Summary
holding that continued supervision of the defendant was "necessary to ensure that he makes as much satisfaction of his debts as is possible" and that early termination "would be an affront to the victims"
Summary of this case from United States v. LinkerOpinion
Case No. 95-20031-01-JWL.
April 2, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant Murray F. Hardesty, a former attorney, stole over $2.1 million from his clients' trust funds while acting as a trustee. Before the late Senior District Judge Earl E. O'Connor, Mr. Hardesty pleaded guilty to embezzlement, mail fraud, and money laundering and was sentenced to restitution in the amount of $1,280,190.80 and seventy months incarceration to be followed by three years supervised release. Defendant commenced his period of supervised release on January 2, 2001. The case is now before the court on defendant's pro se request for early termination of supervised release and termination of restitution order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (doc. #93). The government has objected to defendant's motion, contending that the facts of this case do not warrant early termination of supervised release or the restitution order.
The district court has authority to terminate a period of supervised release after one year if "warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In making its determination, the court must consider several factors, including the nature and circumstances of the original offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for deterrence, the need for protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant, the need for rehabilitative or corrective training, the Guideline factors and range for the original sentence, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission pertaining to supervised release, and sentencing disparities from defendants with similar records guilty of similar offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 3583(e).
In his motion, defendant suggests that termination of supervised release is warranted because he has "exemplified himself socially and economically," because he is "fully rehabilitated," and because he has complied in all respects with post-release requirements of supervised release. In essence, defendant contends that continued supervised release "will serve no meaningful and useful purpose." With respect to the restitution order, defendant maintains that he has no ability to continue making payments.
Defendant also suggests that his motion should be granted because his sentence was not calculated correctly, that he served thirteen months more than he should have, and that the court should now "award" him by terminating his supervised release. Defendant's arguments concerning his sentence have been previously rejected by this court and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
Defendant's motion is denied. Defendant has made monthly, albeit modest, restitution payments and the record before the court reflects that he has sufficient financial means to continue to do so. Supervision of defendant is necessary to ensure that he makes as much satisfaction of his debts as is possible. In short, the court agrees with the government that termination of defendant's supervised release or the restitution order would be an affront to the victims of defendant's illegal conduct.
In light of the foregoing, the court finds that neither early termination of defendant's supervised release nor termination of the restitution order is warranted by the conduct of the defendant or the interest of justice. The motion is therefore denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant's motion for early termination of supervised release and termination of restitution order (doc. #93) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.