Opinion
Criminal Action No. 01-8
April 25, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Government's Motion to Introduce 404(b) Evidence. For the following reasons, the Government's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
On January 11, 2001, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana charged defendant Kevin Huff with one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base ("crack") and cocaine hydrochloride, one count of possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine, and one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride. Huff has pled not guilty to all charges.
At trial of this matter, the Government seeks to introduce the following evidence in its case-in-chief against Huff pursuant to Rule 404(b):
(1) On October 17, 1991, Huff pled guilty to simple possession of crack cocaine and received a two year suspended sentence with two years of active probation.
(2) On February 11, 1994, officers of the Slidell Police Department detained Huff and several other individuals for constructive possession of crack cocaine. Following his detention but before he was transported to jail, Huff escaped. A warrant for his arrest was issued and eventually executed, but the charges were refused by the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney.
(3) On May 18, 1999, New Orleans Police Department officers arrested Huff for possession of crack cocaine. Huff is awaiting trial on this matter in Louisiana state court.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 404(b) provides that
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
The Fifth Circuit applies a two-pronged test to determine the admissibility of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). "First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the evidence must have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice." United States v. Misher, 99 F.3d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
In the instant case, the Government argues that evidence of Huff's prior arrests and conviction are relevant to prove his knowledge of, and intent to participate in, the drug conspiracy alleged in the instant case. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes is admissible to show proof of knowledge or intent. Huff submits that the only similarity between his prior acts and the instant allegations are that they all involve cocaine, and he argues that his previous acts are irrelevant to any issue except the impermissible issue of his character.
First, the Court finds that Huff's 1991 conviction for simple possession of crack cocaine is relevant to the issue of Huff's intent in the instant case, in which Huff is charged with possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. In United States v. Misher, the Fifth Circuit held that a "defendant places his intent in issue when he has pled not guilty in a drug conspiracy case and, therefore, evidence of past drug transactions can be used to establish criminal intent." Misher, 99 F.3d at 670. However, despite the relevance of Huff's previous conviction, the Court finds that its temporal remoteness destroys much of its probative value. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 915 (stating that the "judge should also consider how much time separates the extrinsic and charged offenses: temporal remoteness depreciates the probity of the extrinsic offense"). Accordingly, the Government's motion to offer evidence of Huff's prior conviction in its case-in-chief is DENIED.
Like the 1991 drug conviction, the Court also finds that Huff's 1994 arrest is relevant to his intent in the case at bar. However, the 1994 arrest does not pass muster under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In light of the fact that the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney refused the charges, the Court finds that the relevance and probative value of the 1994 arrest is outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice. Accordingly, the Government's motion to introduce evidence of Huff's 1994 arrest is DENIED.
Finally, the Court finds that Huff's 1999 arrest for possession of crack cocaine is highly relevant to the instant case. In 1999 Huff was arrested for having crack cocaine on his person while he was in a car. In the instant case, police officers found crack cocaine in a car owned by Huff. By pleading not guilty, Huff has raised the issue of whether he knew the cocaine was in his car. See Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911 (noting that "it is settled in this Circuit that Rule 404(b) permits the admission of other crime evidence when a defendant places his intent at issue in a drug conspiracy case by pleading not guilty"). In light of the fact that Huff is presently awaiting trial on his 1999 arrest, the Court finds that this evidence is highly relevant to the instant case and that its relevance is not outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice.See United States v. Leahy, 82 F.3d 624, 637 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that "while some danger of prejudice is always present, exclusion of extrinsic evidence based on its prejudicial effect should occur only sparingly" (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Wilwright, 56 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence of defendant's participation in prior drug sales was not unduly prejudicial); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1562 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has "frequently held in drug offense cases that evidence of a defendant's extrinsic drug offenses is admissible"). Because the Court finds that the relevance and probative value of Huff's 1999 arrest is not outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice, the Government's motion to introduce evidence of Huff's 1999 arrest is GRANTED.