Opinion
Criminal Action No. 98-165-C.
July 12, 2004
RULING
This matter is before the court on the motions of Edwin Edwards and Stephen Edwards to unseal letter of attorney for Juror Number 68 and for leave of court to interview Juror Number 68 and his attorney.
Record document numbers 1972 and 1981.
Petitioners were found guilty of extortion, money laundering, interstate travel in aid of racketeering and RICO violations in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Petitioners were sentenced to serve a 120 month and an 84 month term of imprisonment, respectively, in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons and upon release from imprisonment, the petitioners each shall serve a three year term of supervised release. Judgment was imposed on January 12, 2001. Petitioners' convictions were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Edwin Edwards, et al 303 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1192, 123 S.Ct. 1272, 154 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2003).
18 U.S.C. § 1951, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d).
In conjunction with separate motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, the petitioners filed a motion to have a letter prepared by an attorney for Juror Number 68 unsealed and for leave of court to interview Juror Number 68 and his attorney. In their section 2255 motions, the petitioners argued that each was denied due process and a fair trial by the jurors' exposure to prejudicial extraneous material and by juror misconduct reflecting juror bias.
Factual Background
Jury deliberations commenced on April 24, 2000. On May 2, 2000, the court conducted an investigation into possible juror misconduct, including Juror Number 68's allegations of juror intimidation during deliberations. Each juror was questioned by the court with counsel for the government and the defendants present. On May 4, 2000, Juror Number 68 was removed for cause. Following his removal, and purportedly in response to assertions made by the government in its opposition to the defendants' motion for a judgment of acquittal or new trial, Juror Number 68 obtained legal representation. In a letter dated October 2, 2000, counsel for Juror Number 68 advised the court that Juror Number 68 desired to bring to the Court's attention what Juror Number 68 believed to be serious misconduct by jurors during deliberations.
Record document 1896, transcript pgs. 103-278.
The district court's finding that Juror 68 should be dismissed for just cause because he displayed a lack of candor and was unable to follow instructions was clearly supported. United States v. Edwin Edwards, et al 303 F.3d 606, 631-32 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1192, 123 S.Ct. 1272, 154 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2003).
The October 2, 2000 letter was placed under seal in a miscellaneous record. Sealed v. Sealed, 00-38-B. On October 23, 2000, the defendants' motion for disclosure of information related to Juror Number 68 was filed in Miscellaneous Action 00-38-B. On October 30, 2000, the court ordered copies of the October 2, 2000 letter be released under seal to counsel for the government and the defendants.
On November 8, 2000, the defendants filed a motion for inquiry involving Juror Number 64, the jury foreman. Defendants' brief in support of the motion for inquiry and the government's opposition to the defendants' motion were filed under seal.
Record document number 1624.
See record document numbers 1625 and 1627, respectively.
On December 6, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to place the October 2, 2000 letter into the record and to conduct an inquiry into allegations raised in that letter. The motion and supporting memorandum were filed under seal.
Record document numbers 1663 and 1664.
On December 6, 2000, a hearing was held in chambers with counsel present on the investigation of the alleged misconduct of Juror Number 64 and on the allegations made in the defendants' December 6 motion. Insofar as the defendants' December 6 motion sought to have the October 2, 2000 letter filed into the record, the motion was denied.
Record document number 1696, transcript pgs. 159-209.
Record document number 1696, transcript p. 206.
On December 7, 2000, the hearing on the investigation of alleged juror misconduct continued. Witnesses were called to testify regarding alleged juror misconduct, including Juror Number 64. The court found no factual or legal basis to find Juror Number 64 engaged in improper conduct. Additionally, the court determined that no further investigation was required on the conduct of the jury or any particular juror.
Record document number 1697, transcript pgs. 150-214, 249-261.
Record document number 1697, transcript p. 260.
Record document number 1697, transcript p. 261.
On January 24, 2001, approximately two weeks after judgment was entered, Juror Number 68 was interviewed by the press.
