Opinion
Civ. No. 01-0095-AH-L, Crim. No. 94-00165-AH
February 28, 2001
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside, Vacate or Correct Sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed on February 1, 2001 (Doc. 60). Defendant's sentence following his guilty conviction in this Court was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on December 9, 1996. Though the statute of limitations has long since expired with respect to Defendant's ability to bring a motion under section 2255, he argues that the Court may disregard this statutory bar on "the grounds that [Defendant's sentence] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States." Defendant cites the Supreme Court's recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), apparently for the proposition that the motion is "timely filed in that it was filed within one year from the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by [Apprendi]." Defendant fails to provide any case law, however, supporting his assertion that Apprendi has ever been held to retroactively apply to defeat the statutory limitations scheme applicable in cases such as the one now present before the Court. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is time-barred and is therefore due to be, and hereby is, DENIED.
DISCUSSION
I. Statute of Limitations under § 2255.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides, with regard to the matters presently at issue:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) The date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 2000) (emphasis supplied).
As best as can be determined, Defendant argues Apprendi retroactively holds that any prior sentence (which in hindsight can be shown to have deviated from a rule which had not yet been announced by the Supreme Court) must be set aside, so long as the Defendant can demonstrate that he fits within the holding of Apprendi. As Defendant clearly misunderstands the holding of Apprendi, a short discussion of the holding of that case is in order.
II. The Rule in Apprendi
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court reexamined its prior decisions regarding the role of sentencing factors and enhancement triggers applicable to criminal defendants. After reviewing the historical background of common-law criminal indictment and sentencing procedure, the Court, writing through Justice Stevens, confirmed as a rule the principle first expressed in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). In Jones, the Court addressed the question of whether the penalty enhancement section of a multi-part federal statute (the federal car-jacking statute) defined a separate crime or was merely a penalty provision. Id. The sentencing judge viewed the provision in question as a sentencing factor and accordingly, he enhanced defendant's sentence using facts that had not been submitted to the jury for a determination. On certiorari review, the Court reversed and remanded, concluding that each portion of the statute, including the provision setting forth the sentencing enhancement factor, defined a separate offense. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252, 119 S.Ct. at 1215:
In Apprendi, the defendant pled guilty to a New Jersey state charge of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. See Apprendi, 120 5. CT. at 2352. Under New Jersey law, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose carried a term of imprisonment between five and ten years. A separate statute, described by the New Jersey courts as a hate-crime statute, provided for an extended term of imprisonment if the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." Id. at 2351 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000)). The hate-crime statute authorized an increased term of imprisonment of 10 to 20 years.
At sentencing, the trial judge determined that the hate-crime enhancement applied, and sentenced Apprendi to 12 years imprisonment. Apprendi filed a direct appeal attacking the enhancement of his sentence under the hate-crime statute, contending that the hate-crime issue had not been submitted to the jury and, therefore, the court erred in applying the enhancement. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the enhancement under the hate-crime statute increased Apprendi's maximum statutory penalty, the issue should have been submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Id. at 2362-63. Essentially, the Court reiterated what it claimed had already been established in Jones, namely that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.
In a subsequent appellate decision, United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[i]n Apprendi, the Supreme Court made it clear that the principle discussed in Jones is a rule of constitutional law." Id. at 931. Moreover, as the Aguayo-Delgado decision confirms, the Court's ruling in Apprendi means that in any drug case where the defendant is subject to penalties in excess of those prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C), the government must charge drug quantity and prove that fact to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 932; see also Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366 n. 21 (signaling the relevance of the new rule to drug cases by referring to the Court's recent commentary on sentencing beyond the statutory maximum in drug conspiracy cases).
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Rogers, 2000 WL 1451907 (11th Cir. 2000), has confirmed the principle expressed in Aguayo-Delgado. In Rogers, the defendant appealed his sentence of 360 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release pursuant to a drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841. The court focused on whether Rogers was properly sentenced in view of the fact that his sentence was arrived at, in part, by a sentencing judge's determination of a drug quantity attributable to Rogers, which not charged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. at *3. The court reasoned:
Applying Apprendi's constitutional principle to section 841 cases, it is clear that the principle is violated if a defendant is sentenced to a greater sentence than the statutory maximum based upon the quantity of drugs, if such quantity is determined by the sentencing judge rather than the trial jury. The statutory maximum must be determined by assessing the statute without regard to quantity . . . In short, we hold today that drug quantity in section 841(b)(I)(A) and section 841(b)(1)(B) cases must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in light of Apprendi.Rogers, 2000 WL 1451907 at *9.
III. Defendant's Petition is Time-Barred.
Unlike the defendant in Rogers, a case in which the sentence was being reviewed on direct appeal, Defendant here presents a section 2255 petition that has been filed more than three years out of time. While Apprendi certainly clarified the constitutional requirements of criminal indictments with respect to sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. It is for this reason that the Court is prevented from reaching the merits of Defendant's Motion:
We agree with the First Circuit that the Supreme Court has not declared Apprendi to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. For a new rule to be retroactive, the Supreme Court must make it retroactive to cases on collateral review. See In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying § 2244(b)(2)(A) in the context of an application to file a second or successive § 2254 petition). It is not enough that the new rule is or will be applied retroactively by the Eleventh Circuit or that it satisfies the criteria for retroactive application set forth by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See Hill, 113 F.3d at 184. To date, the Supreme Court has not declared that Apprendi be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that application of a new rule by the Supreme Court in a case on collateral review is sufficient to make that new rule apply retroactively, that has not occurred here. Apprendi was decided in the context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court has not applied it in a case on collateral review.In Re Joshua, 224 F.3d at 1283 (referring to Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Additionally, though not directly relevant as Defendant has not previously filed pursuant to section 2255, every other circuit to have addressed the issue has held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review for purposes of certifying a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief. See In re Tatum, 233 F.3d 857 (5th Cir. 2000); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 2000); Rodgers v. United States, 229 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000); Talbott v. State of Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 868-70 (7th Cir. 2000).
Defendant has produced no legal authority authorizing this Court to disregard the statue of limitations applicable to his untimely Motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Consequently, Defendant's time-barred Motion is DENIED.