criminal history demonstrated their inability to conform their conduct to the law, have possession and control over dangerous weapons. See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (interpreting a prior version of this section). There was no error, legal or otherwise, which entitles Jones to be exempted from this law or to prevail in this action.
On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, Jones' motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is denied. This action must be dismissed with prejudice.
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
So ordered.
JUDGMENT
The court, having this day made its Entry, IT IS THEREFORE ADJUDGED that the defendant take nothing by his motion to vacate conviction by a person in federal custody pursuant to § 2255, and the civil action assigned to such motion is dismissed with prejudice.