Record document numbers 1970 and 1979, defendants' exhibit 17 in support of motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, transcript of Juror Number 68 interview.
On December 8, 2003, counsel for Juror Number 68 sent another letter to counsel for the defendants outlining alleged juror misconduct prior to and during deliberations.
Petitioners have not filed any affidavits nor alleged any specific facts which would reasonably lead to the conclusion that any of the jurors were actually exposed to prejudicial extraneous material or outside influence. Rather, based on Juror Number 68's unsworn statements made in the January 24, 2001 press interview and the contents of the two unsworn letters prepared by Juror Number 68's counsel, petitioners seek leave of court to interview Juror Number 68 and his attorney.
Applicable Law
A jury should not be exposed to post-verdict fishing expeditions into their mental processes with the hope that something will turn up. United States v. Blackburn, 446 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1017, 92 S.Ct. 679, 30 L.Ed.2d 665 (1972).
Uniform Local Rule 47.5M C.3. prohibits a juror who consents to be interviewed from disclosing any information for the purpose of obtaining evidence of improprieties in the jury's deliberation.
Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the following:
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony regarding the following four topics: (1) the method or arguments of the jury's deliberations, (2) the effect of any particular thing upon an outcome in the deliberations, (3) the mindset or emotions of any juror during deliberations, and (4) the testifying juror's own mental process during the deliberations. United States v. Ortiz, 942 F.2d 903, 913 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 2966, 119 L.Ed.2d 587 (1992).
Requests to impeach jury verdicts by post-trial contact with jurors are disfavored. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). Inquiries that seek to probe the mental process of jurors . . . are impermissible. Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1980). However, a juror may impeach the jury's verdict with evidence that the verdict was influenced by outside sources. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) specifically prohibits a juror from testifying on any matter that occurred during the jury's deliberations unless it concerns improper extraneous information or outside influence. United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1128, 118 S.Ct. 1817, 140 L.Ed.2d 954 (1998). A convicted defendant is not entitled to probe into the function of the jury unless he makes a substantial showing that some kind of outside influence may have tainted the jury's deliberations. United States v. Cauble, 532 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Texas 1982), aff'd 757 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994, 106 S.Ct. 406, 88 L.Ed.2d 357 (1985). Pressure from other jurors is not considered an "outside influence," and an affidavit concerning such pressure is inadmissible. United States v. Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 241-242 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Vincent, 648 F.2d 1046, 1049-50 (5th Cir. 1981).
The judge's decision whether to interrogate the jury about juror misconduct is within the court's sound discretion, especially when the alleged prejudice results from statements by the jurors themselves, and not from media publicity or other outside influences. Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 1605, 63 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980). In cases where the alleged jury misconduct involves the possibility of juror exposure to prejudicial publicity during the trial, the failure to hold a hearing may constitute an abuse of discretion and reversible error. United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1978).
In Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 150 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth Circuit reiterated its requirement that a necessary showing of "specific instances of misconduct" be made prior to allowing juror interrogation. The Fifth Circuit further explained that:
"the very cogent reasons" for requiring parties to make a showing of likely misconduct before allowing such an inquiry: protecting the jury from post-verdict misconduct and the courts from time consuming and futile proceedings; reducing the "chances and temptations" from tampering with the jury; and increasing the certainty of civil verdicts. . . . We continue to decline to "denigrate jury trials by afterwards ransacking the jurors in search of some ground . . . for a new trial" unless some preliminary showing is made. Id. quoting Wilkerson v. Amco Corp., 703 F.2d 184, 185-186 (5th Cir. 1983).
The proper time to discover juror prejudice is when the jury is being selected and peremptory challenges are available to the attorneys. United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed.2d 471 (1980). A jury's verdict may not be disturbed if it is later learned that personal prejudices were not put aside during deliberations. Id.
In instances where jurors may have made premature expressions as to guilt, the district court must determine whether the juror actually made the statements in question. United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017, 113 S.Ct. 1812, 123 L.Ed.2d 444 (1993). This necessarily requires the court to judge the credibility of the person who allegedly overheard the statement (in this case Juror Number 68). Id. A trial court is entitled to credit a juror's denial of bias. United States v. Robbins, 500 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1974).
Application of the Law to the Facts
Petitioners argued three specific instances of exposure to prejudicial extraneous material or outside influence. In the first instance, the petitioners argued that Juror Number 68 was threatened by a fellow juror regarding the consequences of a hung jury. In the second instance, the petitioners argued that, according to Juror Number 68, a number of jurors indicated that they had watched television, read newspapers, and spoken to other people about the case. In the third instance, the petitioners argued that, according to Juror Number 68, one juror's spouse attended the proceedings and reported on what happened in the courtroom while the jurors were excused to the jury room. The petitioners have failed to come forth with any evidence that any juror was influenced by extraneous prejudicial information.
A review of the record in this matter showed the following. Juror Number 68 sent a note to the district judge on April 27, 2000, advising that he felt "intimidated." An investigation was conducted into juror misconduct, including Juror Number 68's allegations regarding juror intimidation during deliberations. Specifically, the court addressed whether any juror was subjected to threats, including Juror Number 68's allegations that the jury foreman had intimidated other jurors with comments that the jury might go to jail if they did not render a unanimous verdict. Each juror was interrogated and denied being intimidated by the jury foreman. The court found there was no juror misconduct. No further investigation into this allegation is warranted.
Record document number 1316.
In the interview conducted on January 24, 2001, Juror Number 68 stated that jurors were in fact watching television and reading newspapers. Specifically, Juror Number 68 stated the following:
"When certain witnesses would testify, they would come back the next day and say they saw so-and-so. I can't remember exactly the instances they said and I didn't pay attention to those instances because I didn't know that in the future they were going to nit-pick any and every little thing that I did."
Defendants' exhibit 17 in support of motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, interview transcript, p. 5.
Juror Number 68 conceded during the interview that he could not recount any specific instance where a particular juror admitted to having read newspapers or watched television. Under these circumstances, any specific recollection now, nearly four years after Juror Number 68 was removed from the jury, would be suspect and unreliable.
In the interview, Juror Number 68 also stated that one juror spoke to a neighbor about the case. Specifically, Juror Number 68 stated the following:
"There was one particular juror, the same juror that questioned the alternates, who said that they had a friend they would walk with at home in the evenings. Her friend would call her by name and say, "I know you're not supposed to talk about the trial but you know they're guilty." And the juror responded by saying `I know.'"
Defendants' exhibit 17 in support of motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, interview transcript, p. 5.
Finally, in the interview, Juror Number 68 stated that a juror's spouse attended the proceedings one day. Juror Number 68 stated the following:
"One juror had his spouse come into the courtroom one day to observe what was going on. At times the jury would be dismissed out the courtroom, judge's orders, you know. We didn't know what was going on during that period of time. He dismissed us for a few moments. Maybe an argument was going on or something. I don't know. Anyway, his spouse sat out there and she was going to let him know what went on while we were out of the jury room. And the next day he came back and told us that there was nothing that went on. I think the judge and the attorneys went into his chambers or something. They went out of the courtroom. There was nothing that went on that day. That's what she told him."
Defendants' exhibit 17 in support of motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, interview transcript, p. 2.
Neither of these allegations is sufficient to establish a preliminary showing of extraneous prejudicial information. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that outside influences were brought to bear on the jury.
Consideration of the petitioners' remaining allegations regarding comments by jurors reflecting juror bias are prohibited by Rule 606(b).
Considering the record in this matter, including the court's prior investigations into juror misconduct, the record transcripts which have been reviewed in conjunction with the issuance of the ruling on this motion, the source of information, i.e., a juror removed for cause because of his lack of candor and who appears to have divulged information regarding jury deliberations in apparent contravention of this court's orders, and the argument of the parties, the petitioners' motion to unseal the October 2, 2000 letter and to interview Juror Number 68 and his attorney is denied.